seccomp: passthrough uprobe systemcall without filtering

[ Upstream commit 89d1d8434d ]

Adding uprobe as another exception to the seccomp filter alongside
with the uretprobe syscall.

Same as the uretprobe the uprobe syscall is installed by kernel as
replacement for the breakpoint exception and is limited to x86_64
arch and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250720112133.244369-21-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jiri Olsa
2025-07-20 13:21:30 +02:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent d6c55b581c
commit 1c0462f28b

View File

@@ -733,6 +733,26 @@ out:
}
#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
static bool seccomp_uprobe_exception(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
#if defined __NR_uretprobe || defined __NR_uprobe
#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
if (sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE)
#endif
{
#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
if (sd->nr == __NR_uretprobe)
return true;
#endif
#ifdef __NR_uprobe
if (sd->nr == __NR_uprobe)
return true;
#endif
}
#endif
return false;
}
/**
* seccomp_is_const_allow - check if filter is constant allow with given data
* @fprog: The BPF programs
@@ -750,13 +770,8 @@ static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
return false;
/* Our single exception to filtering. */
#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
if (sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE)
#endif
if (sd->nr == __NR_uretprobe)
return true;
#endif
if (seccomp_uprobe_exception(sd))
return true;
for (pc = 0; pc < fprog->len; pc++) {
struct sock_filter *insn = &fprog->filter[pc];
@@ -1034,6 +1049,9 @@ static const int mode1_syscalls[] = {
__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
#ifdef __NR_uretprobe
__NR_uretprobe,
#endif
#ifdef __NR_uprobe
__NR_uprobe,
#endif
-1, /* negative terminated */
};