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fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
commit 613cc2b6f2 upstream.
If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it
then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are
"exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process
being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file
descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access
/proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link,
though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors
will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not
been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be
reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a
PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem
can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect
against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may
reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
Cc: dev@opencontainers.org
Reported-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
21245b8635
commit
c1df5a6371
@@ -1266,6 +1266,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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flush_thread();
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current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
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/*
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* We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
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* dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
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* trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
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* undergoing exec(2).
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*/
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do_close_on_exec(current->files);
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return 0;
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out:
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@@ -1328,7 +1335,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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group */
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current->self_exec_id++;
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flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
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do_close_on_exec(current->files);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
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