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Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description
Update the AMD memory encryption document describing the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Thomas Gleixner
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
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Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) are
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features found on AMD processors.
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SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
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SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
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the standard x86 page tables. A page that is marked encrypted will be
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the standard x86 page tables. A page that is marked encrypted will be
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@@ -6,24 +7,38 @@ automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
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DRAM. SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
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DRAM. SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
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attacks on the system.
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attacks on the system.
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SEV enables running encrypted virtual machines (VMs) in which the code and data
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of the guest VM are secured so that a decrypted version is available only
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within the VM itself. SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared
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memory. Private memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared
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memory may be encrypted with hypervisor key. When SME is enabled, the hypervisor
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key is the same key which is used in SME.
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A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
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A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
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below on how to determine its position). The encryption bit can also be
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below on how to determine its position). The encryption bit can also be
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specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
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specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
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successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
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successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
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bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
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bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
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page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
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page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
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encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encyrpted.
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encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encrypted.
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Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
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Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
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achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
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achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
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so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
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so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
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for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
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for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
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encrypted.
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encrypted.
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Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
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When SEV is enabled, instruction pages and guest page tables are always treated
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function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
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as private. All the DMA operations inside the guest must be performed on shared
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memory. Since the memory encryption bit is controlled by the guest OS when it
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is operating in 64-bit or 32-bit PAE mode, in all other modes the SEV hardware
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forces the memory encryption bit to 1.
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Support for SME and SEV can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The
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CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
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0x8000001f[eax]:
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0x8000001f[eax]:
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Bit[0] indicates support for SME
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Bit[0] indicates support for SME
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Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
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0x8000001f[ebx]:
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0x8000001f[ebx]:
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Bits[5:0] pagetable bit number used to activate memory
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Bits[5:0] pagetable bit number used to activate memory
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encryption
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encryption
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@@ -39,6 +54,13 @@ determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
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Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
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Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
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1 = memory encryption features are enabled
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1 = memory encryption features are enabled
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If SEV is supported, MSR 0xc0010131 (MSR_AMD64_SEV) can be used to determine if
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SEV is active:
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0xc0010131:
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Bit[0] 0 = memory encryption is not active
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1 = memory encryption is active
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Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
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Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
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in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
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in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
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CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
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CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
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