[ Upstream commit 43be4388e9 ]
A warning was hit when running xfstests/generic/068 in a Hyper-V guest:
[...] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[...] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
[...] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1350 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5280 check_flags.part.0+0x165/0x170
[...] ...
[...] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[...] RIP: 0010:check_flags.part.0+0x165/0x170
[...] ...
[...] Call Trace:
[...] lock_is_held_type+0x72/0x150
[...] ? lock_acquire+0x16e/0x4a0
[...] rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
[...] __send_ipi_one+0x14d/0x1b0
[...] hv_send_ipi+0x12/0x30
[...] __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath+0xd1/0x110
[...] __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath+0x11/0x20
[...] .slowpath+0x9/0xe
[...] lockdep_unregister_key+0x128/0x180
[...] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0xbb/0xf0
[...] process_one_work+0x227/0x5c0
[...] worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
[...] ? process_one_work+0x5c0/0x5c0
[...] kthread+0x153/0x170
[...] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
[...] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The cause of the problem is we have call chain lockdep_unregister_key()
-> <irq disabled by raw_local_irq_save()> lockdep_unlock() ->
arch_spin_unlock() -> __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath() -> pv_kick() ->
__send_ipi_one() -> trace_hyperv_send_ipi_one().
Although this particular warning is triggered because Hyper-V has a
trace point in ipi sending, but in general arch_spin_unlock() may call
another function having a trace point in it, so put the arch_spin_lock()
and arch_spin_unlock() after lock_recursion protection to fix this
problem and avoid similiar problems.
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113110512.1056501-1-boqun.feng@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ec618b84f6 ]
schedule() ttwu()
deactivate_task(); if (p->on_rq && ...) // false
atomic_dec(&task_rq(p)->nr_iowait);
if (prev->in_iowait)
atomic_inc(&rq->nr_iowait);
Allows nr_iowait to be decremented before it gets incremented,
resulting in more dodgy IO-wait numbers than usual.
Note that because we can now do ttwu_queue_wakelist() before
p->on_cpu==0, we lose the natural ordering and have to further delay
the decrement.
Fixes: c6e7bd7afa ("sched/core: Optimize ttwu() spinning on p->on_cpu")
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117093829.GD3121429@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6fa6d28051 ]
do_strncpy_from_user() may copy some extra bytes after the NUL
terminator into the destination buffer. This usually does not matter for
normal string operations. However, when BPF programs key BPF maps with
strings, this matters a lot.
A BPF program may read strings from user memory by calling the
bpf_probe_read_user_str() helper which eventually calls
do_strncpy_from_user(). The program can then key a map with the
destination buffer. BPF map keys are fixed-width and string-agnostic,
meaning that map keys are treated as a set of bytes.
The issue is when do_strncpy_from_user() overcopies bytes after the NUL
terminator, it can result in seemingly identical strings occupying
multiple slots in a BPF map. This behavior is subtle and totally
unexpected by the user.
This commit masks out the bytes following the NUL while preserving
long-sized stride in the fast path.
Fixes: 6ae08ae3de ("bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/21efc982b3e9f2f7b0379eed642294caaa0c27a7.1605642949.git.dxu@dxuuu.xyz
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c583bcb8f5 ]
The try_invoke_on_locked_down_task() function requires that
interrupts be enabled, but it is called with interrupts disabled from
rcu_print_task_stall(), resulting in an "IRQs not enabled as expected"
diagnostic. This commit therefore updates rcu_print_task_stall()
to accumulate a list of the first few tasks while holding the current
leaf rcu_node structure's ->lock, then releases that lock and only then
uses try_invoke_on_locked_down_task() to attempt to obtain per-task
detailed information. Of course, as soon as ->lock is released, the
task might exit, so the get_task_struct() function is used to prevent
the task structure from going away in the meantime.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000903d5805ab908fc4@google.com/
Fixes: 5bef8da66a ("rcu: Add per-task state to RCU CPU stall warnings")
Reported-by: syzbot+cb3b69ae80afd6535b0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+f04854e1c5c9e913cc27@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 04e613ded8 ]
Commit ce3d31ad3c ("arm64/smp: Move rcu_cpu_starting() earlier") ensured
that RCU is informed early about incoming CPUs that might end up calling
into printk() before they are online. However, if such a CPU fails the
early CPU feature compatibility checks in check_local_cpu_capabilities(),
then it will be powered off or parked without informing RCU, leading to
an endless stream of stalls:
| rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
| rcu: 2-O...: (0 ticks this GP) idle=002/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=0/0 fqs=2593
| (detected by 0, t=5252 jiffies, g=9317, q=136)
| Task dump for CPU 2:
| task:swapper/2 state:R running task stack: 0 pid: 0 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000028
| Call trace:
| ret_from_fork+0x0/0x30
Ensure that the dying CPU invokes rcu_report_dead() prior to being powered
off or parked.
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105222242.GA8842@willie-the-truck
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106103602.9849-3-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 9a2a9ebc0a upstream.
A new cpufreq governor flag will be added subsequently, so replace
the bool dynamic_switching fleid in struct cpufreq_governor with a
flags field and introduce CPUFREQ_GOV_DYNAMIC_SWITCHING to set for
the "dynamic switching" governors instead of it.
No intentional functional impact.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9696d259d upstream.
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to
allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling
memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);
If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.
Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in
(drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start
is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.
When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called
and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.
Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been
initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still
succeed.
Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization
failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb
initialization success.
Fixes: ac2cbab21f ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")
Reported-by: Elliott Mitchell <ehem+xen@m5p.com>
Tested-by: Elliott Mitchell <ehem+xen@m5p.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 77f6ab8b77 upstream.
Coredump logics needs to report not only the registers of the dumping
thread, but (since 2.5.43) those of other threads getting killed.
Doing that might require extra state saved on the stack in asm glue at
kernel entry; signal delivery logics does that (we need to be able to
save sigcontext there, at the very least) and so does seccomp.
That covers all callers of do_coredump(). Secondary threads get hit with
SIGKILL and caught as soon as they reach exit_mm(), which normally happens
in signal delivery, so those are also fine most of the time. Unfortunately,
it is possible to end up with secondary zapped when it has already entered
exit(2) (or, worse yet, is oopsing). In those cases we reach exit_mm()
when mm->core_state is already set, but the stack contents is not what
we would have in signal delivery.
At least on two architectures (alpha and m68k) it leads to infoleaks - we
end up with a chunk of kernel stack written into coredump, with the contents
consisting of normal C stack frames of the call chain leading to exit_mm()
instead of the expected copy of userland registers. In case of alpha we
leak 312 bytes of stack. Other architectures (including the regset-using
ones) might have similar problems - the normal user of regsets is ptrace
and the state of tracee at the time of such calls is special in the same
way signal delivery is.
Note that had the zapper gotten to the exiting thread slightly later,
it wouldn't have been included into coredump anyway - we skip the threads
that have already cleared their ->mm. So let's pretend that zapper always
loses the race. IOW, have exit_mm() only insert into the dumper list if
we'd gotten there from handling a fatal signal[*]
As the result, the callers of do_exit() that have *not* gone through get_signal()
are not seen by coredump logics as secondary threads. Which excludes voluntary
exit()/oopsen/traps/etc. The dumper thread itself is unaffected by that,
so seccomp is fine.
[*] originally I intended to add a new flag in tsk->flags, but ebiederman pointed
out that PF_SIGNALED is already doing just what we need.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8b92c4ff44 upstream.
Patch series "fix parsing of reboot= cmdline", v3.
The parsing of the reboot= cmdline has two major errors:
- a missing bound check can crash the system on reboot
- parsing of the cpu number only works if specified last
Fix both.
This patch (of 2):
This reverts commit 616feab753.
kstrtoint() and simple_strtoul() have a subtle difference which makes
them non interchangeable: if a non digit character is found amid the
parsing, the former will return an error, while the latter will just
stop parsing, e.g. simple_strtoul("123xyx") = 123.
The kernel cmdline reboot= argument allows to specify the CPU used for
rebooting, with the syntax `s####` among the other flags, e.g.
"reboot=warm,s31,force", so if this flag is not the last given, it's
silently ignored as well as the subsequent ones.
Fixes: 616feab753 ("kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Robin Holt <robinmholt@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2714c3962f ]
Commit 9e6302056f ("perf: Use hrtimers for event multiplexing")
placed the hrtimer (re)start call in the wrong place. Instead of
capturing all scheduling failures, it only considered the PMU failure.
The result is that groups using perf_event_attr::exclusive are no
longer rotated.
Fixes: 9e6302056f ("perf: Use hrtimers for event multiplexing")
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201029162902.038667689@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d3bec0138b ]
Zero-fill element values for all other cpus than current, just as
when not using prealloc. This is the only way the bpf program can
ensure known initial values for all cpus ('onallcpus' cannot be
set when coming from the bpf program).
The scenario is: bpf program inserts some elements in a per-cpu
map, then deletes some (or userspace does). When later adding
new elements using bpf_map_update_elem(), the bpf program can
only set the value of the new elements for the current cpu.
When prealloc is enabled, previously deleted elements are re-used.
Without the fix, values for other cpus remain whatever they were
when the re-used entry was previously freed.
A selftest is added to validate correct operation in above
scenario as well as in case of LRU per-cpu map element re-use.
Fixes: 6c90598174 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Signed-off-by: David Verbeiren <david.verbeiren@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201104112332.15191-1-david.verbeiren@tessares.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 080b6f4076 ]
Commit 3193c0836 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for
___bpf_prog_run()") introduced a __no_fgcse macro that expands to a
function scope __attribute__((optimize("-fno-gcse"))), to disable a
GCC specific optimization that was causing trouble on x86 builds, and
was not expected to have any positive effect in the first place.
However, as the GCC manual documents, __attribute__((optimize))
is not for production use, and results in all other optimization
options to be forgotten for the function in question. This can
cause all kinds of trouble, but in one particular reported case,
it causes -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables to be disregarded,
resulting in .eh_frame info to be emitted for the function.
This reverts commit 3193c0836, and instead, it disables the -fgcse
optimization for the entire source file, but only when building for
X86 using GCC with CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON disabled. Note that the
original commit states that CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n triggers the issue,
whereas CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y performs better without the optimization,
so it is kept disabled in both cases.
Fixes: 3193c0836f ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for ___bpf_prog_run()")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdUg0WJHEcq6to0-eODpXPOywLot6UD2=GFHpzoj_hCoBQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201028171506.15682-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 7bdb157cde upstream.
As shown through runtime testing, the "filename" allocation is not
always freed in perf_event_parse_addr_filter().
There are three possible ways that this could happen:
- It could be allocated twice on subsequent iterations through the loop,
- or leaked on the success path,
- or on the failure path.
Clean up the code flow to make it obvious that 'filename' is always
freed in the reallocation path and in the two return paths as well.
We rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) is NOP and filename is initialized
with NULL.
This fixes the leak. No other side effects expected.
[ Dan Carpenter: cleaned up the code flow & added a changelog. ]
[ Ingo Molnar: updated the changelog some more. ]
Fixes: 375637bc52 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Signed-off-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
--
kernel/events/core.c | 12 +++++-------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9d820f68b2 upstream.
When an exception/interrupt hits kernel space and the kernel is not
currently in the idle task then RCU must be watching.
irqentry_enter() validates this via rcu_irq_enter_check_tick(), which in
turn invokes lockdep when taking a lock. But at that point lockdep does not
yet know about the fact that interrupts have been disabled by the CPU,
which triggers a lockdep splat complaining about inconsistent state.
Invoking trace_hardirqs_off() before rcu_irq_enter_check_tick() defeats the
point of rcu_irq_enter_check_tick() because trace_hardirqs_off() uses RCU.
So use the same sequence as for the idle case and tell lockdep about the
irq state change first, invoke the RCU check and then do the lockdep and
tracer update.
Fixes: a5497bab5f ("entry: Provide generic interrupt entry/exit code")
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87y2jhl19s.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9f5d1c336a upstream.
Gratian managed to trigger the BUG_ON(!newowner) in fixup_pi_state_owner().
This is one possible chain of events leading to this:
Task Prio Operation
T1 120 lock(F)
T2 120 lock(F) -> blocks (top waiter)
T3 50 (RT) lock(F) -> boosts T1 and blocks (new top waiter)
XX timeout/ -> wakes T2
signal
T1 50 unlock(F) -> wakes T3 (rtmutex->owner == NULL, waiter bit is set)
T2 120 cleanup -> try_to_take_mutex() fails because T3 is the top waiter
and the lower priority T2 cannot steal the lock.
-> fixup_pi_state_owner() sees newowner == NULL -> BUG_ON()
The comment states that this is invalid and rt_mutex_real_owner() must
return a non NULL owner when the trylock failed, but in case of a queued
and woken up waiter rt_mutex_real_owner() == NULL is a valid transient
state. The higher priority waiter has simply not yet managed to take over
the rtmutex.
The BUG_ON() is therefore wrong and this is just another retry condition in
fixup_pi_state_owner().
Drop the locks, so that T3 can make progress, and then try the fixup again.
Gratian provided a great analysis, traces and a reproducer. The analysis is
to the point, but it confused the hell out of that tglx dude who had to
page in all the futex horrors again. Condensed version is above.
[ tglx: Wrote comment and changelog ]
Fixes: c1e2f0eaf0 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6w6x7bb.fsf@ni.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87sg9pkvf7.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c1acb4ac1a upstream.
The nesting count of trace_printk allows for 4 levels of nesting. The
nesting counter starts at zero and is incremented before being used to
retrieve the current context's buffer. But the index to the buffer uses the
nesting counter after it was incremented, and not its original number,
which in needs to do.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201029161905.4269-1-hqjagain@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3d9622c12c ("tracing: Add barrier to trace_printk() buffer nesting modification")
Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 726b3d3f14 upstream.
When an interrupt or NMI comes in and switches the context, there's a delay
from when the preempt_count() shows the update. As the preempt_count() is
used to detect recursion having each context have its own bit get set when
tracing starts, and if that bit is already set, it is considered a recursion
and the function exits. But if this happens in that section where context
has changed but preempt_count() has not been updated, this will be
incorrectly flagged as a recursion.
To handle this case, create another bit call TRANSITION and test it if the
current context bit is already set. Flag the call as a recursion if the
TRANSITION bit is already set, and if not, set it and continue. The
TRANSITION bit will be cleared normally on the return of the function that
set it, or if the current context bit is clear, set it and clear the
TRANSITION bit to allow for another transition between the current context
and an even higher one.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: edc15cafcb ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ee11b93f95 upstream.
The code that checks recursion will work to only do the recursion check once
if there's nested checks. The top one will do the check, the other nested
checks will see recursion was already checked and return zero for its "bit".
On the return side, nothing will be done if the "bit" is zero.
The problem is that zero is returned for the "good" bit when in NMI context.
This will set the bit for NMIs making it look like *all* NMI tracing is
recursing, and prevent tracing of anything in NMI context!
The simple fix is to return "bit + 1" and subtract that bit on the end to
get the real bit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: edc15cafcb ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b02414c8f0 upstream.
The recursion protection of the ring buffer depends on preempt_count() to be
correct. But it is possible that the ring buffer gets called after an
interrupt comes in but before it updates the preempt_count(). This will
trigger a false positive in the recursion code.
Use the same trick from the ftrace function callback recursion code which
uses a "transition" bit that gets set, to allow for a single recursion for
to handle transitions between contexts.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 567cd4da54 ("ring-buffer: User context bit recursion checking")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7b3c36fc4c upstream.
This testcase
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <assert.h>
void *tf(void *arg)
{
return NULL;
}
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
pthread_t th;
pthread_create(&th, NULL, tf, NULL);
return 0;
}
waitpid(pid, NULL, WSTOPPED);
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE);
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0,0);
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
int status;
int thread = waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
assert(thread > 0 && thread != pid);
assert(status == 0x80137f);
return 0;
}
fails and triggers WARN_ON_ONCE(!signr) in do_jobctl_trap().
This is because task_join_group_stop() has 2 problems when current is traced:
1. We can't rely on the "JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING" check, a stopped tracee
can be woken up by debugger and it can clone another thread which
should join the group-stop.
We need to check group_stop_count || SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED.
2. If SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED is already set, we should not increment
sig->group_stop_count and add JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME. The new thread
should stop without another do_notify_parent_cldstop() report.
To clarify, the problem is very old and we should blame
ptrace_init_task(). But now that we have task_join_group_stop() it makes
more sense to fix this helper to avoid the code duplication.
Reported-by: syzbot+3485e3773f7da290eecc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201019134237.GA18810@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cb47755725 upstream.
UBSAN reports:
Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
__x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
Commit bd40a17576 ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.
Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.
[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]
Fixes: 361a3bf005 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao <prime.zeng@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d1e7c2996e upstream.
Because sugov_update_next_freq() may skip a frequency update even if
the need_freq_update flag has been set for the policy at hand, policy
limits updates may not take effect as expected.
For example, if the intel_pstate driver operates in the passive mode
with HWP enabled, it needs to update the HWP min and max limits when
the policy min and max limits change, respectively, but that may not
happen if the target frequency does not change along with the limit
at hand. In particular, if the policy min is changed first, causing
the target frequency to be adjusted to it, and the policy max limit
is changed later to the same value, the HWP max limit will not be
updated to follow it as expected, because the target frequency is
still equal to the policy min limit and it will not change until
that limit is updated.
To address this issue, modify get_next_freq() to let the driver
callback run if the CPUFREQ_NEED_UPDATE_LIMITS cpufreq driver flag
is set regardless of whether or not the new frequency to set is
equal to the previous one.
Fixes: f6ebbcf08f ("cpufreq: intel_pstate: Implement passive mode with HWP enabled")
Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: 5.9+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9+: 1c534352f4 cpufreq: Introduce CPUFREQ_NEED_UPDATE_LIMITS ...
Cc: 5.9+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9+: a62f68f5ca cpufreq: Introduce cpufreq_driver_test_flags()
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0a1754b2a9 upstream.
We don't need to check the new buffer size, and the return value
had confused resize_buffer_duplicate_size().
...
ret = ring_buffer_resize(trace_buf->buffer,
per_cpu_ptr(size_buf->data,cpu_id)->entries, cpu_id);
if (ret == 0)
per_cpu_ptr(trace_buf->data, cpu_id)->entries =
per_cpu_ptr(size_buf->data, cpu_id)->entries;
...
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201019142242.11560-1-hqjagain@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d60da506cb ("tracing: Add a resize function to make one buffer equivalent to another buffer")
Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f747c7e15d upstream.
The rcu_tasks_trace_postgp() function uses for_each_process_thread()
to scan the task list without the benefit of RCU read-side protection,
which can result in use-after-free errors on task_struct structures.
This error was missed because the TRACE01 rcutorture scenario enables
lockdep, but also builds with CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y. In this situation,
preemption is disabled everywhere, so lockdep thinks everywhere can
be a legitimate RCU reader. This commit therefore adds the needed
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock().
Note that this bug can occur only after an RCU Tasks Trace CPU stall
warning, which by default only happens after a grace period has extended
for ten minutes (yes, not a typo, minutes).
Fixes: 4593e772b5 ("rcu-tasks: Add stall warnings for RCU Tasks Trace")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 592031cc10 upstream.
When rcu_tasks_trace_postgp() function detects an RCU Tasks Trace
CPU stall, it adds all tasks blocking the current grace period to
a list, invoking get_task_struct() on each to prevent them from
being freed while on the list. It then traverses that list,
printing stall-warning messages for each one that is still blocking
the current grace period and removing it from the list. The list
removal invokes the matching put_task_struct().
This of course means that in the admittedly unlikely event that some
task executes its outermost rcu_read_unlock_trace() in the meantime, it
won't be removed from the list and put_task_struct() won't be executing,
resulting in a task_struct leak. This commit therefore makes the list
removal and put_task_struct() unconditional, stopping the leak.
Note further that this bug can occur only after an RCU Tasks Trace CPU
stall warning, which by default only happens after a grace period has
extended for ten minutes (yes, not a typo, minutes).
Fixes: 4593e772b5 ("rcu-tasks: Add stall warnings for RCU Tasks Trace")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ba3a86e472 upstream.
The more intense grace-period processing resulting from the 50x RCU
Tasks Trace grace-period speedups exposed the following race condition:
o Task A running on CPU 0 executes rcu_read_lock_trace(),
entering a read-side critical section.
o When Task A eventually invokes rcu_read_unlock_trace()
to exit its read-side critical section, this function
notes that the ->trc_reader_special.s flag is zero and
and therefore invoke wil set ->trc_reader_nesting to zero
using WRITE_ONCE(). But before that happens...
o The RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread running on some other
CPU interrogates Task A, but this fails because this task is
currently running. This kthread therefore sends an IPI to CPU 0.
o CPU 0 receives the IPI, and thus invokes trc_read_check_handler().
Because Task A has not yet cleared its ->trc_reader_nesting
counter, this function sees that Task A is still within its
read-side critical section. This function therefore sets the
->trc_reader_nesting.b.need_qs flag, AKA the .need_qs flag.
Except that Task A has already checked the .need_qs flag, which
is part of the ->trc_reader_special.s flag. The .need_qs flag
therefore remains set until Task A's next rcu_read_unlock_trace().
o Task A now invokes synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace(), which cannot
start a new grace period until the current grace period completes.
And thus cannot return until after that time.
But Task A's .need_qs flag is still set, which prevents the current
grace period from completing. And because Task A is blocked, it
will never execute rcu_read_unlock_trace() until its call to
synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() returns.
We are therefore deadlocked.
This race is improbable, but 80 hours of rcutorture made it happen twice.
The race was possible before the grace-period speedup, but roughly 50x
less probable. Several thousand hours of rcutorture would have been
necessary to have a reasonable chance of making this happen before this
50x speedup.
This commit therefore eliminates this deadlock by setting
->trc_reader_nesting to a large negative number before checking the
.need_qs and zeroing (or decrementing with respect to its initial
value) ->trc_reader_nesting. For its part, the IPI handler's
trc_read_check_handler() function adds a check for negative values,
deferring evaluation of the task in this case. Taken together, these
changes avoid this deadlock scenario.
Fixes: 276c410448 ("rcu-tasks: Split ->trc_reader_need_end")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bbeb97464e upstream.
Below race can come, if trace_open and resize of
cpu buffer is running parallely on different cpus
CPUX CPUY
ring_buffer_resize
atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled)
tracing_open
tracing_reset_online_cpus
ring_buffer_reset_cpu
rb_reset_cpu
rb_update_pages
remove/insert pages
resetting pointer
This race can cause data abort or some times infinte loop in
rb_remove_pages and rb_insert_pages while checking pages
for sanity.
Take buffer lock to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1601976833-24377-1-git-send-email-gkohli@codeaurora.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b23d7a5f4a ("ring-buffer: speed up buffer resets by avoiding synchronize_rcu for each CPU")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dfe719fef0 upstream.
Currently, init_listener() tries to prevent adding a filter with
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER if one of the existing filters already
has a listener. However, this check happens without holding any lock that
would prevent another thread from concurrently installing a new filter
(potentially with a listener) on top of the ones we already have.
Theoretically, this is also a data race: The plain load from
current->seccomp.filter can race with concurrent writes to the same
location.
Fix it by moving the check into the region that holds the siglock to guard
against concurrent TSYNC.
(The "Fixes" tag points to the commit that introduced the theoretical
data race; concurrent installation of another filter with TSYNC only
became possible later, in commit 51891498f2 ("seccomp: allow TSYNC and
USER_NOTIF together").)
Fixes: 6a21cc50f0 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace")
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201005014401.490175-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7c69673262 ]
Commit 41c48f3a98 ("bpf: Support access
to bpf map fields") added support to access map fields
with CORE support. For example,
struct bpf_map {
__u32 max_entries;
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
__u32 elem_size;
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
__uint(max_entries, 4);
__type(key, __u32);
__type(value, __u32);
} m_array SEC(".maps");
SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
int cg_skb(void *ctx)
{
struct bpf_array *array = (struct bpf_array *)&m_array;
/* .. array->map.max_entries .. */
}
In kernel, bpf_htab has similar structure,
struct bpf_htab {
struct bpf_map map;
...
}
In the above cg_skb(), to access array->map.max_entries, with CORE, the clang will
generate two builtin's.
base = &m_array;
/* access array.map */
map_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(base, 0, 0);
/* access array.map.max_entries */
max_entries_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(map_addr, 0, 0);
max_entries = *max_entries_addr;
In the current llvm, if two builtin's are in the same function or
in the same function after inlining, the compiler is smart enough to chain
them together and generates like below:
base = &m_array;
max_entries = *(base + reloc_offset); /* reloc_offset = 0 in this case */
and we are fine.
But if we force no inlining for one of functions in test_map_ptr() selftest, e.g.,
check_default(), the above two __builtin_preserve_* will be in two different
functions. In this case, we will have code like:
func check_hash():
reloc_offset_map = 0;
base = &m_array;
map_base = base + reloc_offset_map;
check_default(map_base, ...)
func check_default(map_base, ...):
max_entries = *(map_base + reloc_offset_max_entries);
In kernel, map_ptr (CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) does not allow any arithmetic.
The above "map_base = base + reloc_offset_map" will trigger a verifier failure.
; VERIFY(check_default(&hash->map, map));
0: (18) r7 = 0xffffb4fe8018a004
2: (b4) w1 = 110
3: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +0) = r1
R1_w=invP110 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
; VERIFY_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, check_hash);
4: (18) r1 = 0xffffb4fe8018a000
6: (b4) w2 = 1
7: (63) *(u32 *)(r1 +0) = r2
R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R2_w=invP1 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
8: (b7) r2 = 0
9: (18) r8 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
11: (18) r1 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
13: (0f) r1 += r2
R1 pointer arithmetic on map_ptr prohibited
To fix the issue, let us permit map_ptr + 0 arithmetic which will
result in exactly the same map_ptr.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200908175702.2463625-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b18b099e04 ]
On my system the kernel processes the "kgdb_earlycon" parameter before
the "kgdbcon" parameter. When we setup "kgdb_earlycon" we'll end up
in kgdb_register_callbacks() and "kgdb_use_con" won't have been set
yet so we'll never get around to starting "kgdbcon". Let's remedy
this by detecting that the IO module was already registered when
setting "kgdb_use_con" and registering the console then.
As part of this, to avoid pre-declaring things, move the handling of
the "kgdbcon" further down in the file.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200630151422.1.I4aa062751ff5e281f5116655c976dff545c09a46@changeid
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 921c7ebd13 ]
If should_futex_fail() returns true in futex_wake_pi(), then the 'ret'
variable is set to -EFAULT and then immediately overwritten. So the failure
injection is non-functional.
Fix it by actually leaving the function and returning -EFAULT.
The Fixes tag is kinda blury because the initial commit which introduced
failure injection was already sloppy, but the below mentioned commit broke
it completely.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Fixes: 6b4f4bc9cb ("locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200927000858.24219-1-mateusznosek0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f8e48a3dca ]
It is valid (albeit uncommon) to call local_irq_enable() without first
having called local_irq_disable(). In this case we enter
lockdep_hardirqs_on*() with IRQs enabled and trip a preemption warning
for using __this_cpu_read().
Use this_cpu_read() instead to avoid the warning.
Fixes: 4d004099a6 ("lockdep: Fix lockdep recursion")
Reported-by: syzbot+53f8ce8bbc07924b6417@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 761a8c58db ]
There was a memory corruption bug happening while running the synthetic
event selftests:
kmemleak: Cannot insert 0xffff8c196fa2afe5 into the object search tree (overlaps existing)
CPU: 5 PID: 6866 Comm: ftracetest Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc5-test+ #577
Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x8d/0xc0
create_object.cold+0x3b/0x60
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x57/0x510
? tracing_map_init+0x178/0x340
__kmalloc+0x1b1/0x390
tracing_map_init+0x178/0x340
event_hist_trigger_func+0x523/0xa40
trigger_process_regex+0xc5/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x71/0xd0
vfs_write+0xca/0x210
ksys_write+0x70/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fef0a63a487
Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
RSP: 002b:00007fff76f18398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000039 RCX: 00007fef0a63a487
RDX: 0000000000000039 RSI: 000055eb3b26d690 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055eb3b26d690 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000038
R10: 000055eb3b2cdb80 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000039
R13: 00007fef0a70b500 R14: 0000000000000039 R15: 00007fef0a70b700
kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector disabled
kmemleak: Object 0xffff8c196fa2afe0 (size 8):
kmemleak: comm "ftracetest", pid 6866, jiffies 4295082531
kmemleak: min_count = 1
kmemleak: count = 0
kmemleak: flags = 0x1
kmemleak: checksum = 0
kmemleak: backtrace:
__kmalloc+0x1b1/0x390
tracing_map_init+0x1be/0x340
event_hist_trigger_func+0x523/0xa40
trigger_process_regex+0xc5/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x71/0xd0
vfs_write+0xca/0x210
ksys_write+0x70/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The cause came down to a use of strcat() that was adding an string that was
shorten, but the strcat() did not take that into account.
strcat() is extremely dangerous as it does not care how big the buffer is.
Replace it with seq_buf operations that prevent the buffer from being
overwritten if what is being written is bigger than the buffer.
Fixes: 10819e2579 ("tracing: Handle synthetic event array field type checking correctly")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
