media: ov5647: Use gpiod_set_value_cansleep

All calls to the gpio library are in contexts that can sleep,
therefore there is no issue with having those GPIOs controlled
by controllers which require sleeping (eg I2C GPIO expanders).

Switch to using gpiod_set_value_cansleep instead of gpiod_set_value
to avoid triggering the warning in gpiolib should the GPIO
controller need to sleep.

Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <dave.stevenson@raspberrypi.org>

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -390,3 +391,26 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
+
+		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
+		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+Date:		June 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Control Symetric Multi Threading (SMT)
+
+		active:  Tells whether SMT is active (enabled and siblings online)
+
+		control: Read/write interface to control SMT. Possible
+			 values:
+
+			 "on"		SMT is enabled
+			 "off"		SMT is disabled
+			 "forceoff"	SMT is force disabled. Cannot be changed.
+			 "notsupported" SMT is not supported by the CPU
+
+			 If control status is "forceoff" or "notsupported" writes
+			 are rejected.

Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst

@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   l1tf
+
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.
 

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1888,10 +1888,84 @@
 			(virtualized real and unpaged mode) on capable
 			Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=[KVM,Intel] Mitigation for L1 Terminal Fault
+			CVE-2018-3620.
+
+			Valid arguments: never, cond, always
+
+			always: L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+			cond:	Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between
+				VMEXIT and VMENTER can leak host memory.
+			never:	Disables the mitigation
+
+			Default is cond (do L1 cache flush in specific instances)
+
 	kvm-intel.vpid=	[KVM,Intel] Disable Virtual Processor Identification
 			feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	l1tf=           [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
+			      affected CPUs
+
+			The kernel PTE inversion protection is unconditionally
+			enabled and cannot be disabled.
+
+			full
+				Provides all available mitigations for the
+				L1TF vulnerability. Disables SMT and
+				enables all mitigations in the
+				hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			full,force
+				Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D
+				flush runtime control. Implies the
+				'nosmt=force' command line option.
+				(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+			flush
+				Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation, i.e. conditional
+				L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nosmt
+
+				Disables SMT and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nowarn
+				Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not
+				warn when a VM is started in a potentially
+				insecure configuration.
+
+			off
+				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
+				emit any warnings.
+
+			Default is 'flush'.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
 	l3cr=		[PPC]
@@ -2595,6 +2669,10 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+			[KNL,x86] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
+			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
+				     via the sysfs control file.
+
 	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent

Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
+========================
+
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
+when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
+for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
+     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
+
+   - The Intel XEON PHI family
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
+     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
+     available by end of 2018.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
+
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
+table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
+then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
+data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
+by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
+
+While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
+a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
+data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
+opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
+similar to the Meltdown attack.
+
+While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
+allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
+works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
+works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
+extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+1. Malicious user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
+   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
+   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
+   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
+   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
+   deterministic and more practical.
+
+   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
+   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
+   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
+   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
+
+   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
+   malicious user space applications.
+
+2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
+   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
+   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
+   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
+
+   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
+   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
+   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
+   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
+   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
+   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
+   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
+   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
+
+   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
+   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
+   effective (shadow) page tables.
+
+   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
+   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
+   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
+   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
+   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
+   are described in the next sections.
+
+   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
+   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
+
+.. _l1tf_sys_info:
+
+L1TF system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  ===========================   ===============================
+  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
+  ===========================   ===============================
+
+If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
+information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
+
+  - SMT status:
+
+    =====================  ================
+    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
+    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
+    =====================  ================
+
+  - L1D Flush mode:
+
+    ================================  ====================================
+    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
+
+    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
+
+    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
+    ================================  ====================================
+
+The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
+
+
+Host mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
+user space running on the host.
+
+
+Guest mitigation mechanisms
+---------------------------
+
+.. _l1d_flush:
+
+1. L1D flush on VMENTER
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
+   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
+
+   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
+   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
+   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
+   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
+   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
+   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
+   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
+   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
+   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
+   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
+
+   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
+    - conditional ('cond')
+    - unconditional ('always')
+
+   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
+   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
+   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
+   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
+   address space layout of the hypervisor.
+
+   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
+   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
+   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
+   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
+
+   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
+   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
+
+   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
+   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
+   attackable again.
+
+   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
+   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
+   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+.. _guest_confinement:
+
+2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
+   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
+   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
+   host tasks can run on these cores.
+
+   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
+   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
+   restricted parts of the host memory.
+
+   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
+   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
+   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
+   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
+   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
+   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
+   the code.
+
+   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
+   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
+   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
+   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
+   scenarios.
+
+   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
+   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
+
+.. _interrupt_isolation:
+
+3. Interrupt affinity
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
+   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
+   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
+   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
+   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
+
+   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
+   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
+
+   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
+   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
+   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
+   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
+   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
+   is no way to make general assumptions.
+
+   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
+   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
+   available at:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
+
+.. _smt_control:
+
+4. SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
+   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
+   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
+   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
+   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
+
+   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
+   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
+   control SMT.
+
+   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
+
+     =========== ==========================================================
+     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
+		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
+		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
+		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
+		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
+		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
+		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
+		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
+
+     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
+		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
+     =========== ==========================================================
+
+   The sysfs interface provides two files:
+
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
+
+     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
+     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
+
+	==============  ===================================================
+	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
+			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
+			restrictions.
+
+	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
+			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
+			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
+			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
+
+	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+
+	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
+			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+	==============  ===================================================
+
+     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
+     state are:
+
+     - on
+     - off
+     - forceoff
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
+
+     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
+     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
+
+   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
+   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+5. Disabling EPT
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
+  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
+  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
+  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
+  KPTI is enabled.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
+address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
+
+.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
+		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
+		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
+		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
+		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
+		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
+		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
+		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
+
+  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
+		warnings.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
+
+
+.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
+entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
+
+The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
+following arguments:
+
+  ============  ==============================================================
+  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+
+  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
+		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
+		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
+		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
+
+  never		Disables the mitigation
+  ============  ==============================================================
+
+The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
+parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
+file:
+
+/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
+
+The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
+line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
+module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
+   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
+   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
+
+   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
+   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
+   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
+  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
+
+  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
+  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
+  VMENTER is not required.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
+  mitigations can be employed:
+
+  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
+
+    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
+    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
+
+    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Guest confinement:
+
+    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
+    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
+    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
+    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
+    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
+
+  - Interrupt isolation:
+
+    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
+    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
+    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
+    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
+    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
+    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
+    which might expose valuable information. See
+    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
+
+The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
+certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
+carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
+available:
+
+  - Disabling SMT:
+
+    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
+    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
+    above mitigation methods.
+
+    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
+    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
+    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Disabling EPT:
+
+    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
+    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
+    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
+    significant.
+
+    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
+    parameter.
+
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+   nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
+
+.. _default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+
+  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
+    a guest.
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
+
+  The rationale for this choice is:
+
+  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
+    unattended updates.
+
+  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
+    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
+    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
+
+    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
+    on their machines blindly.
+
+  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
+    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
+    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
+    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
+    be possible, then the default might be different.
+
+  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
+    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
+    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
+    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
+    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
+    kind of scenarios.

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/rpi-poe-fan.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Bindings for the Raspberry Pi PoE HAT fan
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible	: "raspberrypi,rpi-poe-fan"
+- firmware	: Reference to the RPi firmware device node
+- pwms		: the PWM that is used to control the PWM fan
+- cooling-levels      : PWM duty cycle values in a range from 0 to 255
+			which correspond to thermal cooling states
+
+Example:
+	fan0: rpi-poe-fan@0 {
+		compatible = "raspberrypi,rpi-poe-fan";
+		firmware = <&firmware>;
+		cooling-min-state = <0>;
+		cooling-max-state = <3>;
+		#cooling-cells = <2>;
+		cooling-levels = <0 50 150 255>;
+		status = "okay";
+	};
+
+	thermal-zones {
+		cpu_thermal: cpu-thermal {
+			trips {
+				threshold: trip-point@0 {
+					temperature = <45000>;
+					hysteresis = <5000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+				target: trip-point@1 {
+					temperature = <50000>;
+					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+				cpu_hot: cpu_hot@0 {
+					temperature = <55000>;
+					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+			};
+			cooling-maps {
+				map0 {
+					trip = <&threshold>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 0 1>;
+				};
+				map1 {
+					trip = <&target>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 1 2>;
+				};
+				map2 {
+					trip = <&cpu_hot>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 2 3>;
+				};
+			};
+		};
+	};

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/qca8k.txt

@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
 
 Required properties:
 
-- compatible: should be "qca,qca8337"
+- compatible: should be one of:
+    "qca,qca8334"
+    "qca,qca8337"
+
 - #size-cells: must be 0
 - #address-cells: must be 1
 
@@ -14,6 +17,20 @@ port and PHY id, each subnode describing a port needs to have a valid phandle
 referencing the internal PHY connected to it. The CPU port of this switch is
 always port 0.
 
+A CPU port node has the following optional node:
+
+- fixed-link            : Fixed-link subnode describing a link to a non-MDIO
+                          managed entity. See
+                          Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fixed-link.txt
+                          for details.
+
+For QCA8K the 'fixed-link' sub-node supports only the following properties:
+
+- 'speed' (integer, mandatory), to indicate the link speed. Accepted
+  values are 10, 100 and 1000
+- 'full-duplex' (boolean, optional), to indicate that full duplex is
+  used. When absent, half duplex is assumed.
+
 Example:
 
 
@@ -53,6 +70,10 @@ Example:
 					label = "cpu";
 					ethernet = <&gmac1>;
 					phy-mode = "rgmii";
+					fixed-link {
+						speed = 1000;
+						full-duplex;
+					};
 				};
 
 				port@1 {

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/meson-dwmac.txt

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Required properties on all platforms:
 			- "amlogic,meson6-dwmac"
 			- "amlogic,meson8b-dwmac"
 			- "amlogic,meson-gxbb-dwmac"
+			- "amlogic,meson-axg-dwmac"
 		Additionally "snps,dwmac" and any applicable more
 		detailed version number described in net/stmmac.txt
 		should be used.

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/meson,pinctrl.txt

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
 Required properties for the root node:
  - compatible: one of "amlogic,meson8-cbus-pinctrl"
 		      "amlogic,meson8b-cbus-pinctrl"
+		      "amlogic,meson8m2-cbus-pinctrl"
 		      "amlogic,meson8-aobus-pinctrl"
 		      "amlogic,meson8b-aobus-pinctrl"
+		      "amlogic,meson8m2-aobus-pinctrl"
 		      "amlogic,meson-gxbb-periphs-pinctrl"
 		      "amlogic,meson-gxbb-aobus-pinctrl"
 		      "amlogic,meson-gxl-periphs-pinctrl"

Documentation/hwmon/rpi-poe-fan

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Kernel driver rpi-poe-fan
+=====================
+
+This driver enables the use of the Raspberry Pi PoE HAT fan.
+
+Author: Serge Schneider <serge@raspberrypi.org>
+
+Description
+-----------
+
+The driver implements a simple interface for driving the Raspberry Pi PoE
+(Power over Ethernet) HAT fan. The driver passes commands to the Raspberry Pi
+firmware through the mailbox property interface. The firmware then forwards
+the commands to the board over I2C on the ID_EEPROM pins. The driver exposes
+the fan to the user space through the hwmon sysfs interface.

Documentation/process/changes.rst

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ GNU C                  3.2              gcc --version
 GNU make               3.81             make --version
 binutils               2.20             ld -v
 util-linux             2.10o            fdformat --version
-module-init-tools      0.9.10           depmod -V
+kmod                   13               depmod -V
 e2fsprogs              1.41.4           e2fsck -V
 jfsutils               1.1.3            fsck.jfs -V
 reiserfsprogs          3.6.3            reiserfsck -V
@@ -141,12 +141,6 @@ is not build with ``CONFIG_KALLSYMS`` and you have no way to rebuild and
 reproduce the Oops with that option, then you can still decode that Oops
 with ksymoops.
 
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-A new module loader is now in the kernel that requires ``module-init-tools``
-to use.  It is backward compatible with the 2.4.x series kernels.
-
 Mkinitrd
 --------
 
@@ -346,16 +340,17 @@ Util-linux
 
 - <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/>
 
+Kmod
+----
+
+- <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kmod/>
+- <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git>
+
 Ksymoops
 --------
 
 - <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/ksymoops/v2.4/>
 
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-- <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/module-init-tools/>
-
 Mkinitrd
 --------
 

Documentation/vfio-mediated-device.txt

@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ The functions in the mdev_parent_ops structure are as follows:
 * create: allocate basic resources in a driver for a mediated device
 * remove: free resources in a driver when a mediated device is destroyed
 
+(Note that mdev-core provides no implicit serialization of create/remove
+callbacks per mdev parent device, per mdev type, or any other categorization.
+Vendor drivers are expected to be fully asynchronous in this respect or
+provide their own internal resource protection.)
+
 The callbacks in the mdev_parent_ops structure are as follows:
 
 * open: open callback of mediated device

Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt

@@ -123,14 +123,15 @@ memory layout to fit in user mode), check KVM_CAP_MIPS_VZ and use the
 flag KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ.
 
 
-4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST
+4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
 
-Capability: basic
+Capability: basic, KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES for KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
 Architectures: x86
-Type: system
+Type: system ioctl
 Parameters: struct kvm_msr_list (in/out)
 Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
 Errors:
+  EFAULT:    the msr index list cannot be read from or written to
   E2BIG:     the msr index list is to be to fit in the array specified by
              the user.
 
@@ -139,16 +140,23 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
 	__u32 indices[0];
 };
 
-This ioctl returns the guest msrs that are supported.  The list varies
+The user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
-by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.  The
+kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in the
-user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
+indices array with their numbers.
-kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in
+
-the indices array with their numbers.
+KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST returns the guest msrs that are supported.  The list
+varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.
 
 Note: if kvm indicates supports MCE (KVM_CAP_MCE), then the MCE bank MSRs are
 not returned in the MSR list, as different vcpus can have a different number
 of banks, as set via the KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE ioctl.
 
+KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST returns the list of MSRs that can be passed
+to the KVM_GET_MSRS system ioctl.  This lets userspace probe host capabilities
+and processor features that are exposed via MSRs (e.g., VMX capabilities).
+This list also varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change
+otherwise.
+
 
 4.4 KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
 
@@ -475,14 +483,22 @@ Support for this has been removed.  Use KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG instead.
 
 4.18 KVM_GET_MSRS
 
-Capability: basic
+Capability: basic (vcpu), KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES (system)
 Architectures: x86
-Type: vcpu ioctl
+Type: system ioctl, vcpu ioctl
 Parameters: struct kvm_msrs (in/out)
-Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+Returns: number of msrs successfully returned;
+        -1 on error
 
+When used as a system ioctl:
+Reads the values of MSR-based features that are available for the VM.  This
+is similar to KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it returns MSR indices and values.
+The list of msr-based features can be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
+in a system ioctl.
+
+When used as a vcpu ioctl:
 Reads model-specific registers from the vcpu.  Supported msr indices can
-be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.
+be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST in a system ioctl.
 
 struct kvm_msrs {
 	__u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in entries */

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 59
+SUBLEVEL = 70
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Petit Gorille
 
@@ -357,9 +357,9 @@ CONFIG_SHELL := $(shell if [ -x "$$BASH" ]; then echo $$BASH; \
 	  else if [ -x /bin/bash ]; then echo /bin/bash; \
 	  else echo sh; fi ; fi)
 
-HOST_LFS_CFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_CFLAGS)
+HOST_LFS_CFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_CFLAGS 2>/dev/null)
-HOST_LFS_LDFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_LDFLAGS)
+HOST_LFS_LDFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_LDFLAGS 2>/dev/null)
-HOST_LFS_LIBS := $(shell getconf LFS_LIBS)
+HOST_LFS_LIBS := $(shell getconf LFS_LIBS 2>/dev/null)
 
 HOSTCC       = gcc
 HOSTCXX      = g++
@@ -490,9 +490,13 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(CLANG_TARGET) $(CLANG_GCC_TC)
 endif
 
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register
+RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG := -mretpoline-external-thunk
+RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_CLANG := -mretpoline
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC),$(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG)))
+RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_GCC),$(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_CLANG)))
 export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
+export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS
 
 ifeq ($(config-targets),1)
 # ===========================================================================

arch/Kconfig

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ config KEXEC_CORE
 config HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
 	bool
 
+config HOTPLUG_SMT
+	bool
+
 config OPROFILE
 	tristate "OProfile system profiling"
 	depends on PROFILING
@@ -333,6 +336,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
 	bool
 
+config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_INVALIDATE
+	bool
+
 config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
 	bool
 

arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c

@@ -530,24 +530,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_mount, unsigned long, typenr, const char __user *, path,
 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(osf_utsname, char __user *, name)
 {
 	int error;
+	char tmp[5 * 32];
 
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
-	error = -EFAULT;
+	memcpy(tmp + 0 * 32, utsname()->sysname, 32);
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 0, utsname()->sysname, 32))
+	memcpy(tmp + 1 * 32, utsname()->nodename, 32);
-		goto out;
+	memcpy(tmp + 2 * 32, utsname()->release, 32);
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 32, utsname()->nodename, 32))
+	memcpy(tmp + 3 * 32, utsname()->version, 32);
-		goto out;
+	memcpy(tmp + 4 * 32, utsname()->machine, 32);
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 64, utsname()->release, 32))
-		goto out;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 96, utsname()->version, 32))
-		goto out;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 128, utsname()->machine, 32))
-		goto out;
-
-	error = 0;
- out:
 	up_read(&uts_sem);
-	return error;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpagesize)
@@ -567,18 +562,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
 {
 	int len, err = 0;
 	char *kname;
+	char tmp[32];
 
-	if (namelen > 32)
+	if (namelen < 0 || namelen > 32)
 		namelen = 32;
 
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
 	kname = utsname()->domainname;
 	len = strnlen(kname, namelen);
-	if (copy_to_user(name, kname, min(len + 1, namelen)))
+	len = min(len + 1, namelen);
-		err = -EFAULT;
+	memcpy(tmp, kname, len);
 	up_read(&uts_sem);
 
-	return err;
+	if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -739,13 +737,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
 	};
 	unsigned long offset;
 	const char *res;
-	long len, err = -EINVAL;
+	long len;
+	char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1];
 
 	offset = command-1;
 	if (offset >= ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_table)) {
 		/* Digital UNIX has a few unpublished interfaces here */
 		printk("sysinfo(%d)", command);
-		goto out;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
@@ -753,13 +752,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
 	len = strlen(res)+1;
 	if ((unsigned long)len > (unsigned long)count)
 		len = count;
-	if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
+	memcpy(tmp, res, len);
-		err = -EFAULT;
-	else
-		err = 0;
 	up_read(&uts_sem);
- out:
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, len))
-	return err;
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,

arch/arc/Kconfig

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ config ARC
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_LZMA
 
+config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
+	def_bool y
+
 config MIGHT_HAVE_PCI
 	bool
 

arch/arc/Makefile

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ endif
 
 KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_700_defconfig
 
-cflags-y	+= -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -D__linux__
+cflags-y	+= -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -mmedium-calls -D__linux__
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT)	+= -mA7
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2)	+= -mcpu=archs
 
@@ -140,16 +140,3 @@ dtbs: scripts
 
 archclean:
 	$(Q)$(MAKE) $(clean)=$(boot)
-
-# Hacks to enable final link due to absence of link-time branch relexation
-# and gcc choosing optimal(shorter) branches at -O3
-#
-# vineetg Feb 2010: -mlong-calls switched off for overall kernel build
-# However lib/decompress_inflate.o (.init.text) calls
-# zlib_inflate_workspacesize (.text) causing relocation errors.
-# Thus forcing all exten calls in this file to be long calls
-export CFLAGS_decompress_inflate.o = -mmedium-calls
-export CFLAGS_initramfs.o = -mmedium-calls
-ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-export CFLAGS_core.o = -mmedium-calls
-endif

arch/arc/include/asm/cache.h

@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@
 })
 
 /* Largest line length for either L1 or L2 is 128 bytes */
-#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN      128
+#define SMP_CACHE_BYTES		128
+#define cache_line_size()	SMP_CACHE_BYTES
+#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN	SMP_CACHE_BYTES
 
 extern void arc_cache_init(void);
 extern char *arc_cache_mumbojumbo(int cpu_id, char *buf, int len);

arch/arc/include/asm/delay.h

@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_ARC_UDELAY_H
 #define __ASM_ARC_UDELAY_H
 
+#include <asm-generic/types.h>
 #include <asm/param.h>		/* HZ */
 
+extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
+
 static inline void __delay(unsigned long loops)
 {
 	__asm__ __volatile__(

arch/arc/include/asm/mach_desc.h

@@ -34,9 +34,7 @@ struct machine_desc {
 	const char		*name;
 	const char		**dt_compat;
 	void			(*init_early)(void);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	void			(*init_per_cpu)(unsigned int);
-#endif
 	void			(*init_machine)(void);
 	void			(*init_late)(void);
 

arch/arc/kernel/irq.c

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ void __init init_IRQ(void)
 	/* a SMP H/w block could do IPI IRQ request here */
 	if (plat_smp_ops.init_per_cpu)
 		plat_smp_ops.init_per_cpu(smp_processor_id());
+#endif
 
 	if (machine_desc->init_per_cpu)
 		machine_desc->init_per_cpu(smp_processor_id());
-#endif
 }
 
 /*

arch/arc/kernel/process.c

@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(arc_gettls)
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(arc_usr_cmpxchg, int *, uaddr, int, expected, int, new)
 {
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
-	int uval = -EFAULT;
+	u32 uval;
+	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * This is only for old cores lacking LLOCK/SCOND, which by defintion
@@ -60,23 +61,47 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(arc_usr_cmpxchg, int *, uaddr, int, expected, int, new)
 	/* Z indicates to userspace if operation succeded */
 	regs->status32 &= ~STATUS_Z_MASK;
 
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(int)))
+	ret = access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(*uaddr));
-		return -EFAULT;
+	if (!ret)
+		 goto fail;
 
+again:
 	preempt_disable();
 
-	if (__get_user(uval, uaddr))
+	ret = __get_user(uval, uaddr);
-		goto done;
+	if (ret)
+		 goto fault;
+
+	if (uval != expected)
+		 goto out;
+
+	ret = __put_user(new, uaddr);
+	if (ret)
+		 goto fault;
 
-	if (uval == expected) {
-		if (!__put_user(new, uaddr))
 	regs->status32 |= STATUS_Z_MASK;
-	}
 
-done:
+out:
+	preempt_enable();
+	return uval;
+
+fault:
 	preempt_enable();
 
-	return uval;
+	if (unlikely(ret != -EFAULT))
+		 goto fail;
+
+	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = fixup_user_fault(current, current->mm, (unsigned long) uaddr,
+			       FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, NULL);
+	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	if (likely(!ret))
+		 goto again;
+
+fail:
+	force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2

arch/arc/mm/cache.c

@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ void flush_cache_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
 void flush_cache_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long u_vaddr,
 		      unsigned long pfn)
 {
-	unsigned int paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	phys_addr_t paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	u_vaddr &= PAGE_MASK;
 
@@ -1055,8 +1055,9 @@ void flush_anon_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
 		     unsigned long u_vaddr)
 {
 	/* TBD: do we really need to clear the kernel mapping */
-	__flush_dcache_page(page_address(page), u_vaddr);
+	__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page), u_vaddr);
-	__flush_dcache_page(page_address(page), page_address(page));
+	__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page),
+			    (phys_addr_t)page_address(page));
 
 }
 

arch/arc/plat-eznps/include/plat/ctop.h

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #error "Incorrect ctop.h include"
 #endif
 
+#include <linux/types.h>
 #include <soc/nps/common.h>
 
 /* core auxiliary registers */
@@ -143,6 +144,15 @@ struct nps_host_reg_gim_p_int_dst {
 };
 
 /* AUX registers definition */
+struct nps_host_reg_aux_dpc {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u32 ien:1, men:1, hen:1, reserved:29;
+		};
+		u32 value;
+	};
+};
+
 struct nps_host_reg_aux_udmc {
 	union {
 		struct {

arch/arc/plat-eznps/mtm.c

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/log2.h>
 #include <asm/arcregs.h>
@@ -157,10 +159,10 @@ void mtm_enable_core(unsigned int cpu)
 /* Verify and set the value of the mtm hs counter */
 static int __init set_mtm_hs_ctr(char *ctr_str)
 {
-	long hs_ctr;
+	int hs_ctr;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = kstrtol(ctr_str, 0, &hs_ctr);
+	ret = kstrtoint(ctr_str, 0, &hs_ctr);
 
 	if (ret || hs_ctr > MT_HS_CNT_MAX || hs_ctr < MT_HS_CNT_MIN) {
 		pr_err("** Invalid @nps_mtm_hs_ctr [%d] needs to be [%d:%d] (incl)\n",

arch/arm/boot/dts/am3517.dtsi

@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@
 	};
 };
 
+/* Table Table 5-79 of the TRM shows 480ab000 is reserved */
+&usb_otg_hs {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
 &iva {
 	status = "disabled";
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/am437x-sk-evm.dts

@@ -535,6 +535,8 @@
 
 		touchscreen-size-x = <480>;
 		touchscreen-size-y = <272>;
+
+		wakeup-source;
 	};
 
 	tlv320aic3106: tlv320aic3106@1b {

arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-synology-ds116.dts

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
 					      3700 5
 					      3900 6
 					      4000 7>;
-			cooling-cells = <2>;
+			#cooling-cells = <2>;
 		};
 
 		gpio-leds {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm-cygnus.dtsi

@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@
 			reg = <0x18008000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
 			reg = <0x1800b000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@
 
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 			interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 100 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 100 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 			linux,pci-domain = <0>;
 
@@ -278,10 +278,10 @@
 				compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 				msi-controller;
 				interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 96 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 96 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 98 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 98 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 99 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+					     <GIC_SPI 99 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			};
 		};
 
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
 
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 			interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 106 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 106 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 			linux,pci-domain = <1>;
 
@@ -313,10 +313,10 @@
 				compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 				msi-controller;
 				interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 102 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 102 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 104 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 104 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 105 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+					     <GIC_SPI 105 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			};
 		};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm-nsp.dtsi

@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@
 			reg = <0x38000 0x50>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 89 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 89 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			dma-coherent;
 			status = "disabled";
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 131 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 131 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <0>;
 
@@ -519,10 +519,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 			msi-controller;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 127 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 127 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 128 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 128 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 129 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 129 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 130 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+				     <GIC_SPI 130 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			brcm,pcie-msi-inten;
 		};
 	};
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 137 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 137 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <1>;
 
@@ -556,10 +556,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 			msi-controller;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 133 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 133 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 134 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 134 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 135 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 135 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 136 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+				     <GIC_SPI 136 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			brcm,pcie-msi-inten;
 		};
 	};
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 143 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 143 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <2>;
 
@@ -593,10 +593,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 			msi-controller;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 139 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 139 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 140 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 140 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 141 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 141 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 142 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+				     <GIC_SPI 142 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			brcm,pcie-msi-inten;
 		};
 	};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm270x.dtsi

@@ -152,6 +152,13 @@
 		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
 		regulator-always-on;
 	};
+
+	__overrides__ {
+		cam0-pwdn-ctrl;
+		cam0-pwdn;
+		cam0-led-ctrl;
+		cam0-led;
+	};
 };
 
 /* Configure and use the auxilliary interrupt controller */

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm5301x.dtsi

@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@
 	i2c0: i2c@18009000 {
 		compatible = "brcm,iproc-i2c";
 		reg = <0x18009000 0x50>;
-		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <0>;
 		clock-frequency = <100000>;

arch/arm/boot/dts/da850.dtsi

@@ -518,11 +518,7 @@
 			gpio-controller;
 			#gpio-cells = <2>;
 			reg = <0x226000 0x1000>;
-			interrupts = <42 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
+			interrupts = <42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50>;
-				43 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 44 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				45 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 46 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				47 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 48 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				49 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 50 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH>;
 			ti,ngpio = <144>;
 			ti,davinci-gpio-unbanked = <0>;
 			status = "disabled";

arch/arm/boot/dts/emev2.dtsi

@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <0>;
 
-		cpu@0 {
+		cpu0: cpu@0 {
 			device_type = "cpu";
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9";
 			reg = <0>;
 			clock-frequency = <533000000>;
 		};
-		cpu@1 {
+		cpu1: cpu@1 {
 			device_type = "cpu";
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9";
 			reg = <1>;
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 		compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-pmu";
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
 			     <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		interrupt-affinity = <&cpu0>, <&cpu1>;
 	};
 
 	clocks@e0110000 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-zii-rdu2.dtsi

@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
 			dsa,member = <0 0>;
 			eeprom-length = <512>;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gpio6>;
-			interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_FALLING>;
+			interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <2>;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi

@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@
 				  0x82000000 0 0x08000000 0x08000000 0 0x00f00000>;
 			bus-range = <0x00 0xff>;
 			num-lanes = <1>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_REF_125M>,
 				 <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_AXI>,
 				 <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_LVDS1_OUT>,

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/Makefile

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	ads1115.dtbo \
 	ads7846.dtbo \
 	adv7282m.dtbo \
+	adv728x-m.dtbo \
 	akkordion-iqdacplus.dtbo \
 	allo-boss-dac-pcm512x-audio.dtbo \
 	allo-digione.dtbo \
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	applepi-dac.dtbo \
 	at86rf233.dtbo \
 	audioinjector-addons.dtbo \
+	audioinjector-ultra.dtbo \
 	audioinjector-wm8731-audio.dtbo \
 	audremap.dtbo \
 	balena-fin.dtbo \
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	fe-pi-audio.dtbo \
 	goodix.dtbo \
 	googlevoicehat-soundcard.dtbo \
+	gpio-fan.dtbo \
 	gpio-ir.dtbo \
 	gpio-ir-tx.dtbo \
 	gpio-key.dtbo \
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	rpi-dac.dtbo \
 	rpi-display.dtbo \
 	rpi-ft5406.dtbo \
+	rpi-poe.dtbo \
 	rpi-proto.dtbo \
 	rpi-sense.dtbo \
 	rpi-tv.dtbo \

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/README

@@ -274,6 +274,19 @@ Info:   Analog Devices ADV7282M analogue video to CSI2 bridge.
 Load:   dtoverlay=adv7282m,<param>=<val>
 Params: i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
                                 This is required for Pi B+, 2, 0, and 0W.
+        addr                    Overrides the I2C address (default 0x21)
+
+
+Name:   adv728x-m
+Info:   Analog Devices ADV728[0|1|2]-M analogue video to CSI2 bridges.
+        This is a wrapper for adv7282m, and defaults to ADV7282M.
+Load:   dtoverlay=adv728x-m,<param>=<val>
+Params: i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
+                                This is required for Pi B+, 2, 0, and 0W.
+        addr                    Overrides the I2C address (default 0x21)
+        adv7280m                Select ADV7280-M.
+        adv7281m                Select ADV7281-M.
+        adv7281ma               Select ADV7281-MA.
 
 
 Name:   akkordion-iqdacplus
@@ -398,6 +411,12 @@ Params: non-stop-clocks         Keeps the clocks running even when the stream
                                 is paused or stopped (default off)
 
 
+Name:   audioinjector-ultra
+Info:   Configures the audioinjector.net ultra soundcard
+Load:   dtoverlay=audioinjector-ultra
+Params: <None>
+
+
 Name:   audioinjector-wm8731-audio
 Info:   Configures the audioinjector.net audio add on soundcard
 Load:   dtoverlay=audioinjector-wm8731-audio
@@ -544,6 +563,14 @@ Load:   dtoverlay=googlevoicehat-soundcard
 Params: <None>
 
 
+Name:   gpio-fan
+Info:   Configure a GPIO pin to control a cooling fan.
+Load:   dtoverlay=gpio-fan,<param>=<val>
+Params: gpiopin                 GPIO used to control the fan (default 12)
+        temp                    Temperature at which the fan switches on, in
+                                millicelcius (default 55000)
+
+
 Name:   gpio-ir
 Info:   Use GPIO pin as rc-core style infrared receiver input. The rc-core-
         based gpio_ir_recv driver maps received keys directly to a
@@ -1256,15 +1283,7 @@ Info:   Omnivision OV5647 camera module.
         Uses Unicam 1, which is the standard camera connector on most Pi
         variants.
 Load:   dtoverlay=ov5647,<param>=<val>
-Params: cam0-pwdn               GPIO used to control the sensor powerdown line.
+Params: i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
-
-        cam0-led                GPIO used to control the sensor led
-                                Both these fields should be automatically filled
-                                in by the firmware to reflect the default GPIO
-                                configuration of the particular Pi variant in
-                                use.
-
-        i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
                                 This is required for Pi B+, 2, 0, and 0W.
 
 
@@ -1576,6 +1595,12 @@ Params: touchscreen-size-x      Touchscreen X resolution (default 800)
         touchscreen-swapped-x-y Swap X and Y cordinates (default 0);
 
 
+Name:   rpi-poe
+Info:   Raspberry Pi POE HAT
+Load:   dtoverlay=rpi-poe
+Params: <None>
+
+
 Name:   rpi-proto
 Info:   Configures the RPi Proto audio card
 Load:   dtoverlay=rpi-proto

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/adv7282m-overlay.dts

@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@
 			#size-cells = <0>;
 			status = "okay";
 
-			adv7282: adv7282@21 {
+			adv728x: adv728x@21 {
 				compatible = "adi,adv7282-m";
 				reg = <0x21>;
 				status = "okay";
 				clock-frequency = <24000000>;
 				port {
-					adv7282_0: endpoint {
+					adv728x_0: endpoint {
 						remote-endpoint = <&csi1_ep>;
 						clock-lanes = <0>;
 						data-lanes = <1>;
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 				#address-cells = <1>;
 				#size-cells = <0>;
 				csi1_ep: endpoint {
-					remote-endpoint = <&adv7282_0>;
+					remote-endpoint = <&adv728x_0>;
 				};
 			};
 		};
@@ -71,5 +71,6 @@
 
 	__overrides__ {
 		i2c_pins_28_29 =	<0>,"+2-3";
+		addr =			<&adv728x>,"reg:0";
 	};
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/adv728x-m-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// Definitions for Analog Devices ADV728[0|1|2]-M video to CSI2 bridges on VC
+// I2C bus
+
+#include "adv7282m-overlay.dts"
+
+/{
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	// Fragment numbers deliberately high to avoid conflicts with the
+	// included adv7282m overlay file.
+
+	fragment@101 {
+		target = <&adv728x>;
+		__dormant__ {
+			compatible = "adi,adv7280-m";
+		};
+	};
+	fragment@102 {
+		target = <&adv728x>;
+		__dormant__ {
+			compatible = "adi,adv7281-m";
+		};
+	};
+	fragment@103 {
+		target = <&adv728x>;
+		__dormant__ {
+			compatible = "adi,adv7281-ma";
+		};
+	};
+
+	__overrides__ {
+		adv7280m = <0>, "+101";
+		adv7281m = <0>, "+102";
+		adv7281ma = <0>, "+103";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/audioinjector-ultra-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// Definitions for audioinjector.net audio add on soundcard
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		target = <&i2s>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@1 {
+		target = <&i2c1>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "okay";
+
+			cs4265: cs4265@4e {
+				#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
+				compatible = "cirrus,cs4265";
+				reg = <0x4e>;
+				reset-gpios = <&gpio 5 0>;
+				status = "okay";
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@2 {
+		target = <&sound>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			compatible = "simple-audio-card";
+			i2s-controller = <&i2s>;
+			status = "okay";
+
+			simple-audio-card,name = "audioinjector-ultra";
+
+			simple-audio-card,widgets =
+				"Line", "OUTPUTS",
+				"Line", "INPUTS";
+
+			simple-audio-card,routing =
+				"OUTPUTS","LINEOUTL",
+				"OUTPUTS","LINEOUTR",
+				"OUTPUTS","SPDIFOUT",
+				"LINEINL","INPUTS",
+				"LINEINR","INPUTS",
+				"MICL","INPUTS",
+				"MICR","INPUTS";
+
+			simple-audio-card,format = "i2s";
+
+			simple-audio-card,bitclock-master = <&sound_master>;
+			simple-audio-card,frame-master = <&sound_master>;
+
+			simple-audio-card,cpu {
+				sound-dai = <&i2s>;
+				dai-tdm-slot-num = <2>;
+				dai-tdm-slot-width = <32>;
+			};
+
+			sound_master: simple-audio-card,codec {
+				sound-dai = <&cs4265>;
+				system-clock-frequency = <12288000>;
+			};
+		};
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/gpio-fan-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Overlay for the Raspberry Pi GPIO Fan @ BCM GPIO12.
+ * Optional parameters:
+ *	- "gpiopin"	- default GPIO12
+ * 	- "temp"	- default 55000
+ * Requires:
+ *	- kernel configurations: CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN=m and CONFIG_SENSORS_PWM_FAN=m;
+ *	- kernel rebuid;
+ *	- DC Fan connected to GPIO via a N-MOSFET (2N7002)
+ *
+ *                   ┌─────────────────────┐
+ *                   │Fan negative terminal│
+ *                   └┬────────────────────┘
+ *                    │
+ *                 │──┘
+ * [GPIO12]──────┤ │<─┐  2N7002
+ *                 │──┤
+ *                    │
+ *                   ─┴─
+ *                   GND
+ *
+ * sudo dtc -W no-unit_address_vs_reg -@ -I dts -O dtb -o /boot/overlays/gpio-fan.dtbo gpio-fan.dts
+ * sudo nano /boot/config.txt add "dtoverlay=gpio-fan" or "dtoverlay=gpio-fan,gpiopin=12,temp=45000"
+ * or
+ * sudo sh -c "echo '\n# Enable PI GPIO-Fan\ndtoverlay=gpio-fan\n' >> /boot/config.txt"
+ * sudo sh -c "echo '\n# Enable PI GPIO-Fan\ndtoverlay=gpio-fan,gpiopin=12\n' >> /boot/config.txt"
+ *
+ */
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		target-path = "/";
+		__overlay__ {
+			fan0: gpio-fan@0 {
+				compatible = "gpio-fan";
+				gpios = <&gpio 12 1>;
+				gpio-fan,speed-map = <0    0>,
+									 <5000 1>;
+				#cooling-cells = <2>;
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@1 {
+		target = <&cpu_thermal>;
+		polling-delay = <2000>;	/* milliseconds */
+		__overlay__ {
+			trips {
+				cpu_hot: trip-point@0 {
+					temperature = <55000>;	/* (millicelsius) Fan started at 55°C */
+					hysteresis = <5000>;	/* (millicelsius) Fan stopped at 50°C */
+					type = "active";
+				};
+			};
+			cooling-maps {
+				map0 {
+					trip = <&cpu_hot>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 1 1>;
+				};
+			};
+		};
+	};
+	__overrides__ {
+		gpiopin = <&fan0>,"gpios:4", <&fan0>,"brcm,pins:0";
+		temp = <&cpu_hot>,"temperature:0";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/ov5647-overlay.dts

@@ -78,9 +78,17 @@
 		};
 	};
 
-	__overrides__ {
+	fragment@5 {
-		i2c_pins_28_29 = <0>,"+4-5";
+		target-path="/__overrides__";
+		__overlay__ {
+			cam0-pwdn-ctrl = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:0";
 			cam0-pwdn      = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:4";
+			cam0-led-ctrl  = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:12";
 			cam0-led       = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:16";
 		};
+	};
+
+	__overrides__ {
+		i2c_pins_28_29 = <0>,"+4-5";
+	};
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/rpi-poe-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Overlay for the Raspberry Pi POE HAT.
+ */
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		target-path = "/";
+		__overlay__ {
+			fan0: rpi-poe-fan@0 {
+				compatible = "raspberrypi,rpi-poe-fan";
+				firmware = <&firmware>;
+				cooling-min-state = <0>;
+				cooling-max-state = <3>;
+				#cooling-cells = <2>;
+				cooling-levels = <0 50 150 255>;
+				status = "okay";
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@1 {
+		target = <&cpu_thermal>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			trips {
+				threshold: trip-point@0 {
+					temperature = <45000>;
+					hysteresis = <5000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+				target: trip-point@1 {
+					temperature = <50000>;
+					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+				cpu_hot: cpu_hot@0 {
+					temperature = <55000>;
+					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+			};
+			cooling-maps {
+				map0 {
+					trip = <&threshold>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 0 1>;
+				};
+				map1 {
+					trip = <&target>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 1 2>;
+				};
+				map2 {
+					trip = <&cpu_hot>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 2 3>;
+				};
+			};
+		};
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/sh73a0.dtsi

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <0>;
 
-		cpu@0 {
+		cpu0: cpu@0 {
 			device_type = "cpu";
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9";
 			reg = <0>;
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 			power-domains = <&pd_a2sl>;
 			next-level-cache = <&L2>;
 		};
-		cpu@1 {
+		cpu1: cpu@1 {
 			device_type = "cpu";
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9";
 			reg = <1>;
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
 		compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-pmu";
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 55 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
 			     <GIC_SPI 56 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		interrupt-affinity = <&cpu0>, <&cpu1>;
 	};
 
 	cmt1: timer@e6138000 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/stih407-pinctrl.dtsi

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 			st,syscfg = <&syscfg_sbc>;
 			reg = <0x0961f080 0x4>;
 			reg-names = "irqmux";
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 188 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 188 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			interrupt-names = "irqmux";
 			ranges = <0 0x09610000 0x6000>;
 
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@
 			st,syscfg = <&syscfg_front>;
 			reg = <0x0920f080 0x4>;
 			reg-names = "irqmux";
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 189 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 189 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			interrupt-names = "irqmux";
 			ranges = <0 0x09200000 0x10000>;
 
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@
 			st,syscfg = <&syscfg_front>;
 			reg = <0x0921f080 0x4>;
 			reg-names = "irqmux";
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 190 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 190 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			interrupt-names = "irqmux";
 			ranges = <0 0x09210000 0x10000>;
 
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@
 			st,syscfg = <&syscfg_rear>;
 			reg = <0x0922f080 0x4>;
 			reg-names = "irqmux";
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 191 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 191 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			interrupt-names = "irqmux";
 			ranges = <0 0x09220000 0x6000>;
 
@@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@
 			st,syscfg = <&syscfg_flash>;
 			reg = <0x0923f080 0x4>;
 			reg-names = "irqmux";
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 192 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 192 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			interrupt-names = "irqmux";
 			ranges = <0 0x09230000 0x3000>;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra30-cardhu.dtsi

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
 			reg = <0x70>;
+			reset-gpio = <&gpio TEGRA_GPIO(BB, 0) GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 		};
 	};
 

arch/arm/configs/bcm2709_defconfig

@@ -656,8 +656,10 @@ CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2760=m
 CONFIG_BATTERY_GAUGE_LTC2941=m
 CONFIG_HWMON=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_DS1621=m
+CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_JC42=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_LM75=m
+CONFIG_SENSORS_RPI_POE_FAN=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT21=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT3x=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_SHTC1=m
@@ -913,6 +915,7 @@ CONFIG_SND_PISOUND=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU1701=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU7002=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_AK4554=m
+CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4265=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4271_I2C=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_SPDIF=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_WM8804_I2C=m

arch/arm/configs/bcmrpi_defconfig

@@ -649,8 +649,10 @@ CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2760=m
 CONFIG_BATTERY_GAUGE_LTC2941=m
 CONFIG_HWMON=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_DS1621=m
+CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_JC42=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_LM75=m
+CONFIG_SENSORS_RPI_POE_FAN=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT21=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT3x=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_SHTC1=m
@@ -906,6 +908,7 @@ CONFIG_SND_PISOUND=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU1701=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU7002=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_AK4554=m
+CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4265=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4271_I2C=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_SPDIF=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_WM8804_I2C=m

arch/arm/configs/imx_v4_v5_defconfig

@@ -144,9 +144,11 @@ CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
 CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA=y
 CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_UDC=y
 CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_HOST=y
+CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_ULPI=y
 CONFIG_NOP_USB_XCEIV=y
 CONFIG_USB_GADGET=y
 CONFIG_USB_ETH=m
+CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS=y
 CONFIG_MMC=y
 CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=y
 CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=y

arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c

@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ static struct gpiod_lookup_table mmc_gpios_table = {
 		GPIO_LOOKUP("davinci_gpio.0", DA850_MMCSD_CD_PIN, "cd",
 			    GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),
 		GPIO_LOOKUP("davinci_gpio.0", DA850_MMCSD_WP_PIN, "wp",
-			    GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),
+			    GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
 	},
 };
 

arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-smp.c

@@ -109,6 +109,45 @@ void omap5_erratum_workaround_801819(void)
 static inline void omap5_erratum_workaround_801819(void) { }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+/*
+ * Configure ACR and enable ACTLR[0] (Enable invalidates of BTB with
+ * ICIALLU) to activate the workaround for secondary Core.
+ * NOTE: it is assumed that the primary core's configuration is done
+ * by the boot loader (kernel will detect a misconfiguration and complain
+ * if this is not done).
+ *
+ * In General Purpose(GP) devices, ACR bit settings can only be done
+ * by ROM code in "secure world" using the smc call and there is no
+ * option to update the "firmware" on such devices. This also works for
+ * High security(HS) devices, as a backup option in case the
+ * "update" is not done in the "security firmware".
+ */
+static void omap5_secondary_harden_predictor(void)
+{
+	u32 acr, acr_mask;
+
+	asm volatile ("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (acr));
+
+	/*
+	 * ACTLR[0] (Enable invalidates of BTB with ICIALLU)
+	 */
+	acr_mask = BIT(0);
+
+	/* Do we already have it done.. if yes, skip expensive smc */
+	if ((acr & acr_mask) == acr_mask)
+		return;
+
+	acr |= acr_mask;
+	omap_smc1(OMAP5_DRA7_MON_SET_ACR_INDEX, acr);
+
+	pr_debug("%s: ARM ACR setup for CVE_2017_5715 applied on CPU%d\n",
+		 __func__, smp_processor_id());
+}
+#else
+static inline void omap5_secondary_harden_predictor(void) { }
+#endif
+
 static void omap4_secondary_init(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	/*
@@ -131,6 +170,8 @@ static void omap4_secondary_init(unsigned int cpu)
 		set_cntfreq();
 		/* Configure ACR to disable streaming WA for 801819 */
 		omap5_erratum_workaround_801819();
+		/* Enable ACR to allow for ICUALLU workaround */
+		omap5_secondary_harden_predictor();
 	}
 
 	/*

arch/arm/mach-pxa/irq.c

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int pxa_irq_suspend(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < pxa_internal_irq_nr / 32; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(pxa_internal_irq_nr, 32); i++) {
 		void __iomem *base = irq_base(i);
 
 		saved_icmr[i] = __raw_readl(base + ICMR);
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void pxa_irq_resume(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < pxa_internal_irq_nr / 32; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(pxa_internal_irq_nr, 32); i++) {
 		void __iomem *base = irq_base(i);
 
 		__raw_writel(saved_icmr[i], base + ICMR);

arch/arm/mach-rockchip/Kconfig

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ config ARCH_ROCKCHIP
 	select ARM_GLOBAL_TIMER
 	select CLKSRC_ARM_GLOBAL_TIMER_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select ZONE_DMA if ARM_LPAE
+	select PM
 	help
 	  Support for Rockchip's Cortex-A9 Single-to-Quad-Core-SoCs
 	  containing the RK2928, RK30xx and RK31xx series.

arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c

@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ static inline void emit_a32_arsh_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
 }
 
 /* dst = dst >> src */
-static inline void emit_a32_lsr_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
+static inline void emit_a32_rsh_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
 				     bool sstk, struct jit_ctx *ctx) {
 	const u8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1];
 	const u8 *tmp2 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_2];
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ static inline void emit_a32_lsr_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
 		emit(ARM_LDR_I(rm, ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(dst_hi)), ctx);
 	}
 
-	/* Do LSH operation */
+	/* Do RSH operation */
 	emit(ARM_RSB_I(ARM_IP, rt, 32), ctx);
 	emit(ARM_SUBS_I(tmp2[0], rt, 32), ctx);
 	emit(ARM_MOV_SR(ARM_LR, rd, SRTYPE_LSR, rt), ctx);
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static inline void emit_a32_lsh_i64(const u8 dst[], bool dstk,
 }
 
 /* dst = dst >> val */
-static inline void emit_a32_lsr_i64(const u8 dst[], bool dstk,
+static inline void emit_a32_rsh_i64(const u8 dst[], bool dstk,
 				    const u32 val, struct jit_ctx *ctx) {
 	const u8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1];
 	const u8 *tmp2 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_2];
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 	case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
 		if (unlikely(imm > 63))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		emit_a32_lsr_i64(dst, dstk, imm, ctx);
+		emit_a32_rsh_i64(dst, dstk, imm, ctx);
 		break;
 	/* dst = dst << src */
 	case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_LSH | BPF_X:
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 		break;
 	/* dst = dst >> src */
 	case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
-		emit_a32_lsr_r64(dst, src, dstk, sstk, ctx);
+		emit_a32_rsh_r64(dst, src, dstk, sstk, ctx);
 		break;
 	/* dst = dst >> src (signed) */
 	case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ARSH | BPF_X:

arch/arm/probes/kprobes/core.c

@@ -291,8 +291,8 @@ void __kprobes kprobe_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
 				break;
 			case KPROBE_REENTER:
 				/* A nested probe was hit in FIQ, it is a BUG */
-				pr_warn("Unrecoverable kprobe detected at %p.\n",
+				pr_warn("Unrecoverable kprobe detected.\n");
-					p->addr);
+				dump_kprobe(p);
 				/* fall through */
 			default:
 				/* impossible cases */

arch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c

@@ -1517,7 +1517,6 @@ fail:
 	print_registers(&result_regs);
 
 	if (mem) {
-		pr_err("current_stack=%p\n", current_stack);
 		pr_err("expected_memory:\n");
 		print_memory(expected_memory, mem_size);
 		pr_err("result_memory:\n");

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -693,7 +693,6 @@ config NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
 
 config HOLES_IN_ZONE
 	def_bool y
-	depends on NUMA
 
 source kernel/Kconfig.preempt
 source kernel/Kconfig.hz

arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms

@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ config ARCH_ROCKCHIP
 	select GPIOLIB
 	select PINCTRL
 	select PINCTRL_ROCKCHIP
+	select PM
 	select ROCKCHIP_TIMER
 	help
 	  This enables support for the ARMv8 based Rockchip chipsets,

arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-gxl-mali.dtsi

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 &apb {
 	mali: gpu@c0000 {
-		compatible = "amlogic,meson-gxbb-mali", "arm,mali-450";
+		compatible = "amlogic,meson-gxl-mali", "arm,mali-450";
 		reg = <0x0 0xc0000 0x0 0x40000>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 160 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
 			     <GIC_SPI 161 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,

arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/Makefile

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += bcm2837-rpi-3-b.dtb
 dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2709) += bcm2710-rpi-3-b.dtb
 dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += bcm2710-rpi-3-b.dtb
 dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += bcm2710-rpi-3-b-plus.dtb
+dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2709) += bcm2710-rpi-cm3.dtb
+dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += bcm2710-rpi-cm3.dtb
 
 dts-dirs += ../overlays
 

arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/bcm2710-rpi-cm3.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#define RPI364
+
+#include "../../../../arm/boot/dts/bcm2710-rpi-cm3.dts"

arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/northstar2/ns2.dtsi

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 281 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 281 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <0>;
 
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 305 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 305 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <4>;
 
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
 			reg = <0x66080000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 394 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 394 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@
 			reg = <0x660b0000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 395 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 395 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};

arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/bcm958742k.dts

@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@
 	enet-phy-lane-swap;
 };
 
+&sdio0 {
+	mmc-ddr-1_8v;
+};
+
 &uart2 {
 	status = "okay";
 };

arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/bcm958742t.dts

@@ -42,3 +42,7 @@
 &gphy0 {
 	enet-phy-lane-swap;
 };
+
+&sdio0 {
+	mmc-ddr-1_8v;
+};

arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/stingray.dtsi

@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@
 			reg = <0x000b0000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 177 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 177 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@
 			reg = <0x000e0000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 178 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 178 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};

arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8916.dtsi

@@ -1132,14 +1132,14 @@
 
 				port@0 {
 					reg = <0>;
-					etf_out: endpoint {
+					etf_in: endpoint {
 						slave-mode;
 						remote-endpoint = <&funnel0_out>;
 					};
 				};
 				port@1 {
 					reg = <0>;
-					etf_in: endpoint {
+					etf_out: endpoint {
 						remote-endpoint = <&replicator_in>;
 					};
 				};

arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/salvator-common.dtsi

@@ -93,20 +93,12 @@
 		regulator-always-on;
 	};
 
-	rsnd_ak4613: sound {
+	sound_card: sound {
-		compatible = "simple-audio-card";
+		compatible = "audio-graph-card";
 
-		simple-audio-card,format = "left_j";
+		label = "rcar-sound";
-		simple-audio-card,bitclock-master = <&sndcpu>;
-		simple-audio-card,frame-master = <&sndcpu>;
 
-		sndcpu: simple-audio-card,cpu {
+		dais = <&rsnd_port0>;
-			sound-dai = <&rcar_sound>;
-		};
-
-		sndcodec: simple-audio-card,codec {
-			sound-dai = <&ak4613>;
-		};
 	};
 
 	vbus0_usb2: regulator-vbus0-usb2 {
@@ -320,6 +312,12 @@
 		asahi-kasei,out4-single-end;
 		asahi-kasei,out5-single-end;
 		asahi-kasei,out6-single-end;
+
+		port {
+			ak4613_endpoint: endpoint {
+				remote-endpoint = <&rsnd_endpoint0>;
+			};
+		};
 	};
 
 	cs2000: clk_multiplier@4f {
@@ -538,12 +536,20 @@
 		 <&audio_clk_c>,
 		 <&cpg CPG_CORE CPG_AUDIO_CLK_I>;
 
-	rcar_sound,dai {
+	ports {
-		dai0 {
+		rsnd_port0: port@0 {
+			rsnd_endpoint0: endpoint {
+				remote-endpoint = <&ak4613_endpoint>;
+
+				dai-format = "left_j";
+				bitclock-master = <&rsnd_endpoint0>;
+				frame-master = <&rsnd_endpoint0>;
+
 				playback = <&ssi0 &src0 &dvc0>;
 				capture  = <&ssi1 &src1 &dvc1>;
 			};
 		};
+	};
 };
 
 &scif1 {

arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3328.dtsi

@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
 		reg = <0x0 0xff120000 0x0 0x100>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 56 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		clocks = <&cru SCLK_UART1>, <&cru PCLK_UART1>;
-		clock-names = "sclk_uart", "pclk_uart";
+		clock-names = "baudclk", "apb_pclk";
 		dmas = <&dmac 4>, <&dmac 5>;
 		#dma-cells = <2>;
 		pinctrl-names = "default";

arch/arm64/configs/defconfig

@@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ CONFIG_GPIO_XGENE_SB=y
 CONFIG_GPIO_PCA953X=y
 CONFIG_GPIO_PCA953X_IRQ=y
 CONFIG_GPIO_MAX77620=y
+CONFIG_POWER_AVS=y
+CONFIG_ROCKCHIP_IODOMAIN=y
 CONFIG_POWER_RESET_MSM=y
 CONFIG_POWER_RESET_XGENE=y
 CONFIG_POWER_RESET_SYSCON=y

arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h

@@ -20,9 +20,14 @@
 
 #define CTR_L1IP_SHIFT		14
 #define CTR_L1IP_MASK		3
+#define CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT	16
+#define CTR_IMINLINE_SHIFT	0
 #define CTR_CWG_SHIFT		24
 #define CTR_CWG_MASK		15
 
+#define CTR_CACHE_MINLINE_MASK	\
+	(0xf << CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT | 0xf << CTR_IMINLINE_SHIFT)
+
 #define CTR_L1IP(ctr)		(((ctr) >> CTR_L1IP_SHIFT) & CTR_L1IP_MASK)
 
 #define ICACHE_POLICY_VPIPT	0

arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h

@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ static inline void __cmpwait_case_##name(volatile void *ptr,		\
 	unsigned long tmp;						\
 									\
 	asm volatile(							\
+	"	sevl\n"							\
+	"	wfe\n"							\
 	"	ldxr" #sz "\t%" #w "[tmp], %[v]\n"			\
 	"	eor	%" #w "[tmp], %" #w "[tmp], %" #w "[val]\n"	\
 	"	cbnz	%" #w "[tmp], 1f\n"				\

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h

@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT		25
 #define ARM64_SSBD				26
+#define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE		27
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				27
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				28
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */

arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
  * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
+#include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
@@ -45,12 +47,18 @@ is_kryo_midr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 }
 
 static bool
-has_mismatched_cache_line_size(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
+has_mismatched_cache_type(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 			  int scope)
 {
+	u64 mask = CTR_CACHE_MINLINE_MASK;
+
+	/* Skip matching the min line sizes for cache type check */
+	if (entry->capability == ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE)
+		mask ^= arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask;
+
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
-	return (read_cpuid_cachetype() & arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask) !=
+	return (read_cpuid_cachetype() & mask) !=
-		(arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.sys_val & arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask);
+	       (arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.sys_val & mask);
 }
 
 static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(void *__unused)
@@ -511,7 +519,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 	{
 		.desc = "Mismatched cache line size",
 		.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
-		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_line_size,
+		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
+		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
+	},
+	{
+		.desc = "Mismatched cache type",
+		.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE,
+		.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
 		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
 		.enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

@@ -180,14 +180,14 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 1, 1),	/* IDC */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0),	/* CWG */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0),	/* ERG */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 1),	/* DminLine */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT, 4, 1),
 	/*
 	 * Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
 	 * make use of *minLine.
 	 * If we have differing I-cache policies, report it as the weakest - VIPT.
 	 */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_EXACT, 14, 2, ICACHE_POLICY_VIPT),	/* L1Ip */
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0),	/* IminLine */
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_IMINLINE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 

arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c

@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static int __kprobes reenter_kprobe(struct kprobe *p,
 		break;
 	case KPROBE_HIT_SS:
 	case KPROBE_REENTER:
-		pr_warn("Unrecoverable kprobe detected at %p.\n", p->addr);
+		pr_warn("Unrecoverable kprobe detected.\n");
 		dump_kprobe(p);
 		BUG();
 		break;

arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c

@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int __cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
  * This is the secondary CPU boot entry.  We're using this CPUs
  * idle thread stack, but a set of temporary page tables.
  */
-asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
+asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = &init_mm;
 	unsigned int cpu;

arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c

@@ -629,13 +629,14 @@ static void *__iommu_alloc_attrs(struct device *dev, size_t size,
 						    size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 			return NULL;
 		}
-		if (!coherent)
-			__dma_flush_area(page_to_virt(page), iosize);
-
 		addr = dma_common_contiguous_remap(page, size, VM_USERMAP,
 						   prot,
 						   __builtin_return_address(0));
-		if (!addr) {
+		if (addr) {
+			memset(addr, 0, size);
+			if (!coherent)
+				__dma_flush_area(page_to_virt(page), iosize);
+		} else {
 			iommu_dma_unmap_page(dev, *handle, iosize, 0, attrs);
 			dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page,
 						    size >> PAGE_SHIFT);

arch/arm64/mm/init.c

@@ -287,7 +287,11 @@ static void __init zone_sizes_init(unsigned long min, unsigned long max)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
 int pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn)
 {
-	return memblock_is_map_memory(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	phys_addr_t addr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if ((addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) != pfn)
+		return 0;
+	return memblock_is_map_memory(addr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(pfn_valid);
 #endif
@@ -651,11 +655,13 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(TASK_SIZE_32			> TASK_SIZE_64);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 	/*
 	 * Make sure we chose the upper bound of sizeof(struct page)
-	 * correctly.
+	 * correctly when sizing the VMEMMAP array.
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) > (1 << STRUCT_PAGE_MAX_SHIFT));
+#endif
 
 	if (PAGE_SIZE >= 16384 && get_num_physpages() <= 128) {
 		extern int sysctl_overcommit_memory;

arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c

@@ -938,12 +938,12 @@ int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud)
+int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return pud_none(*pud);
 }
 
-int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
+int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return pmd_none(*pmd);
 }

arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgalloc.h

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ extern inline pmd_t *pmd_alloc_kernel(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
 static inline void __pte_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pgtable_t page,
 				  unsigned long address)
 {
+	pgtable_page_dtor(page);
 	__free_page(page);
 }
 
@@ -74,8 +75,9 @@ static inline struct page *pte_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	return page;
 }
 
-extern inline void pte_free(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page *page)
+static inline void pte_free(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page *page)
 {
+	pgtable_page_dtor(page);
 	__free_page(page);
 }
 

arch/microblaze/boot/Makefile

@@ -22,17 +22,19 @@ $(obj)/linux.bin.gz: $(obj)/linux.bin FORCE
 quiet_cmd_cp = CP      $< $@$2
 	cmd_cp = cat $< >$@$2 || (rm -f $@ && echo false)
 
-quiet_cmd_strip = STRIP   $@
+quiet_cmd_strip = STRIP   $< $@$2
 	cmd_strip = $(STRIP) -K microblaze_start -K _end -K __log_buf \
-				-K _fdt_start vmlinux -o $@
+				-K _fdt_start $< -o $@$2
 
 UIMAGE_LOADADDR = $(CONFIG_KERNEL_BASE_ADDR)
+UIMAGE_IN = $@
+UIMAGE_OUT = $@.ub
 
 $(obj)/simpleImage.%: vmlinux FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,cp,.unstrip)
 	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
 	$(call if_changed,uimage)
-	$(call if_changed,strip)
+	$(call if_changed,strip,.strip)
-	@echo 'Kernel: $@ is ready' ' (#'`cat .version`')'
+	@echo 'Kernel: $(UIMAGE_OUT) is ready' ' (#'`cat .version`')'
 
 clean-files += simpleImage.*.unstrip linux.bin.ub dts/*.dtb

arch/mips/Makefile

@@ -155,15 +155,11 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_R4300)	+= -march=r4300 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_VR41XX)	+= -march=r4100 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00)	+= -march=r4600 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_TX49XX)	+= -march=r4600 -Wa,--trap
-cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R1)	+= $(call cc-option,-march=mips32,-mips32 -U_MIPS_ISA -D_MIPS_ISA=_MIPS_ISA_MIPS32) \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R1)	+= -march=mips32 -Wa,--trap
-			-Wa,-mips32 -Wa,--trap
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R2)	+= -march=mips32r2 -Wa,--trap
-cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R2)	+= $(call cc-option,-march=mips32r2,-mips32r2 -U_MIPS_ISA -D_MIPS_ISA=_MIPS_ISA_MIPS32) \
-			-Wa,-mips32r2 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32_R6)	+= -march=mips32r6 -Wa,--trap -modd-spreg
-cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R1)	+= $(call cc-option,-march=mips64,-mips64 -U_MIPS_ISA -D_MIPS_ISA=_MIPS_ISA_MIPS64) \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R1)	+= -march=mips64 -Wa,--trap
-			-Wa,-mips64 -Wa,--trap
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R2)	+= -march=mips64r2 -Wa,--trap
-cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R2)	+= $(call cc-option,-march=mips64r2,-mips64r2 -U_MIPS_ISA -D_MIPS_ISA=_MIPS_ISA_MIPS64) \
-			-Wa,-mips64r2 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_MIPS64_R6)	+= -march=mips64r6 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_R5000)	+= -march=r5000 -Wa,--trap
 cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_R5432)	+= $(call cc-option,-march=r5400,-march=r5000) \

arch/mips/bcm47xx/setup.c

@@ -212,12 +212,6 @@ static int __init bcm47xx_cpu_fixes(void)
 		 */
 		if (bcm47xx_bus.bcma.bus.chipinfo.id == BCMA_CHIP_ID_BCM4706)
 			cpu_wait = NULL;
-
-		/*
-		 * BCM47XX Erratum "R10: PCIe Transactions Periodically Fail"
-		 * Enable ExternalSync for sync instruction to take effect
-		 */
-		set_c0_config7(MIPS_CONF7_ES);
 		break;
 #endif
 	}

arch/mips/include/asm/mipsregs.h

@@ -680,8 +680,6 @@
 #define MIPS_CONF7_WII		(_ULCAST_(1) << 31)
 
 #define MIPS_CONF7_RPS		(_ULCAST_(1) << 2)
-/* ExternalSync */
-#define MIPS_CONF7_ES		(_ULCAST_(1) << 8)
 
 #define MIPS_CONF7_IAR		(_ULCAST_(1) << 10)
 #define MIPS_CONF7_AR		(_ULCAST_(1) << 16)
@@ -2747,7 +2745,6 @@ __BUILD_SET_C0(status)
 __BUILD_SET_C0(cause)
 __BUILD_SET_C0(config)
 __BUILD_SET_C0(config5)
-__BUILD_SET_C0(config7)
 __BUILD_SET_C0(intcontrol)
 __BUILD_SET_C0(intctl)
 __BUILD_SET_C0(srsmap)

arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct mips_fpu_struct {
 
 #define NUM_DSP_REGS   6
 
-typedef __u32 dspreg_t;
+typedef unsigned long dspreg_t;
 
 struct mips_dsp_state {
 	dspreg_t	dspr[NUM_DSP_REGS];
@@ -388,7 +388,20 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
 #define KSTK_ESP(tsk) (task_pt_regs(tsk)->regs[29])
 #define KSTK_STATUS(tsk) (task_pt_regs(tsk)->cp0_status)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LOONGSON3
+/*
+ * Loongson-3's SFB (Store-Fill-Buffer) may buffer writes indefinitely when a
+ * tight read loop is executed, because reads take priority over writes & the
+ * hardware (incorrectly) doesn't ensure that writes will eventually occur.
+ *
+ * Since spin loops of any kind should have a cpu_relax() in them, force an SFB
+ * flush from cpu_relax() such that any pending writes will become visible as
+ * expected.
+ */
+#define cpu_relax()	smp_mb()
+#else
 #define cpu_relax()	barrier()
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Return_address is a replacement for __builtin_return_address(count)

arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 				goto out;
 			}
 			dregs = __get_dsp_regs(child);
-			tmp = (unsigned long) (dregs[addr - DSP_BASE]);
+			tmp = dregs[addr - DSP_BASE];
 			break;
 		}
 		case DSP_CONTROL:

arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
 				goto out;
 			}
 			dregs = __get_dsp_regs(child);
-			tmp = (unsigned long) (dregs[addr - DSP_BASE]);
+			tmp = dregs[addr - DSP_BASE];
 			break;
 		}
 		case DSP_CONTROL:

arch/mips/lib/multi3.c

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
 #include "libgcc.h"
 
 /*
- * GCC 7 suboptimally generates __multi3 calls for mips64r6, so for that
+ * GCC 7 & older can suboptimally generate __multi3 calls for mips64r6, so for
- * specific case only we'll implement it here.
+ * that specific case only we implement that intrinsic here.
  *
  * See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82981
  */
-#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_MIPSR6) && (__GNUC__ == 7)
+#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_MIPSR6) && (__GNUC__ < 8)
 
 /* multiply 64-bit values, low 64-bits returned */
 static inline long long notrace dmulu(long long a, long long b)

arch/openrisc/kernel/entry.S

@@ -221,12 +221,6 @@ EXCEPTION_ENTRY(_data_page_fault_handler)
 	l.addi  r3,r1,0                    // pt_regs
 	/* r4 set be EXCEPTION_HANDLE */   // effective address of fault
 
-	/*
-	 * __PHX__: TODO
-	 *
-	 * all this can be written much simpler. look at
-	 * DTLB miss handler in the CONFIG_GUARD_PROTECTED_CORE part
-	 */
 #ifdef CONFIG_OPENRISC_NO_SPR_SR_DSX
 	l.lwz   r6,PT_PC(r3)               // address of an offending insn
 	l.lwz   r6,0(r6)                   // instruction that caused pf
@@ -258,7 +252,7 @@ EXCEPTION_ENTRY(_data_page_fault_handler)
 
 #else
 
-	l.lwz   r6,PT_SR(r3)               // SR
+	l.mfspr r6,r0,SPR_SR               // SR
 	l.andi  r6,r6,SPR_SR_DSX           // check for delay slot exception
 	l.sfne  r6,r0                      // exception happened in delay slot
 	l.bnf   7f

arch/openrisc/kernel/head.S

@@ -141,8 +141,7 @@
  *	 r4  - EEAR     exception EA
  *	 r10 - current	pointing to current_thread_info struct
  *	 r12 - syscall  0, since we didn't come from syscall
- *	 r13 - temp	it actually contains new SR, not needed anymore
+ *	 r30 - handler	address of the handler we'll jump to
- *	 r31 - handler	address of the handler we'll jump to
  *
  *	 handler has to save remaining registers to the exception
  *	 ksp frame *before* tainting them!
@@ -178,6 +177,7 @@
 	/* r1 is KSP, r30 is __pa(KSP) */			;\
 	tophys  (r30,r1)					;\
 	l.sw    PT_GPR12(r30),r12				;\
+	/* r4 use for tmp before EA */				;\
 	l.mfspr r12,r0,SPR_EPCR_BASE				;\
 	l.sw    PT_PC(r30),r12					;\
 	l.mfspr r12,r0,SPR_ESR_BASE				;\
@@ -197,7 +197,10 @@
 	/* r12 == 1 if we come from syscall */			;\
 	CLEAR_GPR(r12)						;\
 	/* ----- turn on MMU ----- */				;\
-	l.ori	r30,r0,(EXCEPTION_SR)				;\
+	/* Carry DSX into exception SR */			;\
+	l.mfspr r30,r0,SPR_SR					;\
+	l.andi	r30,r30,SPR_SR_DSX				;\
+	l.ori	r30,r30,(EXCEPTION_SR)				;\
 	l.mtspr	r0,r30,SPR_ESR_BASE				;\
 	/* r30:	EA address of handler */			;\
 	LOAD_SYMBOL_2_GPR(r30,handler)				;\

arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c

@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static inline int in_delay_slot(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		return 0;
 	}
 #else
-	return regs->sr & SPR_SR_DSX;
+	return mfspr(SPR_SR) & SPR_SR_DSX;
 #endif
 }
 

arch/parisc/Kconfig

@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ config PREFETCH
 
 config MLONGCALLS
 	bool "Enable the -mlong-calls compiler option for big kernels"
-	def_bool y if (!MODULES)
+	default y
 	depends on PA8X00
 	help
 	  If you configure the kernel to include many drivers built-in instead

arch/parisc/include/asm/barrier.h

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ASM_BARRIER_H
+#define __ASM_BARRIER_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/* The synchronize caches instruction executes as a nop on systems in
+   which all memory references are performed in order. */
+#define synchronize_caches() __asm__ __volatile__ ("sync" : : : "memory")
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
+#define mb()		do { synchronize_caches(); } while (0)
+#define rmb()		mb()
+#define wmb()		mb()
+#define dma_rmb()	mb()
+#define dma_wmb()	mb()
+#else
+#define mb()		barrier()
+#define rmb()		barrier()
+#define wmb()		barrier()
+#define dma_rmb()	barrier()
+#define dma_wmb()	barrier()
+#endif
+
+#define __smp_mb()	mb()
+#define __smp_rmb()	mb()
+#define __smp_wmb()	mb()
+
+#include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
+
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* __ASM_BARRIER_H */

arch/parisc/include/asm/spinlock.h

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ static inline void arch_spin_lock_flags(arch_spinlock_t *x,
 {
 	volatile unsigned int *a;
 
-	mb();
 	a = __ldcw_align(x);
 	while (__ldcw(a) == 0)
 		while (*a == 0)
@@ -30,16 +29,15 @@ static inline void arch_spin_lock_flags(arch_spinlock_t *x,
 				local_irq_disable();
 			} else
 				cpu_relax();
-	mb();
 }
 
 static inline void arch_spin_unlock(arch_spinlock_t *x)
 {
 	volatile unsigned int *a;
-	mb();
+
 	a = __ldcw_align(x);
-	*a = 1;
 	mb();
+	*a = 1;
 }
 
 static inline int arch_spin_trylock(arch_spinlock_t *x)
@@ -47,10 +45,8 @@ static inline int arch_spin_trylock(arch_spinlock_t *x)
 	volatile unsigned int *a;
 	int ret;
 
-	mb();
 	a = __ldcw_align(x);
         ret = __ldcw(a) != 0;
-	mb();
 
 	return ret;
 }

arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S

@@ -481,6 +481,8 @@
 	/* Release pa_tlb_lock lock without reloading lock address. */
 	.macro		tlb_unlock0	spc,tmp
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	or,COND(=)	%r0,\spc,%r0
+	sync
 	or,COND(=)	%r0,\spc,%r0
 	stw             \spc,0(\tmp)
 #endif

arch/parisc/kernel/pacache.S

@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ ENDPROC_CFI(flush_data_cache_local)
 	.macro	tlb_unlock	la,flags,tmp
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	ldi		1,\tmp
+	sync
 	stw		\tmp,0(\la)
 	mtsm		\flags
 #endif

arch/parisc/kernel/syscall.S

@@ -629,11 +629,12 @@ cas_action:
 	stw	%r1, 4(%sr2,%r20)
 #endif
 	/* The load and store could fail */
-1:	ldw,ma	0(%r26), %r28
+1:	ldw	0(%r26), %r28
 	sub,<>	%r28, %r25, %r0
-2:	stw,ma	%r24, 0(%r26)
+2:	stw	%r24, 0(%r26)
 	/* Free lock */
-	stw,ma	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
+	sync
+	stw	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 #if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
 	/* Clear thread register indicator */
 	stw	%r0, 4(%sr2,%r20)
@@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ cas_action:
 3:		
 	/* Error occurred on load or store */
 	/* Free lock */
+	sync
 	stw	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 #if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
 	stw	%r0, 4(%sr2,%r20)
@@ -796,30 +798,30 @@ cas2_action:
 	ldo	1(%r0),%r28
 
 	/* 8bit CAS */
-13:	ldb,ma	0(%r26), %r29
+13:	ldb	0(%r26), %r29
 	sub,=	%r29, %r25, %r0
 	b,n	cas2_end
-14:	stb,ma	%r24, 0(%r26)
+14:	stb	%r24, 0(%r26)
 	b	cas2_end
 	copy	%r0, %r28
 	nop
 	nop
 
 	/* 16bit CAS */
-15:	ldh,ma	0(%r26), %r29
+15:	ldh	0(%r26), %r29
 	sub,=	%r29, %r25, %r0
 	b,n	cas2_end
-16:	sth,ma	%r24, 0(%r26)
+16:	sth	%r24, 0(%r26)
 	b	cas2_end
 	copy	%r0, %r28
 	nop
 	nop
 
 	/* 32bit CAS */
-17:	ldw,ma	0(%r26), %r29
+17:	ldw	0(%r26), %r29
 	sub,=	%r29, %r25, %r0
 	b,n	cas2_end
-18:	stw,ma	%r24, 0(%r26)
+18:	stw	%r24, 0(%r26)
 	b	cas2_end
 	copy	%r0, %r28
 	nop
@@ -827,10 +829,10 @@ cas2_action:
 
 	/* 64bit CAS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
-19:	ldd,ma	0(%r26), %r29
+19:	ldd	0(%r26), %r29
 	sub,*=	%r29, %r25, %r0
 	b,n	cas2_end
-20:	std,ma	%r24, 0(%r26)
+20:	std	%r24, 0(%r26)
 	copy	%r0, %r28
 #else
 	/* Compare first word */
@@ -848,7 +850,8 @@ cas2_action:
 
 cas2_end:
 	/* Free lock */
-	stw,ma	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
+	sync
+	stw	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 	/* Enable interrupts */
 	ssm	PSW_SM_I, %r0
 	/* Return to userspace, set no error */
@@ -858,6 +861,7 @@ cas2_end:
 22:
 	/* Error occurred on load or store */
 	/* Free lock */
+	sync
 	stw	%r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
 	ssm	PSW_SM_I, %r0
 	ldo	1(%r0),%r28

arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h

@@ -76,6 +76,21 @@ do {									\
 	___p1;								\
 })
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+/*
+ * Prevent execution of subsequent instructions until preceding branches have
+ * been fully resolved and are no longer executing speculatively.
+ */
+#define barrier_nospec_asm ori 31,31,0
+
+// This also acts as a compiler barrier due to the memory clobber.
+#define barrier_nospec() asm (stringify_in_c(barrier_nospec_asm) ::: "memory")
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
+#define barrier_nospec_asm
+#define barrier_nospec()
+#endif
+
 #include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
 
 #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BARRIER_H */

arch/powerpc/include/asm/cache.h

@@ -9,11 +9,14 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_8xx) || defined(CONFIG_403GCX)
 #define L1_CACHE_SHIFT		4
 #define MAX_COPY_PREFETCH	1
+#define IFETCH_ALIGN_SHIFT	2
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500MC)
 #define L1_CACHE_SHIFT		6
 #define MAX_COPY_PREFETCH	4
+#define IFETCH_ALIGN_SHIFT	3
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC32)
 #define MAX_COPY_PREFETCH	4
+#define IFETCH_ALIGN_SHIFT	3	/* 603 fetches 2 insn at a time */
 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_47x)
 #define L1_CACHE_SHIFT		7
 #else