commit 6fdda9a9c5 upstream.
As part of normal operaions, the hrtimer subsystem frequently calls
into the timekeeping code, creating a locking order of
hrtimer locks -> timekeeping locks
clock_was_set_delayed() was suppoed to allow us to avoid deadlocks
between the timekeeping the hrtimer subsystem, so that we could
notify the hrtimer subsytem the time had changed while holding
the timekeeping locks. This was done by scheduling delayed work
that would run later once we were out of the timekeeing code.
But unfortunately the lock chains are complex enoguh that in
scheduling delayed work, we end up eventually trying to grab
an hrtimer lock.
Sasha Levin noticed this in testing when the new seqlock lockdep
enablement triggered the following (somewhat abrieviated) message:
[ 251.100221] ======================================================
[ 251.100221] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
[ 251.100221] 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4053 Not tainted
[ 251.101967] -------------------------------------------------------
[ 251.101967] kworker/10:1/4506 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 251.101967] (timekeeper_seq){----..}, at: [<ffffffff81160e96>] retrigger_next_event+0x56/0x70
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] but task is already holding lock:
[ 251.101967] (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81160e7c>] retrigger_next_event+0x3c/0x70
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 251.101967]
-> #5 (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}:
[snipped]
-> #4 (&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock){-.-...}:
[snipped]
-> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}:
[snipped]
-> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.-.}:
[snipped]
-> #1 (&(&pool->lock)->rlock){-.-...}:
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194803>] validate_chain+0x6c3/0x7b0
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194d9d>] __lock_acquire+0x4ad/0x580
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81194ff2>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff84398500>] _raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x80
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81153e69>] __queue_work+0x1a9/0x3f0
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81154168>] queue_work_on+0x98/0x120
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff81161351>] clock_was_set_delayed+0x21/0x30
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff811c4bd1>] do_adjtimex+0x111/0x160
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff811e2711>] compat_sys_adjtimex+0x41/0x70
[ 251.101967] [<ffffffff843a4b49>] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5
[ 251.101967]
-> #0 (timekeeper_seq){----..}:
[snipped]
[ 251.101967] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] Chain exists of:
timekeeper_seq --> &rt_b->rt_runtime_lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock#11
[ 251.101967] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] CPU0 CPU1
[ 251.101967] ---- ----
[ 251.101967] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock#11);
[ 251.101967] lock(&rt_b->rt_runtime_lock);
[ 251.101967] lock(hrtimer_bases.lock#11);
[ 251.101967] lock(timekeeper_seq);
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] 3 locks held by kworker/10:1/4506:
[ 251.101967] #0: (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81154960>] process_one_work+0x200/0x530
[ 251.101967] #1: (hrtimer_work){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81154960>] process_one_work+0x200/0x530
[ 251.101967] #2: (hrtimer_bases.lock#11){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81160e7c>] retrigger_next_event+0x3c/0x70
[ 251.101967]
[ 251.101967] stack backtrace:
[ 251.101967] CPU: 10 PID: 4506 Comm: kworker/10:1 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc2-next-20131206-sasha-00005-g8be2375-dirty #4053
[ 251.101967] Workqueue: events clock_was_set_work
So the best solution is to avoid calling clock_was_set_delayed() while
holding the timekeeping lock, and instead using a flag variable to
decide if we should call clock_was_set() once we've released the locks.
This works for the case here, where the do_adjtimex() was the deadlock
trigger point. Unfortuantely, in update_wall_time() we still hold
the jiffies lock, which would deadlock with the ipi triggered by
clock_was_set(), preventing us from calling it even after we drop the
timekeeping lock. So instead call clock_was_set_delayed() at that point.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 330a1617b0 upstream.
Since 48cdc135d4 (Implement a shadow timekeeper), we have to
call timekeeping_update() after any adjustment to the timekeeping
structure in order to make sure that any adjustments to the structure
persist.
In the timekeeping suspend path, we udpate the timekeeper
structure, so we should be sure to update the shadow-timekeeper
before releasing the timekeeping locks. Currently this isn't done.
In most cases, the next time related code to run would be
timekeeping_resume, which does update the shadow-timekeeper, but
in an abundence of caution, this patch adds the call to
timekeeping_update() in the suspend path.
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f55c07607a upstream.
Since 48cdc135d4 (Implement a shadow timekeeper), we have to
call timekeeping_update() after any adjustment to the timekeeping
structure in order to make sure that any adjustments to the structure
persist.
Unfortunately, the updates to the tai offset via adjtimex do not
trigger this update, causing adjustments to the tai offset to be
made and then over-written by the previous value at the next
update_wall_time() call.
This patch resovles the issue by calling timekeeping_update()
right after setting the tai offset.
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 23a8e8441a upstream.
Doing some different tests, I discovered that function graph tracing, when
filtered via the set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace files, does
not always keep with them if another function ftrace_ops is registered
to trace functions.
The reason is that function graph just happens to trace all functions
that the function tracer enables. When there was only one user of
function tracing, the function graph tracer did not need to worry about
being called by functions that it did not want to trace. But now that there
are other users, this becomes a problem.
For example, one just needs to do the following:
# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
# echo schedule > set_ftrace_filter
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# cat trace
[..]
0) | schedule() {
------------------------------------------
0) <idle>-0 => rcu_pre-7
------------------------------------------
0) ! 2980.314 us | }
0) | schedule() {
------------------------------------------
0) rcu_pre-7 => <idle>-0
------------------------------------------
0) + 20.701 us | }
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/stack_tracer_enabled
# cat trace
[..]
1) + 20.825 us | }
1) + 21.651 us | }
1) + 30.924 us | } /* SyS_ioctl */
1) | do_page_fault() {
1) | __do_page_fault() {
1) 0.274 us | down_read_trylock();
1) 0.098 us | find_vma();
1) | handle_mm_fault() {
1) | _raw_spin_lock() {
1) 0.102 us | preempt_count_add();
1) 0.097 us | do_raw_spin_lock();
1) 2.173 us | }
1) | do_wp_page() {
1) 0.079 us | vm_normal_page();
1) 0.086 us | reuse_swap_page();
1) 0.076 us | page_move_anon_rmap();
1) | unlock_page() {
1) 0.082 us | page_waitqueue();
1) 0.086 us | __wake_up_bit();
1) 1.801 us | }
1) 0.075 us | ptep_set_access_flags();
1) | _raw_spin_unlock() {
1) 0.098 us | do_raw_spin_unlock();
1) 0.105 us | preempt_count_sub();
1) 1.884 us | }
1) 9.149 us | }
1) + 13.083 us | }
1) 0.146 us | up_read();
When the stack tracer was enabled, it enabled all functions to be traced, which
now the function graph tracer also traces. This is a side effect that should
not occur.
To fix this a test is added when the function tracing is changed, as well as when
the graph tracer is enabled, to see if anything other than the ftrace global_ops
function tracer is enabled. If so, then the graph tracer calls a test trampoline
that will look at the function that is being traced and compare it with the
filters defined by the global_ops.
As an optimization, if there's no other function tracers registered, or if
the only registered function tracers also use the global ops, the function
graph infrastructure will call the registered function graph callback directly
and not go through the test trampoline.
Fixes: d2d45c7a03 "tracing: Have stack_tracer use a separate list of functions"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4c35ed241 upstream.
The synchronization needed after ftrace_ops are unregistered must happen
after the callback is disabled from becing called by functions.
The current location happens after the function is being removed from the
internal lists, but not after the function callbacks were disabled, leaving
the functions susceptible of being called after their callbacks are freed.
This affects perf and any externel users of function tracing (LTTng and
SystemTap).
Fixes: cdbe61bfe7 "ftrace: Allow dynamically allocated function tracers"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 405e1d8348 upstream.
ftrace_trace_function is a variable that holds what function will be called
directly by the assembly code (mcount). If just a single function is
registered and it handles recursion itself, then the assembly will call that
function directly without any helper function. It also passes in the
ftrace_op that was registered with the callback. The ftrace_op to send is
stored in the function_trace_op variable.
The ftrace_trace_function and function_trace_op needs to be coordinated such
that the called callback wont be called with the wrong ftrace_op, otherwise
bad things can happen if it expected a different op. Luckily, there's no
callback that doesn't use the helper functions that requires this. But
there soon will be and this needs to be fixed.
Use a set_function_trace_op to store the ftrace_op to set the
function_trace_op to when it is safe to do so (during the update function
within the breakpoint or stop machine calls). Or if dynamic ftrace is not
being used (static tracing) then we have to do a bit more synchronization
when the ftrace_trace_function is set as that takes affect immediately
(as oppose to dynamic ftrace doing it with the modification of the trampoline).
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3132e107d6 upstream.
If trace_puts() is used very early in boot up, it can crash the machine
if it is called before the ring buffer is allocated. If a trace_printk()
is used with no arguments, then it will be converted into a trace_puts()
and suffer the same fate.
Fixes: 09ae72348e "tracing: Add trace_puts() for even faster trace_printk() tracing"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dced341b2d upstream.
The trace buffer has a descriptor pointer that goes back to the trace
array. But it was never assigned. Luckily, nothing uses it (yet), but
it will in the future.
Although nothing currently uses this, if any of the new features get
backported to older kernels, and because this is such a simple change,
I'm marking it for stable too.
Fixes: 12883efb67 "tracing: Consolidate max_tr into main trace_array structure"
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0ac9b1c218 upstream.
Currently, group entity load-weights are initialized to zero. This
admits some races with respect to the first time they are re-weighted in
earlty use. ( Let g[x] denote the se for "g" on cpu "x". )
Suppose that we have root->a and that a enters a throttled state,
immediately followed by a[0]->t1 (the only task running on cpu[0])
blocking:
put_prev_task(group_cfs_rq(a[0]), t1)
put_prev_entity(..., t1)
check_cfs_rq_runtime(group_cfs_rq(a[0]))
throttle_cfs_rq(group_cfs_rq(a[0]))
Then, before unthrottling occurs, let a[0]->b[0]->t2 wake for the first
time:
enqueue_task_fair(rq[0], t2)
enqueue_entity(group_cfs_rq(b[0]), t2)
enqueue_entity_load_avg(group_cfs_rq(b[0]), t2)
account_entity_enqueue(group_cfs_ra(b[0]), t2)
update_cfs_shares(group_cfs_rq(b[0]))
< skipped because b is part of a throttled hierarchy >
enqueue_entity(group_cfs_rq(a[0]), b[0])
...
We now have b[0] enqueued, yet group_cfs_rq(a[0])->load.weight == 0
which violates invariants in several code-paths. Eliminate the
possibility of this by initializing group entity weight.
Signed-off-by: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131016181627.22647.47543.stgit@sword-of-the-dawn.mtv.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1ee14e6c8c upstream.
When we transition cfs_bandwidth_used to false, any currently
throttled groups will incorrectly return false from cfs_rq_throttled.
While tg_set_cfs_bandwidth will unthrottle them eventually, currently
running code (including at least dequeue_task_fair and
distribute_cfs_runtime) will cause errors.
Fix this by turning off cfs_bandwidth_used only after unthrottling all
cfs_rqs.
Tested: toggle bandwidth back and forth on a loaded cgroup. Caused
crashes in minutes without the patch, hasn't crashed with it.
Signed-off-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131016181611.22647.80365.stgit@sword-of-the-dawn.mtv.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2084140594 upstream.
There are a few subtle races, between change_protection_range (used by
mprotect and change_prot_numa) on one side, and NUMA page migration and
compaction on the other side.
The basic race is that there is a time window between when the PTE gets
made non-present (PROT_NONE or NUMA), and the TLB is flushed.
During that time, a CPU may continue writing to the page.
This is fine most of the time, however compaction or the NUMA migration
code may come in, and migrate the page away.
When that happens, the CPU may continue writing, through the cached
translation, to what is no longer the current memory location of the
process.
This only affects x86, which has a somewhat optimistic pte_accessible.
All other architectures appear to be safe, and will either always flush,
or flush whenever there is a valid mapping, even with no permissions
(SPARC).
The basic race looks like this:
CPU A CPU B CPU C
load TLB entry
make entry PTE/PMD_NUMA
fault on entry
read/write old page
start migrating page
change PTE/PMD to new page
read/write old page [*]
flush TLB
reload TLB from new entry
read/write new page
lose data
[*] the old page may belong to a new user at this point!
The obvious fix is to flush remote TLB entries, by making sure that
pte_accessible aware of the fact that PROT_NONE and PROT_NUMA memory may
still be accessible if there is a TLB flush pending for the mm.
This should fix both NUMA migration and compaction.
[mgorman@suse.de: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e0acd0a68e upstream.
This is only theoretical, but after try_to_wake_up(p) was changed
to check p->state under p->pi_lock the code like
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
can miss a signal. This is the special case of wait-for-condition,
it relies on try_to_wake_up/schedule interaction and thus it does
not need mb() between __set_current_state() and if(signal_pending).
However, this __set_current_state() can move into the critical
section protected by rq->lock, now that try_to_wake_up() takes
another lock we need to ensure that it can't be reordered with
"if (signal_pending(current))" check inside that section.
The patch is actually one-liner, it simply adds smp_wmb() before
spin_lock_irq(rq->lock). This is what try_to_wake_up() already
does by the same reason.
We turn this wmb() into the new helper, smp_mb__before_spinlock(),
for better documentation and to allow the architectures to change
the default implementation.
While at it, kill smp_mb__after_lock(), it has no callers.
Perhaps we can also add smp_mb__before/after_spinunlock() for
prepare_to_wait().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 85fbd722ad upstream.
Freezable kthreads and workqueues are fundamentally problematic in
that they effectively introduce a big kernel lock widely used in the
kernel and have already been the culprit of several deadlock
scenarios. This is the latest occurrence.
During resume, libata rescans all the ports and revalidates all
pre-existing devices. If it determines that a device has gone
missing, the device is removed from the system which involves
invalidating block device and flushing bdi while holding driver core
layer locks. Unfortunately, this can race with the rest of device
resume. Because freezable kthreads and workqueues are thawed after
device resume is complete and block device removal depends on
freezable workqueues and kthreads (e.g. bdi_wq, jbd2) to make
progress, this can lead to deadlock - block device removal can't
proceed because kthreads are frozen and kthreads can't be thawed
because device resume is blocked behind block device removal.
839a8e8660 ("writeback: replace custom worker pool implementation
with unbound workqueue") made this particular deadlock scenario more
visible but the underlying problem has always been there - the
original forker task and jbd2 are freezable too. In fact, this is
highly likely just one of many possible deadlock scenarios given that
freezer behaves as a big kernel lock and we don't have any debug
mechanism around it.
I believe the right thing to do is getting rid of freezable kthreads
and workqueues. This is something fundamentally broken. For now,
implement a funny workaround in libata - just avoid doing block device
hot[un]plug while the system is frozen. Kernel engineering at its
finest. :(
v2: Add EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pm_freezing) for cases where libata is built
as a module.
v3: Comment updated and polling interval changed to 10ms as suggested
by Rafael.
v4: Add #ifdef CONFIG_FREEZER around the hack as pm_freezing is not
defined when FREEZER is not configured thus breaking build.
Reported by kbuild test robot.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Tomaž Šolc <tomaz.solc@tablix.org>
Reviewed-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62801
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131213174932.GA27070@htj.dyndns.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 757dfcaa41 upstream.
This patch touches the RT group scheduling case.
Functions inc_rt_prio_smp() and dec_rt_prio_smp() change (global) rq's
priority, while rt_rq passed to them may be not the top-level rt_rq.
This is wrong, because changing of priority on a child level does not
guarantee that the priority is the highest all over the rq. So, this
leak makes RT balancing unusable.
The short example: the task having the highest priority among all rq's
RT tasks (no one other task has the same priority) are waking on a
throttle rt_rq. The rq's cpupri is set to the task's priority
equivalent, but real rq->rt.highest_prio.curr is less.
The patch below fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/49231385567953@web4m.yandex.ru
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c4602c1c81 upstream.
Ftrace currently initializes only the online CPUs. This implementation has
two problems:
- If we online a CPU after we enable the function profile, and then run the
test, we will lose the trace information on that CPU.
Steps to reproduce:
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# cd <debugfs>/tracing/
# echo <some function name> >> set_ftrace_filter
# echo 1 > function_profile_enabled
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# run test
- If we offline a CPU before we enable the function profile, we will not clear
the trace information when we enable the function profile. It will trouble
the users.
Steps to reproduce:
# cd <debugfs>/tracing/
# echo <some function name> >> set_ftrace_filter
# echo 1 > function_profile_enabled
# run test
# cat trace_stat/function*
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > function_profile_enabled
# echo 1 > function_profile_enabled
# cat trace_stat/function*
# run test
# cat trace_stat/function*
So it is better that we initialize the ftrace profiler for each possible cpu
every time we enable the function profile instead of just the online ones.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387178401-10619-1-git-send-email-miaox@cn.fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f9f9ffc237 upstream.
throttle_cfs_rq() doesn't check to make sure that period_timer is running,
and while update_curr/assign_cfs_runtime does, a concurrently running
period_timer on another cpu could cancel itself between this cpu's
update_curr and throttle_cfs_rq(). If there are no other cfs_rqs running
in the tg to restart the timer, this causes the cfs_rq to be stranded
forever.
Fix this by calling __start_cfs_bandwidth() in throttle if the timer is
inactive.
(Also add some sched_debug lines for cfs_bandwidth.)
Tested: make a run/sleep task in a cgroup, loop switching the cgroup
between 1ms/100ms quota and unlimited, checking for timer_active=0 and
throttled=1 as a failure. With the throttle_cfs_rq() change commented out
this fails, with the full patch it passes.
Signed-off-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131016181632.22647.84174.stgit@sword-of-the-dawn.mtv.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4fc9bbf98f upstream.
Add a flag to tell the PCI subsystem that kernel is shutting down in
preparation to kexec a kernel. Add code in PCI subsystem to use this flag
to clear Bus Master bit on PCI devices only in case of kexec reboot.
This fixes a power-off problem on Acer Aspire V5-573G and likely other
machines and avoids any other issues caused by clearing Bus Master bit on
PCI devices in normal shutdown path. The problem was introduced by
b566a22c23 ("PCI: disable Bus Master on PCI device shutdown").
This patch is based on discussion at
http://marc.info/?l=linux-pci&m=138425645204355&w=2
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=63861
Reported-by: Chang Liu <cl91tp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac01810c9d upstream.
When the system enters suspend, it disables all interrupts in
suspend_device_irqs(), including the interrupts marked EARLY_RESUME.
On the resume side things are different. The EARLY_RESUME interrupts
are reenabled in sys_core_ops->resume and the non EARLY_RESUME
interrupts are reenabled in the normal system resume path.
When suspend_noirq() failed or suspend is aborted for any other
reason, we might omit the resume side call to sys_core_ops->resume()
and therefor the interrupts marked EARLY_RESUME are not reenabled and
stay disabled forever.
To solve this, enable all irqs unconditionally in irq_resume()
regardless whether interrupts marked EARLY_RESUMEhave been already
enabled or not.
This might try to reenable already enabled interrupts in the non
failure case, but the only affected platform is XEN and it has been
confirmed that it does not cause any side effects.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>
Acked-by-and-tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1385388587-16442-1-git-send-email-ldewangan@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4be77398ac upstream.
Since commit 1e75fa8be9 (time: Condense timekeeper.xtime
into xtime_sec - merged in v3.6), there has been an problem
with the error accounting in the timekeeping code, such that
when truncating to nanoseconds, we round up to the next nsec,
but the balancing adjustment to the ntp_error value was dropped.
This causes 1ns per tick drift forward of the clock.
In 3.7, this logic was isolated to only GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL_OLD
architectures (s390, ia64, powerpc).
The fix is simply to balance the accounting and to subtract the
added nanosecond from ntp_error. This allows the internal long-term
clock steering to keep the clock accurate.
While this fix removes the regression added in 1e75fa8be9, the
ideal solution is to move away from GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL_OLD
and use the new VSYSCALL method, which avoids entirely the
nanosecond granular rounding, and the resulting short-term clock
adjustment oscillation needed to keep long term accurate time.
[ jstultz: Many thanks to Martin for his efforts identifying this
subtle bug, and providing the fix. ]
Originally-from: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1385149491-20307-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a97ad0c4b4 upstream.
The current code requires that the scheduled update of the RTC happens
in the closest tick to the half of the second. This seems to be
difficult to achieve reliably. The scheduled work may be missing the
target time by a tick or two and be constantly rescheduled every second.
Relax the limit to 10 ticks. As a typical RTC drifts in the 11-minute
update interval by several milliseconds, this shouldn't affect the
overall accuracy of the RTC much.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 70e5975d3a upstream.
On an SMP system with only one global clockevent and a dummy
clockevent per CPU we run into problems. We want the dummy
clockevents to be registered as the per CPU tick devices, but
we can only achieve that if we register the dummy clockevents
before the global clockevent or if we artificially inflate the
rating of the dummy clockevents to be higher than the rating
of the global clockevent. Failure to do so leads to boot
hangs when the dummy timers are registered on all other CPUs
besides the CPU that accepted the global clockevent as its tick
device and there is no broadcast timer to poke the dummy
devices.
If we're registering multiple clockevents and one clockevent is
global and the other is local to a particular CPU we should
choose to use the local clockevent regardless of the rating of
the device. This way, if the clockevent is a dummy it will take
the tick device duty as long as there isn't a higher rated tick
device and any global clockevent will be bumped out into
broadcast mode, fixing the problem described above.
Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: soren.brinkmann@xilinx.com
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130613183950.GA32061@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5fca243ab upstream.
Since be44562613 ("cgroup: remove synchronize_rcu() from
cgroup_diput()"), cgroup destruction path makes use of workqueue. css
freeing is performed from a work item from that point on and a later
commit, ea15f8ccdb ("cgroup: split cgroup destruction into two
steps"), moves css offlining to workqueue too.
As cgroup destruction isn't depended upon for memory reclaim, the
destruction work items were put on the system_wq; unfortunately, some
controller may block in the destruction path for considerable duration
while holding cgroup_mutex. As large part of destruction path is
synchronized through cgroup_mutex, when combined with high rate of
cgroup removals, this has potential to fill up system_wq's max_active
of 256.
Also, it turns out that memcg's css destruction path ends up queueing
and waiting for work items on system_wq through work_on_cpu(). If
such operation happens while system_wq is fully occupied by cgroup
destruction work items, work_on_cpu() can't make forward progress
because system_wq is full and other destruction work items on
system_wq can't make forward progress because the work item waiting
for work_on_cpu() is holding cgroup_mutex, leading to deadlock.
This can be fixed by queueing destruction work items on a separate
workqueue. This patch creates a dedicated workqueue -
cgroup_destroy_wq - for this purpose. As these work items shouldn't
have inter-dependencies and mostly serialized by cgroup_mutex anyway,
giving high concurrency level doesn't buy anything and the workqueue's
@max_active is set to 1 so that destruction work items are executed
one by one on each CPU.
Hugh Dickins: Because cgroup_init() is run before init_workqueues(),
cgroup_destroy_wq can't be allocated from cgroup_init(). Do it from a
separate core_initcall(). In the future, we probably want to reorder
so that workqueue init happens before cgroup_init().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Shawn Bohrer <shawn.bohrer@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131111220626.GA7509@sbohrermbp13-local.rgmadvisors.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/alpine.LNX.2.00.1310301606080.2333@eggly.anvils
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0fc0287c9e upstream.
Juri hit the below lockdep report:
[ 4.303391] ======================================================
[ 4.303392] [ INFO: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected ]
[ 4.303394] 3.12.0-dl-peterz+ #144 Not tainted
[ 4.303395] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 4.303397] kworker/u4:3/689 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
[ 4.303399] (&p->mems_allowed_seq){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8114e63c>] new_slab+0x6c/0x290
[ 4.303417]
[ 4.303417] and this task is already holding:
[ 4.303418] (&(&q->__queue_lock)->rlock){..-...}, at: [<ffffffff812d2dfb>] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x5b/0x100
[ 4.303431] which would create a new lock dependency:
[ 4.303432] (&(&q->__queue_lock)->rlock){..-...} -> (&p->mems_allowed_seq){+.+...}
[ 4.303436]
[ 4.303898] the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
[ 4.303918] -> (&p->mems_allowed_seq){+.+...} ops: 2762 {
[ 4.303922] HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
[ 4.303923] [<ffffffff8108ab9a>] __lock_acquire+0x65a/0x1ff0
[ 4.303926] [<ffffffff8108cbe3>] lock_acquire+0x93/0x140
[ 4.303929] [<ffffffff81063dd6>] kthreadd+0x86/0x180
[ 4.303931] [<ffffffff816ded6c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 4.303933] SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
[ 4.303933] [<ffffffff8108abcc>] __lock_acquire+0x68c/0x1ff0
[ 4.303935] [<ffffffff8108cbe3>] lock_acquire+0x93/0x140
[ 4.303940] [<ffffffff81063dd6>] kthreadd+0x86/0x180
[ 4.303955] [<ffffffff816ded6c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 4.303959] INITIAL USE at:
[ 4.303960] [<ffffffff8108a884>] __lock_acquire+0x344/0x1ff0
[ 4.303963] [<ffffffff8108cbe3>] lock_acquire+0x93/0x140
[ 4.303966] [<ffffffff81063dd6>] kthreadd+0x86/0x180
[ 4.303969] [<ffffffff816ded6c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 4.303972] }
Which reports that we take mems_allowed_seq with interrupts enabled. A
little digging found that this can only be from
cpuset_change_task_nodemask().
This is an actual deadlock because an interrupt doing an allocation will
hit get_mems_allowed()->...->__read_seqcount_begin(), which will spin
forever waiting for the write side to complete.
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Reported-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8a2b753844 upstream.
An ordered workqueue implements execution ordering by using single
pool_workqueue with max_active == 1. On a given pool_workqueue, work
items are processed in FIFO order and limiting max_active to 1
enforces the queued work items to be processed one by one.
Unfortunately, 4c16bd327c ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for
unbound workqueues") accidentally broke this guarantee by applying
NUMA affinity to ordered workqueues too. On NUMA setups, an ordered
workqueue would end up with separate pool_workqueues for different
nodes. Each pool_workqueue still limits max_active to 1 but multiple
work items may be executed concurrently and out of order depending on
which node they are queued to.
Fix it by using dedicated ordered_wq_attrs[] when creating ordered
workqueues. The new attrs match the unbound ones except that no_numa
is always set thus forcing all NUMA nodes to share the default
pool_workqueue.
While at it, add sanity check in workqueue creation path which
verifies that an ordered workqueues has only the default
pool_workqueue.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8a56d7761d upstream.
Commit 8c4f3c3fa9 "ftrace: Check module functions being traced on reload"
fixed module loading and unloading with respect to function tracing, but
it missed the function graph tracer. If you perform the following
# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# modprobe nfsd
# echo nop > current_tracer
You'll get the following oops message:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2910 at /linux.git/kernel/trace/ftrace.c:1640 __ftrace_hash_rec_update.part.35+0x168/0x1b9()
Modules linked in: nfsd exportfs nfs_acl lockd ipt_MASQUERADE sunrpc ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_filter ip6_tables uinput snd_hda_codec_idt
CPU: 2 PID: 2910 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.13.0-rc1-test #7
Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS SDBLI944.86P 05/08/2007
0000000000000668 ffff8800787efcf8 ffffffff814fe193 ffff88007d500000
0000000000000000 ffff8800787efd38 ffffffff8103b80a 0000000000000668
ffffffff810b2b9a ffffffff81a48370 0000000000000001 ffff880037aea000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff814fe193>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c
[<ffffffff8103b80a>] warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0x9b
[<ffffffff810b2b9a>] ? __ftrace_hash_rec_update.part.35+0x168/0x1b9
[<ffffffff8103b83e>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x1c
[<ffffffff810b2b9a>] __ftrace_hash_rec_update.part.35+0x168/0x1b9
[<ffffffff81502f89>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x364/0x364
[<ffffffff810b2cc2>] ftrace_shutdown+0xd7/0x12b
[<ffffffff810b47f0>] unregister_ftrace_graph+0x49/0x78
[<ffffffff810c4b30>] graph_trace_reset+0xe/0x10
[<ffffffff810bf393>] tracing_set_tracer+0xa7/0x26a
[<ffffffff810bf5e1>] tracing_set_trace_write+0x8b/0xbd
[<ffffffff810c501c>] ? ftrace_return_to_handler+0xb2/0xde
[<ffffffff811240a8>] ? __sb_end_write+0x5e/0x5e
[<ffffffff81122aed>] vfs_write+0xab/0xf6
[<ffffffff8150a185>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x85/0x85
[<ffffffff81122dbd>] SyS_write+0x59/0x82
[<ffffffff8150a185>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x85/0x85
[<ffffffff8150a2d2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
---[ end trace 940358030751eafb ]---
The above mentioned commit didn't go far enough. Well, it covered the
function tracer by adding checks in __register_ftrace_function(). The
problem is that the function graph tracer circumvents that (for a slight
efficiency gain when function graph trace is running with a function
tracer. The gain was not worth this).
The problem came with ftrace_startup() which should always be called after
__register_ftrace_function(), if you want this bug to be completely fixed.
Anyway, this solution moves __register_ftrace_function() inside of
ftrace_startup() and removes the need to call them both.
Reported-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Fixes: ed926f9b35 ("ftrace: Use counters to enable functions to trace")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d3aea84a4a upstream.
...to make it clear what the intent behind each record's operation was.
In many cases you can infer this, based on the context of the syscall
and the result. In other cases it's not so obvious. For instance, in
the case where you have a file being renamed over another, you'll have
two different records with the same filename but different inode info.
By logging this information we can clearly tell which one was created
and which was deleted.
This fixes what was broken in commit bfcec708.
Commit 79f6530c should also be backported to stable v3.7+.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 79f6530cb5 upstream.
The old audit PATH records for mq_open looked like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=1 name=(null) inode=6777
dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=26732
dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
...with the audit related changes that went into 3.7, they now look like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=2 name=(null) inode=66655
dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=1 name=(null) inode=6926
dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=0 name="test_mq"
Both of these look wrong to me. As Steve Grubb pointed out:
"What we need is 1 PATH record that identifies the MQ. The other PATH
records probably should not be there."
Fix it to record the mq root as a parent, and flag it such that it
should be hidden from view when the names are logged, since the root of
the mq filesystem isn't terribly interesting. With this change, we get
a single PATH record that looks more like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1368021604.836:484): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=16914
dev=00:0c mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0
In order to do this, a new audit_inode_parent_hidden() function is
added. If we do it this way, then we avoid having the existing callers
of audit_inode needing to do any sort of flag conversion if auditing is
inactive.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4d8fe7376a upstream.
Using the nlmsg_len member of the netlink header to test if the message
is valid is wrong as it includes the size of the netlink header itself.
Thereby allowing to send short netlink messages that pass those checks.
Use nlmsg_len() instead to test for the right message length. The result
of nlmsg_len() is guaranteed to be non-negative as the netlink message
already passed the checks of nlmsg_ok().
Also switch to min_t() to please checkpatch.pl.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0868a5e150 upstream.
When the audit=1 kernel parameter is absent and auditd is not running,
AUDIT_USER_AVC messages are being silently discarded.
AUDIT_USER_AVC messages should be sent to userspace using printk(), as
mentioned in the commit message of 4a4cd633 ("AUDIT: Optimise the
audit-disabled case for discarding user messages").
When audit_enabled is 0, audit_receive_msg() discards all user messages
except for AUDIT_USER_AVC messages. However, audit_log_common_recv_msg()
refuses to allocate an audit_buffer if audit_enabled is 0. The fix is to
special case AUDIT_USER_AVC messages in both functions.
It looks like commit 50397bd1 ("[AUDIT] clean up audit_receive_msg()")
introduced this bug.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fd432b9f8c upstream.
When system has a lot of highmem (e.g. 16GiB using a 32 bits kernel),
the code to calculate how much memory we need to preallocate in
normal zone may cause overflow. As Leon has analysed:
It looks that during computing 'alloc' variable there is overflow:
alloc = (3943404 - 1970542) - 1978280 = -5418 (signed)
And this function goes to err_out.
Fix this by avoiding that overflow.
References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60817
Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Drugi <eyak@wp.pl>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 98d6f4dd84 upstream.
Fedora Ruby maintainer reported latest Ruby doesn't work on Fedora Rawhide
on ARM. (http://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/9008)
Because of, commit 1c6b39ad3f (alarmtimers: Return -ENOTSUPP if no
RTC device is present) intruduced to return ENOTSUPP when
clock_get{time,res} can't find a RTC device. However this is incorrect.
First, ENOTSUPP isn't exported to userland (ENOTSUP or EOPNOTSUP are the
closest userland equivlents).
Second, Posix and Linux man pages agree that clock_gettime and
clock_getres should return EINVAL if clk_id argument is invalid.
While the arugment that the clockid is valid, but just not supported
on this hardware could be made, this is just a technicality that
doesn't help userspace applicaitons, and only complicates error
handling.
Thus, this patch changes the code to use EINVAL.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vit Ondruch <v.ondruch@tiscali.cz>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
[jstultz: Tweaks to commit message to include full rational]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d049f74f2d upstream.
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 12ae030d54 upstream.
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5 ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea81174789 upstream.
Mike reported that commit 7d1a9417 ("x86: Use generic idle loop")
regressed several workloads and caused excessive reschedule
interrupts.
The patch in question failed to notice that the x86 code had an
inverted sense of the polling state versus the new generic code (x86:
default polling, generic: default !polling).
Fix the two prominent x86 mwait based idle drivers and introduce a few
new generic polling helpers (fixing the wrong smp_mb__after_clear_bit
usage).
Also switch the idle routines to using tif_need_resched() which is an
immediate TIF_NEED_RESCHED test as opposed to need_resched which will
end up being slightly different.
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: lenb@kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-nc03imb0etuefmzybzj7sprf@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 057db8488b upstream.
Andrey reported the following report:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3
ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3)
Accessed by thread T13003:
#0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440)
#1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40)
#2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20)
#3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260)
#4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360)
#5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30)
#6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140)
#7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0)
#8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130)
#9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30)
#10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)
Allocated by thread T5167:
#0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0)
#1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500)
#2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90)
#3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0)
#4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40)
#5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430)
#6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0)
#7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710)
#8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50)
#9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0)
#10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0)
#11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50)
#12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb
ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap redzone: fa
Heap kmalloc redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Shadow gap: fe
The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;'
Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug
occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to
parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered
is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop
that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because
there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine
what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size.
Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character
with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul
character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory.
Luckily, only root user has write access to this file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 97b9410643 upstream.
Marc Kleine-Budde pointed out, that commit 77cc982 "clocksource: use
clockevents_config_and_register() where possible" caused a regression
for some of the converted subarchs.
The reason is, that the clockevents core code converts the minimal
hardware tick delta to a nanosecond value for core internal
usage. This conversion is affected by integer math rounding loss, so
the backwards conversion to hardware ticks will likely result in a
value which is less than the configured hardware limitation. The
affected subarchs used their own workaround (SIGH!) which got lost in
the conversion.
The solution for the issue at hand is simple: adding evt->mult - 1 to
the shifted value before the integer divison in the core conversion
function takes care of it. But this only works for the case where for
the scaled math mult/shift pair "mult <= 1 << shift" is true. For the
case where "mult > 1 << shift" we can apply the rounding add only for
the minimum delta value to make sure that the backward conversion is
not less than the given hardware limit. For the upper bound we need to
omit the rounding add, because the backwards conversion is always
larger than the original latch value. That would violate the upper
bound of the hardware device.
Though looking closer at the details of that function reveals another
bogosity: The upper bounds check is broken as well. Checking for a
resulting "clc" value greater than KTIME_MAX after the conversion is
pointless. The conversion does:
u64 clc = (latch << evt->shift) / evt->mult;
So there is no sanity check for (latch << evt->shift) exceeding the
64bit boundary. The latch argument is "unsigned long", so on a 64bit
arch the handed in argument could easily lead to an unnoticed shift
overflow. With the above rounding fix applied the calculation before
the divison is:
u64 clc = (latch << evt->shift) + evt->mult - 1;
So we need to make sure, that neither the shift nor the rounding add
is overflowing the u64 boundary.
[ukl: move assignment to rnd after eventually changing mult, fix build
issue and correct comment with the right math]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: nicolas.ferre@atmel.com
Cc: Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch>
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de
Cc: Ronald Wahl <ronald.wahl@raritan.com>
Cc: LAK <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@atmel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1380052223-24139-1-git-send-email-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea84753c98 upstream.
Both Anjana and Eunki reported a stall in the while_each_thread loop
in cgroup_attach_task().
It's because, when we attach a single thread to a cgroup, if the cgroup
is exiting or is already in that cgroup, we won't break the loop.
If the task is already in the cgroup, the bug can lead to another thread
being attached to the cgroup unexpectedly:
# echo 5207 > tasks
# cat tasks
5207
# echo 5207 > tasks
# cat tasks
5207
5215
What's worse, if the task to be attached isn't the leader of the thread
group, we might never exit the loop, hence cpu stall. Thanks for Oleg's
analysis.
This bug was introduced by commit 081aa458c3
("cgroup: consolidate cgroup_attach_task() and cgroup_attach_proc()")
[ lizf: - fixed the first continue, pointed out by Oleg,
- rewrote changelog. ]
Reported-by: Eunki Kim <eunki_kim@samsung.com>
Reported-by: Anjana V Kumar <anjanavk12@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anjana V Kumar <anjanavk12@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ded7975475 upstream.
The commit facd8b80c6
("irq: Sanitize invoke_softirq") converted irq exit
calls of do_softirq() to __do_softirq() on all architectures,
assuming it was only used there for its irq disablement
properties.
But as a side effect, the softirqs processed in the end
of the hardirq are always called on the inline current
stack that is used by irq_exit() instead of the softirq
stack provided by the archs that override do_softirq().
The result is mostly safe if the architecture runs irq_exit()
on a separate irq stack because then softirqs are processed
on that same stack that is near empty at this stage (assuming
hardirq aren't nesting).
Otherwise irq_exit() runs in the task stack and so does the softirq
too. The interrupted call stack can be randomly deep already and
the softirq can dig through it even further. To add insult to the
injury, this softirq can be interrupted by a new hardirq, maximizing
the chances for a stack overrun as reported in powerpc for example:
do_IRQ: stack overflow: 1920
CPU: 0 PID: 1602 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 3.10.4-300.1.fc19.ppc64p7 #1
Call Trace:
[c0000000050a8740] .show_stack+0x130/0x200 (unreliable)
[c0000000050a8810] .dump_stack+0x28/0x3c
[c0000000050a8880] .do_IRQ+0x2b8/0x2c0
[c0000000050a8930] hardware_interrupt_common+0x154/0x180
--- Exception: 501 at .cp_start_xmit+0x3a4/0x820 [8139cp]
LR = .cp_start_xmit+0x390/0x820 [8139cp]
[c0000000050a8d40] .dev_hard_start_xmit+0x394/0x640
[c0000000050a8e00] .sch_direct_xmit+0x110/0x260
[c0000000050a8ea0] .dev_queue_xmit+0x260/0x630
[c0000000050a8f40] .br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xc4/0x130 [bridge]
[c0000000050a8fc0] .br_dev_xmit+0x198/0x270 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9070] .dev_hard_start_xmit+0x394/0x640
[c0000000050a9130] .dev_queue_xmit+0x428/0x630
[c0000000050a91d0] .ip_finish_output+0x2a4/0x550
[c0000000050a9290] .ip_local_out+0x50/0x70
[c0000000050a9310] .ip_queue_xmit+0x148/0x420
[c0000000050a93b0] .tcp_transmit_skb+0x4e4/0xaf0
[c0000000050a94a0] .__tcp_ack_snd_check+0x7c/0xf0
[c0000000050a9520] .tcp_rcv_established+0x1e8/0x930
[c0000000050a95f0] .tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x21c/0x570
[c0000000050a96c0] .tcp_v4_rcv+0x734/0x930
[c0000000050a97a0] .ip_local_deliver_finish+0x184/0x360
[c0000000050a9840] .ip_rcv_finish+0x148/0x400
[c0000000050a98d0] .__netif_receive_skb_core+0x4f8/0xb00
[c0000000050a99d0] .netif_receive_skb+0x44/0x110
[c0000000050a9a70] .br_handle_frame_finish+0x2bc/0x3f0 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9b20] .br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x2ac/0x420 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9bd0] .br_nf_pre_routing+0x4dc/0x7d0 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9c70] .nf_iterate+0x114/0x130
[c0000000050a9d30] .nf_hook_slow+0xb4/0x1e0
[c0000000050a9e00] .br_handle_frame+0x290/0x330 [bridge]
[c0000000050a9ea0] .__netif_receive_skb_core+0x34c/0xb00
[c0000000050a9fa0] .netif_receive_skb+0x44/0x110
[c0000000050aa040] .napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x120
[c0000000050aa0c0] .cp_rx_poll+0x31c/0x590 [8139cp]
[c0000000050aa1d0] .net_rx_action+0x1dc/0x310
[c0000000050aa2b0] .__do_softirq+0x158/0x330
[c0000000050aa3b0] .irq_exit+0xc8/0x110
[c0000000050aa430] .do_IRQ+0xdc/0x2c0
[c0000000050aa4e0] hardware_interrupt_common+0x154/0x180
--- Exception: 501 at .bad_range+0x1c/0x110
LR = .get_page_from_freelist+0x908/0xbb0
[c0000000050aa7d0] .list_del+0x18/0x50 (unreliable)
[c0000000050aa850] .get_page_from_freelist+0x908/0xbb0
[c0000000050aa9e0] .__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x21c/0xae0
[c0000000050aaba0] .alloc_pages_vma+0xd0/0x210
[c0000000050aac60] .handle_pte_fault+0x814/0xb70
[c0000000050aad50] .__get_user_pages+0x1a4/0x640
[c0000000050aae60] .get_user_pages_fast+0xec/0x160
[c0000000050aaf10] .__gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x3b0/0x430 [kvm]
[c0000000050aafd0] .kvmppc_gfn_to_pfn+0x64/0x130 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab070] .kvmppc_mmu_map_page+0x94/0x530 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab190] .kvmppc_handle_pagefault+0x174/0x610 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab270] .kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x464/0x9b0 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab320] kvm_start_lightweight+0x1ec/0x1fc [kvm]
[c0000000050ab4f0] .kvmppc_vcpu_run_pr+0x168/0x3b0 [kvm]
[c0000000050ab9c0] .kvmppc_vcpu_run+0xc8/0xf0 [kvm]
[c0000000050aba50] .kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5c/0x1a0 [kvm]
[c0000000050abae0] .kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x478/0x730 [kvm]
[c0000000050abc90] .do_vfs_ioctl+0x4ec/0x7c0
[c0000000050abd80] .SyS_ioctl+0xd4/0xf0
[c0000000050abe30] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98
Since this is a regression, this patch proposes a minimalistic
and low-risk solution by blindly forcing the hardirq exit processing of
softirqs on the softirq stack. This way we should reduce significantly
the opportunities for task stack overflow dug by softirqs.
Longer term solutions may involve extending the hardirq stack coverage to
irq_exit(), etc...
Reported-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
