Merge remote-tracking branch 'stable/linux-4.19.y' into rpi-4.19.y

Ported pcie-brcmstb bounce buffer implementation to ARM64.
This enables full 4G RAM usage on Raspberry Pi in 64-bit mode.

Signed-off-by: Yaroslav Rosomakho <yaroslavros@gmail.com>

.gitignore

@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
 *.bin
 *.bz2
 *.c.[012]*.*
-*.dtb*
+*.dtb
+*.dtbo
 *.dtb.S
 *.dwo
 *.elf

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Contact:	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
 Description:
 		Unsigned integer.
 
-		Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to add a qmap mux
+		Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to add a qmap mux
 		based network device, supported by recent Qualcomm based
 		modems.
 
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ Contact:	Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
 Description:
 		Unsigned integer.
 
-		Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to delete a previously
+		Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to delete a previously
 		created qmap mux based network device.

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -489,8 +490,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
-		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
-		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+		See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   spectre
+   l1tf
+   mds

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst

@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
 line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
 module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
 
+.. _mitigation_selection:
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
@@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
 the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
 machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
 guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
-bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+bare metal hypervisor it will:
 
  - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
    nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+   CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+  all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+  but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+  abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+         The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+    ========================  ============================================
+    'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+    'SMT mitigated'           SMT is enabled and mitigated
+    'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+    'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+    ========================  ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+  mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+  effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+  without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+  This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+  microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+  the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+  takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+  The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+  space and when entering a guest.
+
+  If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+  is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+  other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+  For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+  transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+  vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+  - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+    available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+    guest transition.
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+    invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+    For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+  - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+    CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+    mitigation is enabled.
+
+  The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+   L1TF         MDS   VMX-L1FLUSH   Host MDS     MDS-State
+
+   Don't care   No    Don't care    N/A          Not affected
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Off          Vulnerable
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Full         Mitigated
+
+   Yes          Yes   Enabled       Don't care   Mitigated
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Off          Vulnerable
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Full         Mitigated
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+  This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+  host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+  have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+  cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+  to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+  for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+  command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+  XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+  before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+  either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+  means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+  disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+  exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+  Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+  depends on the type of workloads.
+
+  See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+  :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+		for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+		userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+		protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+		It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+  full,nosmt	The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+		CPUs.  This is the complete mitigation.
+
+  off		Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+   execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+   can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+   See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+   If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+   guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+  for L1TF applies.
+  See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Spectre Side Channels
+=====================
+
+Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction
+and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly
+bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits
+do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory.
+
+This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern
+high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors
+use branch prediction and speculative execution.
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+    - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors
+
+    - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors
+
+    - IBM POWER and zSeries processors
+
+    - Higher end ARM processors
+
+    - Apple CPUs
+
+    - Higher end MIPS CPUs
+
+    - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre
+vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
+
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+   CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
+   CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
+   CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave
+traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches,
+buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to
+influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects
+of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer
+privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
+
+Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
+conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
+execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
+:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
+---------------------------------------
+
+The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
+of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions
+used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an
+array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in
+memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are
+done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative
+memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which
+leak information to the attacker.
+
+There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
+over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
+are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
+
+Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
+only about user-controlled array bounds checks.  It can affect any
+conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
+handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic
+in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
+a user GS.
+
+Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
+-------------------------------------------
+
+The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
+execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`.  The indirect
+branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of
+indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code
+to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by
+the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative
+execution can be measured to infer data values.
+
+.. _poison_btb:
+
+In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
+branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target
+buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such
+poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code,
+with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's
+control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not
+fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction,
+this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget
+code with the same offset.
+
+The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such
+as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets
+without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have
+very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of
+the attack revealing useful data.
+
+One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative
+subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget.  An attacker's
+imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the
+return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine
+return instructions.  This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
+stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit.
+
+On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible
+from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer
+(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core.  A malicious
+program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to
+steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
+speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
+victim's data.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
+not cover all possible attack vectors.
+
+1. A user process attacking the kernel
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
+   via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
+   be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
+   a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack.  The index or pointer
+   is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken
+   for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be
+   accessed and leaked.
+
+   For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could
+   potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
+   macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
+
+Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
+   swapgs path for an interrupt or exception.  If they initialize
+   the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
+   skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
+   window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value.  This
+   could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
+
+   For example:
+
+   ::
+
+     if (coming from user space)
+         swapgs
+     mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
+     mov (%reg), %reg1
+
+   When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
+   swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
+   value.  So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
+   value.  If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
+   in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
+   become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
+
+   A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
+   speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
+   rest of the speculative window.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+   target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
+   After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
+   target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
+   execution.
+
+   If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during
+   speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the
+   gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After
+   the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect.
+
+   The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch
+   target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as
+   "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all
+   indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths
+   to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution.
+   x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
+   (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to
+   mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
+   more efficient than retpoline.
+
+   There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with
+   Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
+   attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature
+   is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code.
+
+2. A user process attacking another user process
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A malicious user process can try to attack another user process,
+   either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the
+   sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous
+   multi-threading (SMT) system.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
+   between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such
+   as remote procedure calls (RPC).  Those parameters are used in gadget
+   code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in
+   the attacked process.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer.  This can
+   influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either
+   runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on
+   a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core.
+
+   A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
+   by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation
+   for itself.  An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process
+   from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's
+   indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost
+   from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch
+   target buffer.  When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has
+   indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch
+   Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the
+   sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer.  In addition,
+   the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the
+   branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process.
+
+   On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch.
+   This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch
+   prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to
+   a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer
+   left by the previous process will also be cleared.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks
+   more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2).
+
+3. A virtualized guest attacking the host
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the
+   kernel.  The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization
+   exit paths.
+
+   For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
+   (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to
+   speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel.  For places
+   where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros
+   are used to stop speculative memory access.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
+   <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing
+   the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths.
+
+   To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
+   for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer,
+   and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit.  This prevents rogue
+   guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel.
+
+   To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have
+   indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl().  The branch target
+   buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes.
+
+4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the
+   other guest.
+
+   Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
+   between guests.  This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory
+   or message passing.  Such parameters could be used to derive data
+   pointers to privileged data in guest.  The privileged data could be
+   accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths.
+
+   Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
+   :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return
+   stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence
+   speculation execution paths in the victim guest.
+
+   Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same
+   CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit,
+   and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest.
+
+   If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
+   in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator,
+   by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via
+   prctl().  A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode
+   based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest.
+
+.. _spectre_sys_info:
+
+Spectre system information
+--------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is
+vulnerable, and which mitigations are active.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
+       - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
+         protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
+     * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
+       - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
+         barriers.
+
+However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
+and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
+variant 1 are covered.
+
+The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with
+retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the
+CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation.
+
+This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate
+attack between user processes:
+
+1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional
+   isolation between processes of different users.
+2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional
+   isolation between CPU threads running on the same core.
+
+These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled
+per process on a case-by-case base.
+
+The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  - Kernel status:
+
+  ====================================  =================================
+  'Not affected'                        The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Vulnerable'                          Vulnerable, no mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline'  Software-focused mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline'      AMD-specific software mitigation
+  'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS'           Hardware-focused mitigation
+  ====================================  =================================
+
+  - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
+    used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
+
+  ========== =============================================================
+  'IBRS_FW'  Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware
+  ========== =============================================================
+
+  - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between
+    processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is
+    an x86 only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ===================   ========================================================
+  'IBPB: disabled'      IBPB unused
+  'IBPB: always-on'     Use IBPB on all tasks
+  'IBPB: conditional'   Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ===================   ========================================================
+
+  - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection
+    between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through
+    prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86
+    only feature. For more details see below.
+
+  ====================  ========================================================
+  'STIBP: disabled'     STIBP unused
+  'STIBP: forced'       Use STIBP on all tasks
+  'STIBP: conditional'  Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks
+  ====================  ========================================================
+
+  - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status:
+
+  =============   ===========================================
+  'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
+  =============   ===========================================
+
+Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
+report vulnerability.
+
+Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+1. Kernel mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
+   by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
+   basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
+   <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
+   not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
+
+   Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
+   check from being mis-speculated.  The barrier is done by the
+   barrier_nospec() macro.
+
+   For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
+   added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed.  These
+   barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
+   FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
+   jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
+   :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
+   addresses.  Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped
+   in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to
+   a gadget.
+
+   To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel
+   needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the
+   -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
+   If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
+   to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option.  The kernel config
+   CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
+   the latest updated microcode.
+
+   On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
+   cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
+
+   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
+   IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+   The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
+   CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
+   via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default
+   before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
+   using the firmware.
+
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+   and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
+   attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
+
+2. User program mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
+   clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
+   can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
+   This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
+   target buffer left by malicious software.  Alternatively, the
+   programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
+   sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
+   flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
+
+   Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
+   also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
+   on x86.  All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
+   speculation restricted by default.  Administrators can change
+   that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+   See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+   Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
+   more overhead and run slower.
+
+   User programs should use address space randomization
+   (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more
+   difficult.
+
+3. VM mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
+   mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code
+   uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any
+   usable disclosure gadgets.  However, this may not cover all variant
+   1 attack vectors.
+
+   For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
+   Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of
+   poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests.  It also
+   flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return
+   stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used,
+   or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread,
+   the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching
+   to a new guest on a CPU.
+
+   The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs.
+
+   To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is
+   in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have
+   its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl().
+
+   The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation
+   they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves.
+
+.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
+kernel command line.
+
+	nospectre_v1
+
+		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+		possible in the system.
+
+	nospectre_v2
+
+		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+		allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+		to spectre_v2=off.
+
+
+        spectre_v2=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+		The default operation protects the kernel from
+		user space attacks.
+
+		on
+			unconditionally enable, implies
+			spectre_v2_user=on
+		off
+			unconditionally disable, implies
+		        spectre_v2_user=off
+		auto
+			kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+		        vulnerable
+
+		Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+		mitigation method at run time according to the
+		CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+		CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+		compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+		Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+		against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+		Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+		the user space protections.
+
+		Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+		retpoline
+					replace indirect branches
+		retpoline,generic
+					google's original retpoline
+		retpoline,amd
+					AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2=auto.
+
+For user space mitigation:
+
+        spectre_v2_user=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		user space tasks
+
+		on
+			Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+		off
+			Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+			enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+		prctl
+			Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+			but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+			per thread. The mitigation control state
+			is inherited on fork.
+
+		prctl,ibpb
+			Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different user
+			space processes.
+
+		seccomp
+			Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+			threads will enable the mitigation unless
+			they explicitly opt out.
+
+		seccomp,ibpb
+			Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+			always when switching between different
+			user space processes.
+
+		auto
+			Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+			the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+		Default mitigation:
+		If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+		spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
+		In general the kernel by default selects
+		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
+		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
+		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
+		cannot be disabled.
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not
+   execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can
+   be disabled.
+
+2. Protect sensitive programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto
+   keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
+   disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+
+3. Sandbox untrusted programs
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned
+   off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
+   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+   This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
+   buffer.  All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
+   branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
+   changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+3. High security mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
+   at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This will add
+   overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be
+   restricted.
+
+   On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching
+   to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs
+   against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on
+   sibling threads.
+
+   Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs
+   whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled,
+   while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new
+   program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in
+   :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`).  This "ibpb" option
+   has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP
+   on all the time.
+
+References on Spectre
+---------------------
+
+Intel white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref1:
+
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref2:
+
+[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref3:
+
+[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref4:
+
+[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_.
+
+AMD white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref5:
+
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref6:
+
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+
+ARM white papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref7:
+
+[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref8:
+
+[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_.
+
+Google white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref9:
+
+[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_.
+
+MIPS white paper:
+
+.. _spec_ref10:
+
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+
+Academic papers:
+
+.. _spec_ref11:
+
+[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref12:
+
+[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_.
+
+.. _spec_ref13:
+
+[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_.

Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst

@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
-   l1tf
+   hw-vuln/index
 
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2079,7 +2079,7 @@
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
-			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
 
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
@@ -2319,6 +2319,32 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2476,6 +2502,41 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v1 [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
+					       mds=off [X86]
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
@@ -2801,11 +2862,11 @@
 			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
 				     via the sysfs control file.
 
-	nospectre_v1	[PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
-			check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
-			in the system.
+	nospectre_v1	[X66, PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
+			are possible in the system.
 
-	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
 			to spectre_v2=off.
@@ -4916,12 +4977,6 @@
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.
 
-			native      Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
-			            This is a little bit faster than trapping
-			            and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
-			            better than they would in emulation mode.
-			            It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
 			            might break your system.

Documentation/arm/kernel_mode_neon.txt

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ TL;DR summary
 * Use only NEON instructions, or VFP instructions that don't rely on support
   code
 * Isolate your NEON code in a separate compilation unit, and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp'
 * Put kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around the calls into your
   NEON code
 * Don't sleep in your NEON code, and be aware that it will be executed with
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ instructions appearing in unexpected places if no special care is taken.
 Therefore, the recommended and only supported way of using NEON/VFP in the
 kernel is by adhering to the following rules:
 * isolate the NEON code in a separate compilation unit and compile it with
-  '-mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
+  '-march=armv7-a -mfpu=neon -mfloat-abi=softfp';
 * issue the calls to kernel_neon_begin(), kernel_neon_end() as well as the calls
   into the unit containing the NEON code from a compilation unit which is *not*
   built with the GCC flag '-mfpu=neon' set.

Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ stable kernels.
 | ARM            | Cortex-A72      | #853709         | N/A                         |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A73      | #858921         | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921        |
 | ARM            | Cortex-A55      | #1024718        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718       |
+| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #1463225        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225       |
 | ARM            | MMU-500         | #841119,#826419 | N/A                         |
 |                |                 |                 |                             |
 | Cavium         | ThunderX ITS    | #22375, #24313  | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375        |

Documentation/atomic_t.txt

@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ These helper barriers exist because architectures have varying implicit
 ordering on their SMP atomic primitives. For example our TSO architectures
 provide full ordered atomics and these barriers are no-ops.
 
+NOTE: when the atomic RmW ops are fully ordered, they should also imply a
+compiler barrier.
+
 Thus:
 
   atomic_fetch_add();

Documentation/conf.py

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ needs_sphinx = '1.3'
 extensions = ['kerneldoc', 'rstFlatTable', 'kernel_include', 'cdomain', 'kfigure', 'sphinx.ext.ifconfig']
 
 # The name of the math extension changed on Sphinx 1.4
-if major == 1 and minor > 3:
+if (major == 1 and minor > 3) or (major > 1):
     extensions.append("sphinx.ext.imgmath")
 else:
     extensions.append("sphinx.ext.pngmath")

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpu/brcm,bcm-v3d.txt

@@ -6,15 +6,20 @@ For V3D 2.x, see brcm,bcm-vc4.txt.
 Required properties:
 - compatible:	Should be "brcm,7268-v3d" or "brcm,7278-v3d"
 - reg:		Physical base addresses and lengths of the register areas
-- reg-names:	Names for the register areas.  The "hub", "bridge", and "core0"
+- reg-names:	Names for the register areas.  The "hub" and "core0"
 		  register areas are always required.  The "gca" register area
-		  is required if the GCA cache controller is present.
+		  is required if the GCA cache controller is present.  The
+		  "bridge" register area is required if an external reset
+		  controller is not present.
 - interrupts:	The interrupt numbers.  The first interrupt is for the hub,
-		  while the following interrupts are for the cores.
+		  while the following interrupts are separate interrupt lines
+		  for the cores (if they don't share the hub's interrupt).
 		  See bindings/interrupt-controller/interrupts.txt
 
 Optional properties:
 - clocks:	The core clock the unit runs on
+- resets:	The reset line for v3d, if not using a mapping of the bridge
+		  See bindings/reset/reset.txt
 
 v3d {
 	compatible = "brcm,7268-v3d";

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/ilitek,ili2xxx.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Ilitek ILI210x/ILI251x touchscreen controller
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible:
+    ilitek,ili210x for ILI210x
+    ilitek,ili251x for ILI251x
+
+- reg: The I2C address of the device
+
+- interrupts: The sink for the touchscreen's IRQ output
+    See ../interrupt-controller/interrupts.txt
+
+Optional properties for main touchpad device:
+
+- reset-gpios: GPIO specifier for the touchscreen's reset pin (active low)
+
+Example:
+
+	touchscreen@41 {
+		compatible = "ilitek,ili251x";
+		reg = <0x41>;
+		interrupt-parent = <&gpio4>;
+		interrupts = <7 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_FALLING>;
+		reset-gpios = <&gpio5 21 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+	};
+

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Required properties:
  - compatible: Should be one of the following:
    - "microchip,mcp2510" for MCP2510.
    - "microchip,mcp2515" for MCP2515.
+   - "microchip,mcp25625" for MCP25625.
  - reg: SPI chip select.
  - clocks: The clock feeding the CAN controller.
  - interrupts: Should contain IRQ line for the CAN controller.

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-orion-mdio.txt

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Required properties:
 
 Optional properties:
 - interrupts: interrupt line number for the SMI error/done interrupt
-- clocks: phandle for up to three required clocks for the MDIO instance
+- clocks: phandle for up to four required clocks for the MDIO instance
 
 The child nodes of the MDIO driver are the individual PHY devices
 connected to this MDIO bus. They must have a "reg" property given the

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/brcmstb-pcie.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+Brcmstb PCIe Host Controller Device Tree Bindings
+
+Required Properties:
+- compatible
+  "brcm,bcm7425-pcie" -- for 7425 family MIPS-based SOCs.
+  "brcm,bcm7435-pcie" -- for 7435 family MIPS-based SOCs.
+  "brcm,bcm7445-pcie" -- for 7445 and later ARM based SOCs (not including
+      the 7278).
+  "brcm,bcm7278-pcie"  -- for 7278 family ARM-based SOCs.
+
+- reg -- the register start address and length for the PCIe reg block.
+- interrupts -- two interrupts are specified; the first interrupt is for
+     the PCI host controller and the second is for MSI if the built-in
+     MSI controller is to be used.
+- interrupt-names -- names of the interrupts (above): "pcie" and "msi".
+- #address-cells -- set to <3>.
+- #size-cells -- set to <2>.
+- #interrupt-cells: set to <1>.
+- interrupt-map-mask and interrupt-map, standard PCI properties to define the
+     mapping of the PCIe interface to interrupt numbers.
+- ranges: ranges for the PCI memory and I/O regions.
+- linux,pci-domain -- should be unique per host controller.
+
+Optional Properties:
+- clocks -- phandle of pcie clock.
+- clock-names -- set to "sw_pcie" if clocks is used.
+- dma-ranges -- Specifies the inbound memory mapping regions when
+     an "identity map" is not possible.
+- msi-controller -- this property is typically specified to have the
+     PCIe controller use its internal MSI controller.
+- msi-parent -- set to use an external MSI interrupt controller.
+- brcm,enable-ssc -- (boolean) indicates usage of spread-spectrum clocking.
+- max-link-speed --  (integer) indicates desired generation of link:
+     1 => 2.5 Gbps (gen1), 2 => 5.0 Gbps (gen2), 3 => 8.0 Gbps (gen3).
+
+Example Node:
+
+pcie0: pcie@f0460000 {
+		reg = <0x0 0xf0460000 0x0 0x9310>;
+		interrupts = <0x0 0x0 0x4>;
+		compatible = "brcm,bcm7445-pcie";
+		#address-cells = <3>;
+		#size-cells = <2>;
+		ranges = <0x02000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0xc0000000 0x00000000 0x08000000
+			  0x02000000 0x00000000 0x08000000 0x00000000 0xc8000000 0x00000000 0x08000000>;
+		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
+		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 7>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 1 &intc 0 47 3
+				 0 0 0 2 &intc 0 48 3
+				 0 0 0 3 &intc 0 49 3
+				 0 0 0 4 &intc 0 50 3>;
+		clocks = <&sw_pcie0>;
+		clock-names = "sw_pcie";
+		msi-parent = <&pcie0>;  /* use PCIe's internal MSI controller */
+		msi-controller;         /* use PCIe's internal MSI controller */
+		brcm,ssc;
+		max-link-speed = <1>;
+		linux,pci-domain = <0>;
+	};

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/rtc.txt

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ below.
 - trickle-diode-disable :   Do not use internal trickle charger diode Should be
                             given if internal trickle charger diode should be
                             disabled
+- backup-switchover-mode :  Configure RTC backup power supply switch behaviour
 - wakeup-source :           Enables wake up of host system on alarm
 - quartz-load-femtofarads : The capacitive load of the quartz(x-tal),
                             expressed in femto Farad (fF).

Documentation/driver-api/usb/power-management.rst

@@ -370,11 +370,15 @@ autosuspend the interface's device.  When the usage counter is = 0
 then the interface is considered to be idle, and the kernel may
 autosuspend the device.
 
-Drivers need not be concerned about balancing changes to the usage
-counter; the USB core will undo any remaining "get"s when a driver
-is unbound from its interface.  As a corollary, drivers must not call
-any of the ``usb_autopm_*`` functions after their ``disconnect``
-routine has returned.
+Drivers must be careful to balance their overall changes to the usage
+counter.  Unbalanced "get"s will remain in effect when a driver is
+unbound from its interface, preventing the device from going into
+runtime suspend should the interface be bound to a driver again.  On
+the other hand, drivers are allowed to achieve this balance by calling
+the ``usb_autopm_*`` functions even after their ``disconnect`` routine
+has returned -- say from within a work-queue routine -- provided they
+retain an active reference to the interface (via ``usb_get_intf`` and
+``usb_put_intf``).
 
 Drivers using the async routines are responsible for their own
 synchronization and mutual exclusion.

Documentation/fb/modedb.txt

@@ -51,6 +51,20 @@ To force the VGA output to be enabled and drive a specific mode say:
 Specifying the option multiple times for different ports is possible, e.g.:
     video=LVDS-1:d video=HDMI-1:D
 
+Options can also be passed after the mode, using commas as separator.
+
+       Sample usage: 720x480,rotate=180 - 720x480 mode, rotated by 180 degrees
+
+Valid options are:
+
+  - margin_top, margin_bottom, margin_left, margin_right (integer):
+    Number of pixels in the margins, typically to deal with overscan on TVs
+  - reflect_x (boolean): Perform an axial symmetry on the X axis
+  - reflect_y (boolean): Perform an axial symmetry on the Y axis
+  - rotate (integer): Rotate the initial framebuffer by x
+    degrees. Valid values are 0, 90, 180 and 270.
+
+
 ***** oOo ***** oOo ***** oOo ***** oOo ***** oOo ***** oOo ***** oOo *****
 
 What is the VESA(TM) Coordinated Video Timings (CVT)?

Documentation/filesystems/porting

@@ -622,3 +622,8 @@ in your dentry operations instead.
 	alloc_file_clone(file, flags, ops) does not affect any caller's references.
 	On success you get a new struct file sharing the mount/dentry with the
 	original, on failure - ERR_PTR().
+--
+[mandatory]
+	DCACHE_RCUACCESS is gone; having an RCU delay on dentry freeing is the
+	default.  DCACHE_NORCU opts out, and only d_alloc_pseudo() has any
+	business doing so.

Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-i801

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ Supported adapters:
   * Intel Cannon Lake (PCH)
   * Intel Cedar Fork (PCH)
   * Intel Ice Lake (PCH)
+  * Intel Comet Lake (PCH)
    Datasheets: Publicly available at the Intel website
 
 On Intel Patsburg and later chipsets, both the normal host SMBus controller

Documentation/index.rst

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------

Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/vidioc-create-bufs.rst

@@ -102,7 +102,19 @@ than the number requested.
       - ``format``
       - Filled in by the application, preserved by the driver.
     * - __u32
-      - ``reserved``\ [8]
+      - ``capabilities``
+      - Set by the driver. If 0, then the driver doesn't support
+        capabilities. In that case all you know is that the driver is
+	guaranteed to support ``V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP`` and *might* support
+	other :c:type:`v4l2_memory` types. It will not support any others
+	capabilities. See :ref:`here <v4l2-buf-capabilities>` for a list of the
+	capabilities.
+
+	If you want to just query the capabilities without making any
+	other changes, then set ``count`` to 0, ``memory`` to
+	``V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP`` and ``format.type`` to the buffer type.
+    * - __u32
+      - ``reserved``\ [7]
       - A place holder for future extensions. Drivers and applications
 	must set the array to zero.
 

Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/vidioc-reqbufs.rst

@@ -59,9 +59,14 @@ When the I/O method is not supported the ioctl returns an ``EINVAL`` error
 code.
 
 Applications can call :ref:`VIDIOC_REQBUFS` again to change the number of
-buffers, however this cannot succeed when any buffers are still mapped.
-A ``count`` value of zero frees all buffers, after aborting or finishing
-any DMA in progress, an implicit
+buffers. Note that if any buffers are still mapped or exported via DMABUF,
+then :ref:`VIDIOC_REQBUFS` can only succeed if the
+``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_ORPHANED_BUFS`` capability is set. Otherwise
+:ref:`VIDIOC_REQBUFS` will return the ``EBUSY`` error code.
+If ``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_ORPHANED_BUFS`` is set, then these buffers are
+orphaned and will be freed when they are unmapped or when the exported DMABUF
+fds are closed. A ``count`` value of zero frees or orphans all buffers, after
+aborting or finishing any DMA in progress, an implicit
 :ref:`VIDIOC_STREAMOFF <VIDIOC_STREAMON>`.
 
 
@@ -88,10 +93,56 @@ any DMA in progress, an implicit
 	``V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF`` or ``V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR``. See
 	:c:type:`v4l2_memory`.
     * - __u32
-      - ``reserved``\ [2]
+      - ``capabilities``
+      - Set by the driver. If 0, then the driver doesn't support
+        capabilities. In that case all you know is that the driver is
+	guaranteed to support ``V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP`` and *might* support
+	other :c:type:`v4l2_memory` types. It will not support any others
+	capabilities.
+
+	If you want to query the capabilities with a minimum of side-effects,
+	then this can be called with ``count`` set to 0, ``memory`` set to
+	``V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP`` and ``type`` set to the buffer type. This will
+	free any previously allocated buffers, so this is typically something
+	that will be done at the start of the application.
+    * - __u32
+      - ``reserved``\ [1]
       - A place holder for future extensions. Drivers and applications
 	must set the array to zero.
 
+.. tabularcolumns:: |p{6.1cm}|p{2.2cm}|p{8.7cm}|
+
+.. _v4l2-buf-capabilities:
+.. _V4L2-BUF-CAP-SUPPORTS-MMAP:
+.. _V4L2-BUF-CAP-SUPPORTS-USERPTR:
+.. _V4L2-BUF-CAP-SUPPORTS-DMABUF:
+.. _V4L2-BUF-CAP-SUPPORTS-REQUESTS:
+.. _V4L2-BUF-CAP-SUPPORTS-ORPHANED-BUFS:
+
+.. cssclass:: longtable
+
+.. flat-table:: V4L2 Buffer Capabilities Flags
+    :header-rows:  0
+    :stub-columns: 0
+    :widths:       3 1 4
+
+    * - ``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_MMAP``
+      - 0x00000001
+      - This buffer type supports the ``V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP`` streaming mode.
+    * - ``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_USERPTR``
+      - 0x00000002
+      - This buffer type supports the ``V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR`` streaming mode.
+    * - ``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_DMABUF``
+      - 0x00000004
+      - This buffer type supports the ``V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF`` streaming mode.
+    * - ``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_REQUESTS``
+      - 0x00000008
+      - This buffer type supports :ref:`requests <media-request-api>`.
+    * - ``V4L2_BUF_CAP_SUPPORTS_ORPHANED_BUFS``
+      - 0x00000010
+      - The kernel allows calling :ref:`VIDIOC_REQBUFS` while buffers are still
+        mapped or exported via DMABUF. These orphaned buffers will be freed
+        when they are unmapped or when the exported DMABUF fds are closed.
 
 Return Value
 ============

Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt

@@ -250,6 +250,14 @@ tcp_base_mss - INTEGER
 	Path MTU discovery (MTU probing).  If MTU probing is enabled,
 	this is the initial MSS used by the connection.
 
+tcp_min_snd_mss - INTEGER
+	TCP SYN and SYNACK messages usually advertise an ADVMSS option,
+	as described in RFC 1122 and RFC 6691.
+	If this ADVMSS option is smaller than tcp_min_snd_mss,
+	it is silently capped to tcp_min_snd_mss.
+
+	Default : 48 (at least 8 bytes of payload per segment)
+
 tcp_congestion_control - STRING
 	Set the congestion control algorithm to be used for new
 	connections. The algorithm "reno" is always available, but
@@ -410,6 +418,7 @@ tcp_min_rtt_wlen - INTEGER
 	minimum RTT when it is moved to a longer path (e.g., due to traffic
 	engineering). A longer window makes the filter more resistant to RTT
 	inflations such as transient congestion. The unit is seconds.
+	Possible values: 0 - 86400 (1 day)
 	Default: 300
 
 tcp_moderate_rcvbuf - BOOLEAN

Documentation/robust-futexes.txt

@@ -218,5 +218,4 @@ All other architectures should build just fine too - but they won't have
 the new syscalls yet.
 
 Architectures need to implement the new futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
-inline function before writing up the syscalls (that function returns
--ENOSYS right now).
+inline function before writing up the syscalls.

Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt.c

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ void calc_runnable_avg_yN_inv(void)
 	int i;
 	unsigned int x;
 
-	printf("static const u32 runnable_avg_yN_inv[] = {");
+	/* To silence -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings. */
+	printf("static const u32 runnable_avg_yN_inv[] __maybe_unused = {");
 	for (i = 0; i < HALFLIFE; i++) {
 		x = ((1UL<<32)-1)*pow(y, i);
 

Documentation/sphinx/kerneldoc.py

@@ -37,7 +37,19 @@ import glob
 from docutils import nodes, statemachine
 from docutils.statemachine import ViewList
 from docutils.parsers.rst import directives, Directive
-from sphinx.ext.autodoc import AutodocReporter
+
+#
+# AutodocReporter is only good up to Sphinx 1.7
+#
+import sphinx
+
+Use_SSI = sphinx.__version__[:3] >= '1.7'
+if Use_SSI:
+    from sphinx.util.docutils import switch_source_input
+else:
+    from sphinx.ext.autodoc import AutodocReporter
+
+import kernellog
 
 __version__  = '1.0'
 
@@ -90,7 +102,8 @@ class KernelDocDirective(Directive):
         cmd += [filename]
 
         try:
-            env.app.verbose('calling kernel-doc \'%s\'' % (" ".join(cmd)))
+            kernellog.verbose(env.app,
+                              'calling kernel-doc \'%s\'' % (" ".join(cmd)))
 
             p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
             out, err = p.communicate()
@@ -100,7 +113,8 @@ class KernelDocDirective(Directive):
             if p.returncode != 0:
                 sys.stderr.write(err)
 
-                env.app.warn('kernel-doc \'%s\' failed with return code %d' % (" ".join(cmd), p.returncode))
+                kernellog.warn(env.app,
+                               'kernel-doc \'%s\' failed with return code %d' % (" ".join(cmd), p.returncode))
                 return [nodes.error(None, nodes.paragraph(text = "kernel-doc missing"))]
             elif env.config.kerneldoc_verbosity > 0:
                 sys.stderr.write(err)
@@ -121,20 +135,28 @@ class KernelDocDirective(Directive):
                     lineoffset += 1
 
             node = nodes.section()
-            buf = self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter
+            self.do_parse(result, node)
+
+            return node.children
+
+        except Exception as e:  # pylint: disable=W0703
+            kernellog.warn(env.app, 'kernel-doc \'%s\' processing failed with: %s' %
+                           (" ".join(cmd), str(e)))
+            return [nodes.error(None, nodes.paragraph(text = "kernel-doc missing"))]
+
+    def do_parse(self, result, node):
+        if Use_SSI:
+            with switch_source_input(self.state, result):
+                self.state.nested_parse(result, 0, node, match_titles=1)
+        else:
+            save = self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter
             self.state.memo.reporter = AutodocReporter(result, self.state.memo.reporter)
             self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level = [], 0
             try:
                 self.state.nested_parse(result, 0, node, match_titles=1)
             finally:
-                self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter = buf
+                self.state.memo.title_styles, self.state.memo.section_level, self.state.memo.reporter = save
 
-            return node.children
-
-        except Exception as e:  # pylint: disable=W0703
-            env.app.warn('kernel-doc \'%s\' processing failed with: %s' %
-                         (" ".join(cmd), str(e)))
-            return [nodes.error(None, nodes.paragraph(text = "kernel-doc missing"))]
 
 def setup(app):
     app.add_config_value('kerneldoc_bin', None, 'env')

Documentation/sphinx/kernellog.py

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Sphinx has deprecated its older logging interface, but the replacement
+# only goes back to 1.6.  So here's a wrapper layer to keep around for
+# as long as we support 1.4.
+#
+import sphinx
+
+if sphinx.__version__[:3] >= '1.6':
+    UseLogging = True
+    from sphinx.util import logging
+    logger = logging.getLogger('kerneldoc')
+else:
+    UseLogging = False
+
+def warn(app, message):
+    if UseLogging:
+        logger.warning(message)
+    else:
+        app.warn(message)
+
+def verbose(app, message):
+    if UseLogging:
+        logger.verbose(message)
+    else:
+        app.verbose(message)
+
+

Documentation/sphinx/kfigure.py

@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ import sphinx
 from sphinx.util.nodes import clean_astext
 from six import iteritems
 
+import kernellog
+
 PY3 = sys.version_info[0] == 3
 
 if PY3:
@@ -171,20 +173,20 @@ def setupTools(app):
     This function is called once, when the builder is initiated.
     """
     global dot_cmd, convert_cmd   # pylint: disable=W0603
-    app.verbose("kfigure: check installed tools ...")
+    kernellog.verbose(app, "kfigure: check installed tools ...")
 
     dot_cmd = which('dot')
     convert_cmd = which('convert')
 
     if dot_cmd:
-        app.verbose("use dot(1) from: " + dot_cmd)
+        kernellog.verbose(app, "use dot(1) from: " + dot_cmd)
     else:
-        app.warn("dot(1) not found, for better output quality install "
-                 "graphviz from http://www.graphviz.org")
+        kernellog.warn(app, "dot(1) not found, for better output quality install "
+                       "graphviz from http://www.graphviz.org")
     if convert_cmd:
-        app.verbose("use convert(1) from: " + convert_cmd)
+        kernellog.verbose(app, "use convert(1) from: " + convert_cmd)
     else:
-        app.warn(
+        kernellog.warn(app,
             "convert(1) not found, for SVG to PDF conversion install "
             "ImageMagick (https://www.imagemagick.org)")
 
@@ -220,12 +222,13 @@ def convert_image(img_node, translator, src_fname=None):
 
     # in kernel builds, use 'make SPHINXOPTS=-v' to see verbose messages
 
-    app.verbose('assert best format for: ' + img_node['uri'])
+    kernellog.verbose(app, 'assert best format for: ' + img_node['uri'])
 
     if in_ext == '.dot':
 
         if not dot_cmd:
-            app.verbose("dot from graphviz not available / include DOT raw.")
+            kernellog.verbose(app,
+                              "dot from graphviz not available / include DOT raw.")
             img_node.replace_self(file2literal(src_fname))
 
         elif translator.builder.format == 'latex':
@@ -252,7 +255,8 @@ def convert_image(img_node, translator, src_fname=None):
 
         if translator.builder.format == 'latex':
             if convert_cmd is None:
-                app.verbose("no SVG to PDF conversion available / include SVG raw.")
+                kernellog.verbose(app,
+                                  "no SVG to PDF conversion available / include SVG raw.")
                 img_node.replace_self(file2literal(src_fname))
             else:
                 dst_fname = path.join(translator.builder.outdir, fname + '.pdf')
@@ -265,18 +269,19 @@ def convert_image(img_node, translator, src_fname=None):
         _name = dst_fname[len(translator.builder.outdir) + 1:]
 
         if isNewer(dst_fname, src_fname):
-            app.verbose("convert: {out}/%s already exists and is newer" % _name)
+            kernellog.verbose(app,
+                              "convert: {out}/%s already exists and is newer" % _name)
 
         else:
             ok = False
             mkdir(path.dirname(dst_fname))
 
             if in_ext == '.dot':
-                app.verbose('convert DOT to: {out}/' + _name)
+                kernellog.verbose(app, 'convert DOT to: {out}/' + _name)
                 ok = dot2format(app, src_fname, dst_fname)
 
             elif in_ext == '.svg':
-                app.verbose('convert SVG to: {out}/' + _name)
+                kernellog.verbose(app, 'convert SVG to: {out}/' + _name)
                 ok = svg2pdf(app, src_fname, dst_fname)
 
             if not ok:
@@ -305,7 +310,8 @@ def dot2format(app, dot_fname, out_fname):
     with open(out_fname, "w") as out:
         exit_code = subprocess.call(cmd, stdout = out)
         if exit_code != 0:
-            app.warn("Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
+            kernellog.warn(app,
+                          "Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
     return bool(exit_code == 0)
 
 def svg2pdf(app, svg_fname, pdf_fname):
@@ -322,7 +328,7 @@ def svg2pdf(app, svg_fname, pdf_fname):
     # use stdout and stderr from parent
     exit_code = subprocess.call(cmd)
     if exit_code != 0:
-        app.warn("Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
+        kernellog.warn(app, "Error #%d when calling: %s" % (exit_code, " ".join(cmd)))
     return bool(exit_code == 0)
 
 
@@ -415,15 +421,15 @@ def visit_kernel_render(self, node):
     app = self.builder.app
     srclang = node.get('srclang')
 
-    app.verbose('visit kernel-render node lang: "%s"' % (srclang))
+    kernellog.verbose(app, 'visit kernel-render node lang: "%s"' % (srclang))
 
     tmp_ext = RENDER_MARKUP_EXT.get(srclang, None)
     if tmp_ext is None:
-        app.warn('kernel-render: "%s" unknown / include raw.' % (srclang))
+        kernellog.warn(app, 'kernel-render: "%s" unknown / include raw.' % (srclang))
         return
 
     if not dot_cmd and tmp_ext == '.dot':
-        app.verbose("dot from graphviz not available / include raw.")
+        kernellog.verbose(app, "dot from graphviz not available / include raw.")
         return
 
     literal_block = node[0]

Documentation/sysctl/net.txt

@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ Values :
 	0 - disable JIT kallsyms export (default value)
 	1 - enable JIT kallsyms export for privileged users only
 
+bpf_jit_limit
+-------------
+
+This enforces a global limit for memory allocations to the BPF JIT
+compiler in order to reject unprivileged JIT requests once it has
+been surpassed. bpf_jit_limit contains the value of the global limit
+in bytes.
+
 dev_weight
 --------------
 

Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst

@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
 available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
 misfeature will fail.
 
+.. _set_spec_ctrl:
+
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
 

Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ of a virtual machine.  The ioctls belong to three classes
 
  - VM ioctls: These query and set attributes that affect an entire virtual
    machine, for example memory layout.  In addition a VM ioctl is used to
-   create virtual cpus (vcpus).
+   create virtual cpus (vcpus) and devices.
 
    Only run VM ioctls from the same process (address space) that was used
    to create the VM.
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ of a virtual machine.  The ioctls belong to three classes
    Only run vcpu ioctls from the same thread that was used to create the
    vcpu.
 
+ - device ioctls: These query and set attributes that control the operation
+   of a single device.
+
+   device ioctls must be issued from the same process (address space) that
+   was used to create the VM.
 
 2. File descriptors
 -------------------
@@ -32,10 +37,11 @@ The kvm API is centered around file descriptors.  An initial
 open("/dev/kvm") obtains a handle to the kvm subsystem; this handle
 can be used to issue system ioctls.  A KVM_CREATE_VM ioctl on this
 handle will create a VM file descriptor which can be used to issue VM
-ioctls.  A KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl on a VM fd will create a virtual cpu
-and return a file descriptor pointing to it.  Finally, ioctls on a vcpu
-fd can be used to control the vcpu, including the important task of
-actually running guest code.
+ioctls.  A KVM_CREATE_VCPU or KVM_CREATE_DEVICE ioctl on a VM fd will
+create a virtual cpu or device and return a file descriptor pointing to
+the new resource.  Finally, ioctls on a vcpu or device fd can be used
+to control the vcpu or device.  For vcpus, this includes the important
+task of actually running guest code.
 
 In general file descriptors can be migrated among processes by means
 of fork() and the SCM_RIGHTS facility of unix domain socket.  These

Documentation/x86/conf.py

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+    ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+     'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]

Documentation/x86/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   mds

Documentation/x86/mds.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+ - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) (CVE-2019-11091)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
+memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
+structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
+MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS.
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+   data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+   data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+          advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+	  effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+   on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+   mds_user_clear.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+   all but one of the kernel to user space transitions.  The exception
+   is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
+   handled directly in do_nmi().
+
+   (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
+    enable IRQs.  In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
+    enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.

MAINTAINERS

@@ -7327,6 +7327,12 @@ L:	alsa-devel@alsa-project.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
 S:	Supported
 F:	sound/soc/intel/
 
+INTEL ATOMISP2 DUMMY / POWER-MANAGEMENT DRIVER
+M:	Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
+L:	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
+S:	Maintained
+F:	drivers/platform/x86/intel_atomisp2_pm.c
+
 INTEL C600 SERIES SAS CONTROLLER DRIVER
 M:	Intel SCU Linux support <intel-linux-scu@intel.com>
 M:	Artur Paszkiewicz <artur.paszkiewicz@intel.com>

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 32
+SUBLEVEL = 66
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = "People's Front"
 
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE  := -DMODULE
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE := -T $(srctree)/scripts/module-common.lds
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS :=
 GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS :=
+CLANG_FLAGS :=
 
 export ARCH SRCARCH CONFIG_SHELL HOSTCC KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS CROSS_COMPILE AS LD CC
 export CPP AR NM STRIP OBJCOPY OBJDUMP KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS KBUILD_HOSTLDLIBS
@@ -482,8 +483,8 @@ endif
 
 ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
 ifneq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)
-CLANG_FLAGS	:= --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%))
-GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR := $(dir $(shell which $(LD)))
+CLANG_FLAGS	+= --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%))
+GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR := $(dir $(shell which $(CROSS_COMPILE)elfedit))
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= --prefix=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR)
 GCC_TOOLCHAIN	:= $(realpath $(GCC_TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/..)
 endif
@@ -491,6 +492,7 @@ ifneq ($(GCC_TOOLCHAIN),)
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= --gcc-toolchain=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN)
 endif
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= -no-integrated-as
+CLANG_FLAGS	+= -Werror=unknown-warning-option
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(CLANG_FLAGS)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(CLANG_FLAGS)
 export CLANG_FLAGS
@@ -508,13 +510,6 @@ export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-fno-PIE)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-fno-PIE)
 
-# check for 'asm goto'
-ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-goto.sh $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS)), y)
-  CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO := 1
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DCC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO
-  KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DCC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO
-endif
-
 # The expansion should be delayed until arch/$(SRCARCH)/Makefile is included.
 # Some architectures define CROSS_COMPILE in arch/$(SRCARCH)/Makefile.
 # CC_VERSION_TEXT is referenced from Kconfig (so it needs export),
@@ -623,15 +618,18 @@ ifeq ($(may-sync-config),1)
 # Read in dependencies to all Kconfig* files, make sure to run syncconfig if
 # changes are detected. This should be included after arch/$(SRCARCH)/Makefile
 # because some architectures define CROSS_COMPILE there.
--include include/config/auto.conf.cmd
+include include/config/auto.conf.cmd
 
 # To avoid any implicit rule to kick in, define an empty command
-$(KCONFIG_CONFIG) include/config/auto.conf.cmd: ;
+$(KCONFIG_CONFIG): ;
 
 # The actual configuration files used during the build are stored in
 # include/generated/ and include/config/. Update them if .config is newer than
 # include/config/auto.conf (which mirrors .config).
-include/config/%.conf: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) include/config/auto.conf.cmd
+#
+# This exploits the 'multi-target pattern rule' trick.
+# The syncconfig should be executed only once to make all the targets.
+%/auto.conf %/auto.conf.cmd %/tristate.conf: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG)
 	$(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile syncconfig
 else
 # External modules and some install targets need include/generated/autoconf.h
@@ -656,10 +654,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-disable-warning,frame-address,)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-disable-warning, format-truncation)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-disable-warning, format-overflow)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-disable-warning, int-in-bool-context)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-disable-warning, address-of-packed-member)
 
 ifdef CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-option,-Oz,-Os)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(call cc-disable-warning,maybe-uninitialized,)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -Os $(call cc-disable-warning,maybe-uninitialized,)
 else
 ifdef CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -O2 $(call cc-disable-warning,maybe-uninitialized,)
@@ -701,7 +699,6 @@ ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, address-of-packed-member)
 # Quiet clang warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, tautological-compare)
 # CLANG uses a _MergedGlobals as optimization, but this breaks modpost, as the
@@ -948,9 +945,11 @@ mod_sign_cmd = true
 endif
 export mod_sign_cmd
 
+HOST_LIBELF_LIBS = $(shell pkg-config libelf --libs 2>/dev/null || echo -lelf)
+
 ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
   has_libelf := $(call try-run,\
-		echo "int main() {}" | $(HOSTCC) -xc -o /dev/null -lelf -,1,0)
+		echo "int main() {}" | $(HOSTCC) -xc -o /dev/null $(HOST_LIBELF_LIBS) -,1,0)
   ifeq ($(has_libelf),1)
     objtool_target := tools/objtool FORCE
   else

arch/Kconfig

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ config KPROBES
 config JUMP_LABEL
        bool "Optimize very unlikely/likely branches"
        depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
+       depends on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO
        help
          This option enables a transparent branch optimization that
 	 makes certain almost-always-true or almost-always-false branch

arch/arc/Kconfig

@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ config NR_CPUS
 
 config ARC_SMP_HALT_ON_RESET
 	bool "Enable Halt-on-reset boot mode"
-	default y if ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
 	help
 	  In SMP configuration cores can be configured as Halt-on-reset
 	  or they could all start at same time. For Halt-on-reset, non
@@ -539,18 +538,6 @@ config ARC_DBG_TLB_PARANOIA
 
 endif
 
-config ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
-	bool "Support uboot arg Handling"
-	default n
-	help
-	  ARC Linux by default checks for uboot provided args as pointers to
-	  external cmdline or DTB. This however breaks in absence of uboot,
-	  when booting from Metaware debugger directly, as the registers are
-	  not zeroed out on reset by mdb and/or ARCv2 based cores. The bogus
-	  registers look like uboot args to kernel which then chokes.
-	  So only enable the uboot arg checking/processing if users are sure
-	  of uboot being in play.
-
 config ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME
 	string "Built in DTB"
 	help

arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts

@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@
 			interrupt-names = "macirq";
 			phy-mode = "rgmii";
 			snps,pbl = <32>;
+			snps,multicast-filter-bins = <256>;
 			clocks = <&gmacclk>;
 			clock-names = "stmmaceth";
 			phy-handle = <&phy0>;
@@ -183,6 +184,9 @@
 			mac-address = [00 00 00 00 00 00]; /* Filled in by U-Boot */
 			dma-coherent;
 
+			tx-fifo-depth = <4096>;
+			rx-fifo-depth = <4096>;
+
 			mdio {
 				#address-cells = <1>;
 				#size-cells = <0>;

arch/arc/configs/hsdk_defconfig

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y
 # CONFIG_UTS_NS is not set
 # CONFIG_PID_NS is not set
 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM=y
 CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
 CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=y
 # CONFIG_VM_EVENT_COUNTERS is not set

arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ CONFIG_ARC_CACHE_LINE_SHIFT=5
 # CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LLSC is not set
 CONFIG_ARC_KVADDR_SIZE=402
 CONFIG_ARC_EMUL_UNALIGNED=y
-CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_NET=y
 CONFIG_UNIX=y

arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_defconfig

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ CONFIG_PARTITION_ADVANCED=y
 CONFIG_ARC_PLAT_AXS10X=y
 CONFIG_AXS103=y
 CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2=y
-CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME="vdk_hs38"
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_NET=y

arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_smp_defconfig

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_AXS103=y
 CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2=y
 CONFIG_SMP=y
 # CONFIG_ARC_TIMERS_64BIT is not set
-# CONFIG_ARC_SMP_HALT_ON_RESET is not set
-CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME="vdk_hs38_smp"
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_NET=y

arch/arc/include/asm/cmpxchg.h

@@ -92,8 +92,11 @@ __cmpxchg(volatile void *ptr, unsigned long expected, unsigned long new)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LLSC */
 
-#define cmpxchg(ptr, o, n) ((typeof(*(ptr)))__cmpxchg((ptr), \
-				(unsigned long)(o), (unsigned long)(n)))
+#define cmpxchg(ptr, o, n) ({				\
+	(typeof(*(ptr)))__cmpxchg((ptr),		\
+				  (unsigned long)(o),	\
+				  (unsigned long)(n));	\
+})
 
 /*
  * atomic_cmpxchg is same as cmpxchg
@@ -198,8 +201,11 @@ static inline unsigned long __xchg(unsigned long val, volatile void *ptr,
 	return __xchg_bad_pointer();
 }
 
-#define xchg(ptr, with) ((typeof(*(ptr)))__xchg((unsigned long)(with), (ptr), \
-						 sizeof(*(ptr))))
+#define xchg(ptr, with) ({				\
+	(typeof(*(ptr)))__xchg((unsigned long)(with),	\
+			       (ptr),			\
+			       sizeof(*(ptr)));		\
+})
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARC_PLAT_EZNPS */
 

arch/arc/kernel/head.S

@@ -100,15 +100,14 @@ ENTRY(stext)
 	st.ab   0, [r5, 4]
 1:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
 	; Uboot - kernel ABI
 	;    r0 = [0] No uboot interaction, [1] cmdline in r2, [2] DTB in r2
 	;    r1 = magic number (always zero as of now)
 	;    r2 = pointer to uboot provided cmdline or external DTB in mem
 	; These are handled later in handle_uboot_args()
 	st	r0, [@uboot_tag]
+	st      r1, [@uboot_magic]
 	st	r2, [@uboot_arg]
-#endif
 
 	; setup "current" tsk and optionally cache it in dedicated r25
 	mov	r9, @init_task

arch/arc/kernel/setup.c

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ unsigned int intr_to_DE_cnt;
 
 /* Part of U-boot ABI: see head.S */
 int __initdata uboot_tag;
+int __initdata uboot_magic;
 char __initdata *uboot_arg;
 
 const struct machine_desc *machine_desc;
@@ -484,13 +485,14 @@ static inline bool uboot_arg_invalid(unsigned long addr)
 #define UBOOT_TAG_NONE		0
 #define UBOOT_TAG_CMDLINE	1
 #define UBOOT_TAG_DTB		2
+/* We always pass 0 as magic from U-boot */
+#define UBOOT_MAGIC_VALUE	0
 
 void __init handle_uboot_args(void)
 {
 	bool use_embedded_dtb = true;
 	bool append_cmdline = false;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
 	/* check that we know this tag */
 	if (uboot_tag != UBOOT_TAG_NONE &&
 	    uboot_tag != UBOOT_TAG_CMDLINE &&
@@ -499,6 +501,11 @@ void __init handle_uboot_args(void)
 		goto ignore_uboot_args;
 	}
 
+	if (uboot_magic != UBOOT_MAGIC_VALUE) {
+		pr_warn(IGNORE_ARGS "non zero uboot magic\n");
+		goto ignore_uboot_args;
+	}
+
 	if (uboot_tag != UBOOT_TAG_NONE &&
             uboot_arg_invalid((unsigned long)uboot_arg)) {
 		pr_warn(IGNORE_ARGS "invalid uboot arg: '%px'\n", uboot_arg);
@@ -517,7 +524,6 @@ void __init handle_uboot_args(void)
 		append_cmdline = true;
 
 ignore_uboot_args:
-#endif
 
 	if (use_embedded_dtb) {
 		machine_desc = setup_machine_fdt(__dtb_start);

arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c

@@ -185,11 +185,6 @@ static void *__init unw_hdr_alloc_early(unsigned long sz)
 				       MAX_DMA_ADDRESS);
 }
 
-static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz)
-{
-	return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
-}
-
 static void init_unwind_table(struct unwind_table *table, const char *name,
 			      const void *core_start, unsigned long core_size,
 			      const void *init_start, unsigned long init_size,
@@ -370,6 +365,10 @@ ret_err:
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz)
+{
+	return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
 
 static struct unwind_table *last_table;
 

arch/arc/mm/tlb.c

@@ -911,9 +911,11 @@ void do_tlb_overlap_fault(unsigned long cause, unsigned long address,
 			  struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct cpuinfo_arc_mmu *mmu = &cpuinfo_arc700[smp_processor_id()].mmu;
-	unsigned int pd0[mmu->ways];
 	unsigned long flags;
-	int set;
+	int set, n_ways = mmu->ways;
+
+	n_ways = min(n_ways, 4);
+	BUG_ON(mmu->ways > 4);
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
@@ -921,9 +923,10 @@ void do_tlb_overlap_fault(unsigned long cause, unsigned long address,
 	for (set = 0; set < mmu->sets; set++) {
 
 		int is_valid, way;
+		unsigned int pd0[4];
 
 		/* read out all the ways of current set */
-		for (way = 0, is_valid = 0; way < mmu->ways; way++) {
+		for (way = 0, is_valid = 0; way < n_ways; way++) {
 			write_aux_reg(ARC_REG_TLBINDEX,
 					  SET_WAY_TO_IDX(mmu, set, way));
 			write_aux_reg(ARC_REG_TLBCOMMAND, TLBRead);
@@ -937,14 +940,14 @@ void do_tlb_overlap_fault(unsigned long cause, unsigned long address,
 			continue;
 
 		/* Scan the set for duplicate ways: needs a nested loop */
-		for (way = 0; way < mmu->ways - 1; way++) {
+		for (way = 0; way < n_ways - 1; way++) {
 
 			int n;
 
 			if (!pd0[way])
 				continue;
 
-			for (n = way + 1; n < mmu->ways; n++) {
+			for (n = way + 1; n < n_ways; n++) {
 				if (pd0[way] != pd0[n])
 					continue;
 

arch/arm/Kconfig

@@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ config ARCH_DAVINCI
 	select HAVE_IDE
 	select PM_GENERIC_DOMAINS if PM
 	select PM_GENERIC_DOMAINS_OF if PM && OF
+	select REGMAP_MMIO
 	select RESET_CONTROLLER
 	select USE_OF
 	select ZONE_DMA

arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S

@@ -1395,7 +1395,21 @@ ENTRY(efi_stub_entry)
 
 		@ Preserve return value of efi_entry() in r4
 		mov	r4, r0
-		bl	cache_clean_flush
+
+		@ our cache maintenance code relies on CP15 barrier instructions
+		@ but since we arrived here with the MMU and caches configured
+		@ by UEFI, we must check that the CP15BEN bit is set in SCTLR.
+		@ Note that this bit is RAO/WI on v6 and earlier, so the ISB in
+		@ the enable path will be executed on v7+ only.
+		mrc	p15, 0, r1, c1, c0, 0	@ read SCTLR
+		tst	r1, #(1 << 5)		@ CP15BEN bit set?
+		bne	0f
+		orr	r1, r1, #(1 << 5)	@ CP15 barrier instructions
+		mcr	p15, 0, r1, c1, c0, 0	@ write SCTLR
+ ARM(		.inst	0xf57ff06f		@ v7+ isb	)
+ THUMB(		isb						)
+
+0:		bl	cache_clean_flush
 		bl	cache_off
 
 		@ Set parameters for booting zImage according to boot protocol

arch/arm/boot/dts/Makefile

@@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	bcm2708-rpi-b.dtb \
 	bcm2708-rpi-b-plus.dtb \
 	bcm2708-rpi-cm.dtb \
-	bcm2708-rpi-0-w.dtb \
+	bcm2708-rpi-zero.dtb \
+	bcm2708-rpi-zero-w.dtb \
 	bcm2709-rpi-2-b.dtb \
 	bcm2710-rpi-3-b.dtb \
+	bcm2711-rpi-4-b.dtb \
 	bcm2710-rpi-3-b-plus.dtb \
 	bcm2710-rpi-cm3.dtb
 
@@ -92,6 +94,7 @@ dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	bcm2836-rpi-2-b.dtb \
 	bcm2837-rpi-3-b.dtb \
 	bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dtb \
+	bcm2838-rpi-4-b.dtb \
 	bcm2835-rpi-zero.dtb \
 	bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dtb
 dtb-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM_5301X) += \

arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-evm.dts

@@ -57,6 +57,24 @@
 		enable-active-high;
 	};
 
+	/* TPS79501 */
+	v1_8d_reg: fixedregulator-v1_8d {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "v1_8d";
+		vin-supply = <&vbat>;
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
+	};
+
+	/* TPS79501 */
+	v3_3d_reg: fixedregulator-v3_3d {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "v3_3d";
+		vin-supply = <&vbat>;
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+	};
+
 	matrix_keypad: matrix_keypad0 {
 		compatible = "gpio-matrix-keypad";
 		debounce-delay-ms = <5>;
@@ -499,10 +517,10 @@
 		status = "okay";
 
 		/* Regulators */
-		AVDD-supply = <&vaux2_reg>;
-		IOVDD-supply = <&vaux2_reg>;
-		DRVDD-supply = <&vaux2_reg>;
-		DVDD-supply = <&vbat>;
+		AVDD-supply = <&v3_3d_reg>;
+		IOVDD-supply = <&v3_3d_reg>;
+		DRVDD-supply = <&v3_3d_reg>;
+		DVDD-supply = <&v1_8d_reg>;
 	};
 };
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-evmsk.dts

@@ -73,6 +73,24 @@
 		enable-active-high;
 	};
 
+	/* TPS79518 */
+	v1_8d_reg: fixedregulator-v1_8d {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "v1_8d";
+		vin-supply = <&vbat>;
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
+	};
+
+	/* TPS78633 */
+	v3_3d_reg: fixedregulator-v3_3d {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "v3_3d";
+		vin-supply = <&vbat>;
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+	};
+
 	leds {
 		pinctrl-names = "default";
 		pinctrl-0 = <&user_leds_s0>;
@@ -501,10 +519,10 @@
 		status = "okay";
 
 		/* Regulators */
-		AVDD-supply = <&vaux2_reg>;
-		IOVDD-supply = <&vaux2_reg>;
-		DRVDD-supply = <&vaux2_reg>;
-		DVDD-supply = <&vbat>;
+		AVDD-supply = <&v3_3d_reg>;
+		IOVDD-supply = <&v3_3d_reg>;
+		DRVDD-supply = <&v3_3d_reg>;
+		DVDD-supply = <&v1_8d_reg>;
 	};
 };
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
 	bus-width = <4>;
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>;
-	cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+	cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 	status = "okay";
 };
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi

@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
 	bus-width = <4>;
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>;
-	cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+	cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 	status = "okay";
 };
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/am57xx-idk-common.dtsi

@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@
 	vqmmc-supply = <&ldo1_reg>;
 	bus-width = <4>;
 	cd-gpios = <&gpio6 27 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; /* gpio 219 */
+	no-1-8-v;
 };
 
 &mmc2 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-xp-98dx3236.dtsi

@@ -336,3 +336,11 @@
 	status = "disabled";
 };
 
+&uart0 {
+	compatible = "marvell,armada-38x-uart";
+};
+
+&uart1 {
+	compatible = "marvell,armada-38x-uart";
+};
+

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708-rpi-b-plus.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2708.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-smsc9514.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708-rpi-b.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2708.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-smsc9512.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708-rpi-cm.dtsi

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #include "bcm2708.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 
 &leds {
 	act_led: act {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708-rpi-zero-w.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2708.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
 
 / {
@@ -8,12 +9,13 @@
 	model = "Raspberry Pi Zero W";
 
 	chosen {
-		bootargs = "8250.nr_uarts=1";
+		bootargs = "coherent_pool=1M 8250.nr_uarts=1";
 	};
 
 	aliases {
 		serial0 = &uart1;
 		serial1 = &uart0;
+		mmc1 = &mmcnr;
 	};
 };
 
@@ -73,10 +75,9 @@
 	};
 };
 
-&mmc {
+&mmcnr {
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&sdio_pins>;
-	non-removable;
 	bus-width = <4>;
 	status = "okay";
 };
@@ -132,15 +133,10 @@
 };
 
 &i2s {
-	#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&i2s_pins>;
 };
 
-&random {
-	status = "okay";
-};
-
 &leds {
 	act_led: act {
 		label = "led0";

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708-rpi-zero.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/dts-v1/;
+
+#include "bcm2708.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "raspberrypi,model-zero", "brcm,bcm2835";
+	model = "Raspberry Pi Zero";
+
+	chosen {
+		bootargs = "coherent_pool=1M";
+	};
+};
+
+&gpio {
+	spi0_pins: spi0_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <9 10 11>;
+		brcm,function = <4>; /* alt0 */
+	};
+
+	spi0_cs_pins: spi0_cs_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <8 7>;
+		brcm,function = <1>; /* output */
+	};
+
+	i2c0_pins: i2c0 {
+		brcm,pins = <0 1>;
+		brcm,function = <4>;
+	};
+
+	i2c1_pins: i2c1 {
+		brcm,pins = <2 3>;
+		brcm,function = <4>;
+	};
+
+	i2s_pins: i2s {
+		brcm,pins = <18 19 20 21>;
+		brcm,function = <4>; /* alt0 */
+	};
+
+	audio_pins: audio_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <>;
+		brcm,function = <>;
+	};
+};
+
+&uart0 {
+	status = "okay";
+};
+
+&spi0 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&spi0_pins &spi0_cs_pins>;
+	cs-gpios = <&gpio 8 1>, <&gpio 7 1>;
+
+	spidev0: spidev@0{
+		compatible = "spidev";
+		reg = <0>;	/* CE0 */
+		#address-cells = <1>;
+		#size-cells = <0>;
+		spi-max-frequency = <125000000>;
+	};
+
+	spidev1: spidev@1{
+		compatible = "spidev";
+		reg = <1>;	/* CE1 */
+		#address-cells = <1>;
+		#size-cells = <0>;
+		spi-max-frequency = <125000000>;
+	};
+};
+
+&i2c0 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&i2c0_pins>;
+	clock-frequency = <100000>;
+};
+
+&i2c1 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&i2c1_pins>;
+	clock-frequency = <100000>;
+};
+
+&i2c2 {
+	clock-frequency = <100000>;
+};
+
+&i2s {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&i2s_pins>;
+};
+
+&leds {
+	act_led: act {
+		label = "led0";
+		linux,default-trigger = "mmc0";
+		gpios = <&gpio 47 0>;
+	};
+};
+
+&hdmi {
+	hpd-gpios = <&gpio 46 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+};
+
+&audio {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&audio_pins>;
+};
+
+/ {
+	__overrides__ {
+		act_led_gpio = <&act_led>,"gpios:4";
+		act_led_activelow = <&act_led>,"gpios:8";
+		act_led_trigger = <&act_led>,"linux,default-trigger";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708-rpi.dtsi

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* Downstream version of bcm2835-rpi.dtsi */
+/* Downstream modifications to bcm2835-rpi.dtsi */
 
-#include <dt-bindings/power/raspberrypi-power.h>
+#include "bcm2835-rpi.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	memory {
@@ -49,29 +49,10 @@
 			reg = <0x7e200000 0x1000>;
 		};
 
-		firmware: firmware {
-			compatible = "raspberrypi,bcm2835-firmware", "simple-bus";
-			#address-cells = <0>;
-			#size-cells = <0>;
-			mboxes = <&mailbox>;
-		};
-
-		power: power {
-			compatible = "raspberrypi,bcm2835-power";
-			firmware = <&firmware>;
-			#power-domain-cells = <1>;
-		};
-
 		fb: fb {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2708-fb";
 			firmware = <&firmware>;
-			status = "disabled";
-		};
-
-		mailbox@7e00b840 {
-			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-vchiq";
-			reg = <0x7e00b840 0x3c>;
-			interrupts = <0 2>;
+			status = "okay";
 		};
 
 		vcsm: vcsm {
@@ -91,10 +72,6 @@
 		sound: sound {
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
-
-		txp: txp@7e004000 {
-			status = "disabled";
-		};
 	};
 
 	__overrides__ {
@@ -118,21 +95,30 @@
 		sd_force_pio = <&sdhost>,"brcm,force-pio?";
 		sd_pio_limit = <&sdhost>,"brcm,pio-limit:0";
 		sd_debug     = <&sdhost>,"brcm,debug";
-		sdio_overclock = <&mmc>,"brcm,overclock-50:0";
+		sdio_overclock = <&mmc>,"brcm,overclock-50:0",
+				 <&mmcnr>,"brcm,overclock-50:0";
 		axiperf      = <&axiperf>,"status";
 	};
 };
 
-&dma {
-	brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x7f34>;
-};
-
 &hdmi {
-	power-domains = <&power RPI_POWER_DOMAIN_HDMI>;
+	status = "disabled";
 };
 
-&usb {
-	power-domains = <&power RPI_POWER_DOMAIN_USB>;
+&txp {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
+&i2c0 {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
+&i2c1 {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
+&i2c2 {
+	status = "disabled";
 };
 
 &clocks {
@@ -144,16 +130,8 @@ sdhost_pins: &sdhost_gpio48 {
 };
 
 &sdhost {
-	pinctrl-names = "default";
-	pinctrl-0 = <&sdhost_gpio48>;
-	bus-width = <4>;
 	brcm,overclock-50 = <0>;
 	brcm,pio-limit = <1>;
-	status = "okay";
-};
-
-&fb {
-	status = "okay";
 };
 
 &cpu_thermal {
@@ -163,11 +141,3 @@ sdhost_pins: &sdhost_gpio48 {
 &vec {
 	status = "disabled";
 };
-
-&csi0 {
-	power-domains = <&power RPI_POWER_DOMAIN_UNICAM0>;
-};
-
-&csi1 {
-	power-domains = <&power RPI_POWER_DOMAIN_UNICAM1>;
-};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2708.dtsi

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 #include "bcm2835.dtsi"
 #include "bcm270x.dtsi"
-#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	/delete-node/ cpus;

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2709-rpi-2-b.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2709.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2709-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-smsc9514.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2709-rpi.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
+
+&vchiq {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2836-vchiq", "brcm,bcm2835-vchiq";
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2709.dtsi

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 #include "bcm2836.dtsi"
 #include "bcm270x.dtsi"
-#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	soc {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm270x.dtsi

@@ -3,18 +3,18 @@
 
 / {
 	chosen {
-		bootargs = "";
+		bootargs = "coherent_pool=1M";
 		/delete-property/ stdout-path;
 	};
 
 	soc: soc {
 
 		watchdog: watchdog@7e100000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 		};
 
 		random: rng@7e104000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 		};
 
 		gpio@7e200000 { /* gpio */
@@ -40,18 +40,18 @@
 		};
 
 		spi0: spi@7e204000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 			dmas = <&dma 6>, <&dma 7>;
 			dma-names = "tx", "rx";
 		};
 
 		pixelvalve0: pixelvalve@7e206000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
 		pixelvalve1: pixelvalve@7e207000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
 
 		/delete-node/ sdhci@7e300000;
 
-		mmc: mmc@7e300000 {
+		sdhci: mmc: mmc@7e300000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-mmc", "brcm,bcm2835-sdhci";
 			reg = <0x7e300000 0x100>;
 			interrupts = <2 30>;
@@ -79,8 +79,21 @@
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
+		/* A clone of mmc but with non-removable set */
+		mmcnr: mmcnr@7e300000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-mmc", "brcm,bcm2835-sdhci";
+			reg = <0x7e300000 0x100>;
+			interrupts = <2 30>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_EMMC>;
+			dmas = <&dma 11>;
+			dma-names = "rx-tx";
+			brcm,overclock-50 = <0>;
+			non-removable;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
 		hvs: hvs@7e400000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
@@ -106,7 +119,7 @@
 		};
 
 		pixelvalve2: pixelvalve@7e807000 {
-			/* Add alias */
+			/* Add label */
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
@@ -118,8 +131,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2708-usb";
 			reg = <0x7e980000 0x10000>,
 			      <0x7e006000 0x1000>;
-			interrupts = <2 0>,
-				     <1 9>;
+			interrupt-names = "usb",
+					  "soft";
+			interrupts = <1 9>,
+				     <2 0>;
 		};
 
 		v3d@7ec00000 { /* vd3 */
@@ -137,22 +152,6 @@
 		};
 	};
 
-	vdd_5v0_reg: fixedregulator_5v0 {
-		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
-		regulator-name = "5v0";
-		regulator-min-microvolt = <5000000>;
-		regulator-max-microvolt = <5000000>;
-		regulator-always-on;
-	};
-
-	vdd_3v3_reg: fixedregulator_3v3 {
-		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
-		regulator-name = "3v3";
-		regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
-		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
-		regulator-always-on;
-	};
-
 	__overrides__ {
 		cam0-pwdn-ctrl;
 		cam0-pwdn;

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2710-rpi-3-b-plus.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2710.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2709-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-lan7515.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
 
@@ -9,12 +10,13 @@
 	model = "Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+";
 
 	chosen {
-		bootargs = "8250.nr_uarts=1";
+		bootargs = "coherent_pool=1M 8250.nr_uarts=1";
 	};
 
 	aliases {
 		serial0 = &uart1;
 		serial1 = &uart0;
+		mmc1 = &mmcnr;
 	};
 };
 
@@ -74,13 +76,11 @@
 	};
 };
 
-&mmc {
+&mmcnr {
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&sdio_pins>;
-	non-removable;
 	bus-width = <4>;
 	status = "okay";
-	brcm,overclock-50 = <0>;
 };
 
 &firmware {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2710-rpi-3-b.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2710.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2709-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-smsc9514.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
 
@@ -9,12 +10,13 @@
 	model = "Raspberry Pi 3 Model B";
 
 	chosen {
-		bootargs = "8250.nr_uarts=1";
+		bootargs = "coherent_pool=1M 8250.nr_uarts=1";
 	};
 
 	aliases {
 		serial0 = &uart1;
 		serial1 = &uart0;
+		mmc1 = &mmcnr;
 	};
 };
 
@@ -74,13 +76,11 @@
 	};
 };
 
-&mmc {
+&mmcnr {
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&sdio_pins>;
-	non-removable;
 	bus-width = <4>;
 	status = "okay";
-	brcm,overclock-50 = <0>;
 };
 
 &soc {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2710-rpi-cm3.dts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /dts-v1/;
 
 #include "bcm2710.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2709-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi0-2lane.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-4lane.dtsi"
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2710.dtsi

@@ -1,22 +1,18 @@
 #include "bcm2837.dtsi"
 #include "bcm270x.dtsi"
-#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	compatible = "brcm,bcm2837", "brcm,bcm2836";
 
-	soc {
-
-		arm-pmu {
+	arm-pmu {
 #ifdef RPI364
-			compatible = "arm,armv8-pmuv3", "arm,cortex-a7-pmu";
+		compatible = "arm,armv8-pmuv3", "arm,cortex-a7-pmu";
 #else
-			compatible = "arm,cortex-a7-pmu";
+		compatible = "arm,cortex-a7-pmu";
 #endif
-			interrupt-parent = <&local_intc>;
-			interrupts = <9 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
-		};
+	};
 
+	soc {
 		/delete-node/ timer@7e003000;
 	};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2711-rpi-4-b.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/dts-v1/;
+
+#include "bcm2711.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2711-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "raspberrypi,4-model-b", "brcm,bcm2838";
+	model = "Raspberry Pi 4 Model B";
+
+	memory {
+		device_type = "memory";
+		reg = <0x0 0x0 0x0>;
+	};
+
+	chosen {
+		bootargs = "coherent_pool=1M 8250.nr_uarts=1 cma=64M";
+	};
+
+	aliases {
+		serial0 = &uart1;
+		serial1 = &uart0;
+		mmc0 = &emmc2;
+		mmc1 = &mmcnr;
+		mmc2 = &sdhost;
+		i2c3 = &i2c3;
+		i2c4 = &i2c4;
+		i2c5 = &i2c5;
+		i2c6 = &i2c6;
+		/delete-property/ ethernet;
+		/delete-property/ intc;
+		ethernet0 = &genet;
+	};
+};
+
+&soc {
+	virtgpio: virtgpio {
+		compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-virtgpio";
+		gpio-controller;
+		#gpio-cells = <2>;
+		firmware = <&firmware>;
+		status = "okay";
+	};
+};
+
+&mmcnr {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&sdio_pins>;
+	bus-width = <4>;
+	status = "okay";
+};
+
+&firmware {
+	expgpio: gpio {
+		compatible = "raspberrypi,firmware-gpio";
+		gpio-controller;
+		#gpio-cells = <2>;
+		gpio-line-names = "BT_ON",
+				  "WL_ON",
+				  "PWR_LED_OFF",
+				  "GLOBAL_RESET",
+				  "VDD_SD_IO_SEL",
+				  "CAM_GPIO",
+				  "",
+				  "";
+		status = "okay";
+	};
+};
+
+&uart0 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&uart0_pins &bt_pins>;
+	status = "okay";
+};
+
+&uart1 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&uart1_pins>;
+	status = "okay";
+};
+
+&spi0 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&spi0_pins &spi0_cs_pins>;
+	cs-gpios = <&gpio 8 1>, <&gpio 7 1>;
+
+	spidev0: spidev@0{
+		compatible = "spidev";
+		reg = <0>;	/* CE0 */
+		#address-cells = <1>;
+		#size-cells = <0>;
+		spi-max-frequency = <125000000>;
+	};
+
+	spidev1: spidev@1{
+		compatible = "spidev";
+		reg = <1>;	/* CE1 */
+		#address-cells = <1>;
+		#size-cells = <0>;
+		spi-max-frequency = <125000000>;
+	};
+};
+
+// =============================================
+// Board specific stuff here
+
+/ {
+
+	sd_io_1v8_reg: sd_io_1v8_reg {
+		status = "okay";
+		compatible = "regulator-gpio";
+		vin-supply = <&vdd_5v0_reg>;
+		regulator-name = "vdd-sd-io";
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-boot-on;
+		regulator-always-on;
+		regulator-settling-time-us = <5000>;
+
+		gpios = <&expgpio 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		states = <1800000 0x1
+			  3300000 0x0>;
+	};
+};
+
+&sdhost {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
+&emmc2 {
+	status = "okay";
+	broken-cd;
+	vqmmc-supply = <&sd_io_1v8_reg>;
+};
+
+&leds {
+	act_led: act {
+		label = "led0";
+		linux,default-trigger = "mmc0";
+		gpios = <&gpio 42 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+	};
+
+	pwr_led: pwr {
+		label = "led1";
+		linux,default-trigger = "default-on";
+		gpios = <&expgpio 2 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+	};
+};
+
+&audio {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&audio_pins>;
+};
+
+&sdhost_gpio48 {
+	brcm,pins = <22 23 24 25 26 27>;
+	brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
+};
+
+&gpio {
+	spi0_pins: spi0_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <9 10 11>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
+	};
+
+	spi0_cs_pins: spi0_cs_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <8 7>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_GPIO_OUT>;
+	};
+
+	spi3_pins: spi3_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <1 2 3>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	spi3_cs_pins: spi3_cs_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <0 24>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_GPIO_OUT>;
+	};
+
+	spi4_pins: spi4_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <5 6 7>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	spi4_cs_pins: spi4_cs_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <4 25>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_GPIO_OUT>;
+	};
+
+	spi5_pins: spi5_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <13 14 15>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	spi5_cs_pins: spi5_cs_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <12 26>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_GPIO_OUT>;
+	};
+
+	spi6_pins: spi6_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <19 20 21>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	spi6_cs_pins: spi6_cs_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <18 27>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_GPIO_OUT>;
+	};
+
+	i2c0_pins: i2c0 {
+		brcm,pins = <0 1>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+
+	i2c1_pins: i2c1 {
+		brcm,pins = <2 3>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+
+	i2c3_pins: i2c3 {
+		brcm,pins = <4 5>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+
+	i2c4_pins: i2c4 {
+		brcm,pins = <8 9>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+
+	i2c5_pins: i2c5 {
+		brcm,pins = <12 13>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+
+	i2c6_pins: i2c6 {
+		brcm,pins = <22 23>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+
+	i2s_pins: i2s {
+		brcm,pins = <18 19 20 21>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
+	};
+
+	sdio_pins: sdio_pins {
+		brcm,pins =     <34 35 36 37 38 39>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>; // alt3 = SD1
+		brcm,pull =     <0 2 2 2 2 2>;
+	};
+
+	bt_pins: bt_pins {
+		brcm,pins = "-"; // non-empty to keep btuart happy, //4 = 0
+				 // to fool pinctrl
+		brcm,function = <0>;
+		brcm,pull = <2>;
+	};
+
+	uart0_pins: uart0_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <32 33>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+		brcm,pull = <0 2>;
+	};
+
+	uart1_pins: uart1_pins {
+		brcm,pins;
+		brcm,function;
+		brcm,pull;
+	};
+
+	uart2_pins: uart2_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <0 1>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <0 2>;
+	};
+
+	uart3_pins: uart3_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <4 5>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <0 2>;
+	};
+
+	uart4_pins: uart4_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <8 9>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <0 2>;
+	};
+
+	uart5_pins: uart5_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <12 13>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <0 2>;
+	};
+
+	audio_pins: audio_pins {
+		brcm,pins = <40 41>;
+		brcm,function = <4>;
+	};
+};
+
+&i2c0 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&i2c0_pins>;
+	clock-frequency = <100000>;
+};
+
+&i2c1 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&i2c1_pins>;
+	clock-frequency = <100000>;
+};
+
+&i2c2 {
+	clock-frequency = <100000>;
+};
+
+&i2s {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&i2s_pins>;
+};
+
+/ {
+	__overrides__ {
+		act_led_gpio = <&act_led>,"gpios:4";
+		act_led_activelow = <&act_led>,"gpios:8";
+		act_led_trigger = <&act_led>,"linux,default-trigger";
+
+		pwr_led_gpio = <&pwr_led>,"gpios:4";
+		pwr_led_activelow = <&pwr_led>,"gpios:8";
+		pwr_led_trigger = <&pwr_led>,"linux,default-trigger";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2711-rpi.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#include "bcm2708-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2838-rpi.dtsi"
+
+&v3d {
+     /* Undo the overwriting by bcm270x.dtsi */
+     power-domains = <&pm BCM2835_POWER_DOMAIN_GRAFX_V3D>;
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2711.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#include "bcm2838.dtsi"
+#include "bcm270x.dtsi"
+
+/ {
+	soc {
+		/delete-node/ v3d@7ec00000;
+	};
+
+	__overrides__ {
+		arm_freq;
+	};
+};
+
+&v3d {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
+&firmwarekms {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 112 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&smi {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 112 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&mmc {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 126 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&mmcnr {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 126 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&usb {
+	reg = <0x7e980000 0x10000>,
+	      <0x7e00b200 0x200>;
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 73 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		     <GIC_SPI 40 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&gpio {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 113 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		     <GIC_SPI 114 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-common.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/* This include file covers the common peripherals and configuration between
+ * bcm2835, bcm2836 and bcm2837 implementations.
+ */
+
+/ {
+	soc {
+		timer@7e003000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-system-timer";
+			reg = <0x7e003000 0x1000>;
+			interrupts = <1 0>, <1 1>, <1 2>, <1 3>;
+			/* This could be a reference to BCM2835_CLOCK_TIMER,
+			 * but we don't have the driver using the common clock
+			 * support yet.
+			 */
+			clock-frequency = <1000000>;
+		};
+
+		intc: interrupt-controller@7e00b200 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-armctrl-ic";
+			reg = <0x7e00b200 0x200>;
+			interrupt-controller;
+			#interrupt-cells = <2>;
+		};
+
+		thermal: thermal@7e212000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-thermal";
+			reg = <0x7e212000 0x8>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_TSENS>;
+			#thermal-sensor-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		v3d: v3d@7ec00000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-v3d";
+			reg = <0x7ec00000 0x1000>;
+			interrupts = <1 10>;
+		};
+	};
+};
+
+&gpio {
+	i2c_slave_gpio18: i2c_slave_gpio18 {
+		brcm,pins = <18 19 20 21>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	jtag_gpio4: jtag_gpio4 {
+		brcm,pins = <4 5 6 12 13>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-b-rev2.dts

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
 };
 
 &hdmi {
-	hpd-gpios = <&gpio 46 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+	hpd-gpios = <&gpio 46 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 };
 
 &pwm {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi.dtsi

@@ -30,12 +30,28 @@
 			#power-domain-cells = <1>;
 		};
 
-		mailbox@7e00b840 {
+		vchiq: mailbox@7e00b840 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-vchiq";
 			reg = <0x7e00b840 0x3c>;
 			interrupts = <0 2>;
 		};
 	};
+
+	vdd_3v3_reg: fixedregulator_3v3 {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "3v3";
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-always-on;
+	};
+
+	vdd_5v0_reg: fixedregulator_5v0 {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "5v0";
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <5000000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <5000000>;
+		regulator-always-on;
+	};
 };
 
 &gpio {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835.dtsi

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include "bcm283x.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2835-common.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	compatible = "brcm,bcm2835";

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2836-rpi-2-b.dts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /dts-v1/;
 #include "bcm2836.dtsi"
-#include "bcm2835-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2836-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-smsc9514.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-usb-host.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2836-rpi.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "bcm2835-rpi.dtsi"
+
+&vchiq {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2836-vchiq", "brcm,bcm2835-vchiq";
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2836.dtsi

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include "bcm283x.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2835-common.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	compatible = "brcm,bcm2836";

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b-plus.dts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /dts-v1/;
 #include "bcm2837.dtsi"
-#include "bcm2835-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2836-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-lan7515.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-usb-host.dtsi"
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-3-b.dts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /dts-v1/;
 #include "bcm2837.dtsi"
-#include "bcm2835-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2836-rpi.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-smsc9514.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-usb-host.dtsi"
 #include "bcm283x-rpi-csi1-2lane.dtsi"

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837.dtsi

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #include "bcm283x.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2835-common.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	compatible = "brcm,bcm2837";

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2838-rpi-4-b.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/dts-v1/;
+#include "bcm2838.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2835-rpi.dtsi"
+#include "bcm2838-rpi.dtsi"
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "raspberrypi,4-model-b", "brcm,bcm2838";
+	model = "Raspberry Pi 4 Model B";
+
+	chosen {
+		/* 8250 auxiliary UART instead of pl011 */
+		stdout-path = "serial1:115200n8";
+	};
+
+	memory {
+		reg = <0 0 0x40000000>;
+	};
+
+	leds {
+		act {
+			gpios = <&gpio 42 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		pwr {
+			label = "PWR";
+			gpios = <&expgpio 2 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+		};
+	};
+
+	wifi_pwrseq: wifi-pwrseq {
+		compatible = "mmc-pwrseq-simple";
+		reset-gpios = <&expgpio 1 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+	};
+
+	sd_io_1v8_reg: sd_io_1v8_reg {
+		status = "okay";
+		compatible = "regulator-gpio";
+		vin-supply = <&vdd_5v0_reg>;
+		regulator-name = "vdd-sd-io";
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-boot-on;
+		regulator-always-on;
+		regulator-settling-time-us = <5000>;
+
+		gpios = <&expgpio 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		states = <1800000 0x1
+			  3300000 0x0>;
+	};
+};
+
+&firmware {
+	expgpio: gpio {
+		compatible = "raspberrypi,firmware-gpio";
+		gpio-controller;
+		#gpio-cells = <2>;
+		gpio-line-names = "BT_ON",
+				  "WL_ON",
+				  "PWR_LED_OFF",
+				  "GLOBAL_RESET",
+				  "VDD_SD_IO_SEL",
+				  "CAM_GPIO",
+				  "",
+				  "";
+		status = "okay";
+	};
+};
+
+&pwm1 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&pwm0_gpio40 &pwm1_gpio41>;
+	status = "okay";
+};
+
+/* SDHCI is used to control the SDIO for wireless */
+&sdhci {
+	#address-cells = <1>;
+	#size-cells = <0>;
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&emmc_gpio34>;
+	status = "okay";
+	bus-width = <4>;
+	non-removable;
+	mmc-pwrseq = <&wifi_pwrseq>;
+
+	brcmf: wifi@1 {
+		reg = <1>;
+		compatible = "brcm,bcm4329-fmac";
+	};
+};
+
+/* EMMC2 is used to drive the SD card */
+&emmc2 {
+	status = "okay";
+	broken-cd;
+	vqmmc-supply = <&sd_io_1v8_reg>;
+};
+
+/* uart0 communicates with the BT module */
+&uart0 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&uart0_ctsrts_gpio30 &uart0_gpio32 &gpclk2_gpio43>;
+	status = "okay";
+
+	bluetooth {
+		compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt";
+		max-speed = <2000000>;
+		shutdown-gpios = <&expgpio 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+	};
+};
+
+/* uart1 is mapped to the pin header */
+&uart1 {
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&uart1_gpio14>;
+	status = "okay";
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2838-rpi.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/ {
+	soc {
+		/delete-node/ mailbox@7e00b840;
+	};
+};
+
+&scb {
+	vchiq: mailbox@7e00b840 {
+		compatible = "brcm,bcm2838-vchiq";
+		reg = <0 0x7e00b840 0x3c>;
+		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 34 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+	};
+};
+
+&dma {
+	/* The VPU firmware uses DMA channel 11 for VCHIQ */
+	brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x1f5>;
+};
+
+&dma40 {
+	/* The VPU firmware DMA channel 11 for VCHIQ */
+	brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x7000>;
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2838.dtsi

@@ -0,0 +1,745 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "bcm283x.dtsi"
+
+#include <dt-bindings/interrupt-controller/arm-gic.h>
+#include <dt-bindings/soc/bcm2835-pm.h>
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2838";
+
+	#address-cells = <2>;
+	#size-cells = <1>;
+
+	interrupt-parent = <&gicv2>;
+
+	soc {
+		ranges = <0x7e000000  0x0 0xfe000000  0x01800000>,
+			 <0x7c000000  0x0 0xfc000000  0x02000000>,
+			 <0x40000000  0x0 0xff800000  0x00800000>;
+		/* Emulate a contiguous 30-bit address range for DMA */
+		dma-ranges = <0xc0000000  0x0 0x00000000  0x3c000000>;
+
+		/delete-node/ interrupt-controller@7e00f300;
+		/delete-node/ v3d@7ec00000;
+
+		local_intc: local_intc@40000000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2836-l1-intc";
+			reg = <0x40000000 0x100>;
+		};
+
+		gicv2: gic400@40041000 {
+			interrupt-controller;
+			#interrupt-cells = <3>;
+			compatible = "arm,gic-400";
+			reg =	<0x40041000 0x1000>,
+				<0x40042000 0x2000>,
+				<0x40044000 0x2000>,
+				<0x40046000 0x2000>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 9 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) |
+						 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
+		};
+
+		thermal: thermal@7d5d2200 {
+			compatible = "brcm,avs-tmon-bcm2838";
+			reg = <0x7d5d2200 0x2c>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 137 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupt-names = "tmon";
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_TSENS>;
+			#thermal-sensor-cells = <0>;
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+
+		pm: watchdog@7e100000 {
+			reg = <0x7e100000 0x114>,
+			      <0x7e00a000 0x24>,
+			      <0x7ec11000 0x20>;
+		};
+
+		rng@7e104000 {
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 125 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		uart2: serial@7e201400 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pl011", "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";
+			reg = <0x7e201400 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_UART>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
+			arm,primecell-periphid = <0x00241011>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		uart3: serial@7e201600 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pl011", "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";
+			reg = <0x7e201600 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_UART>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
+			arm,primecell-periphid = <0x00241011>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		uart4: serial@7e201800 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pl011", "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";
+			reg = <0x7e201800 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_UART>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
+			arm,primecell-periphid = <0x00241011>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		uart5: serial@7e201a00 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pl011", "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";
+			reg = <0x7e201a00 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_UART>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
+			arm,primecell-periphid = <0x00241011>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		spi@7e204000 {
+			reg = <0x7e204000 0x0200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		spi3: spi@7e204600 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-spi";
+			reg = <0x7e204600 0x0200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		spi4: spi@7e204800 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-spi";
+			reg = <0x7e204800 0x0200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		spi5: spi@7e204a00 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-spi";
+			reg = <0x7e204a00 0x0200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		spi6: spi@7e204c00 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-spi";
+			reg = <0x7e204c00 0x0200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		i2c3: i2c@7e205600 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2c";
+			reg = <0x7e205600 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		i2c4: i2c@7e205800 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2c";
+			reg = <0x7e205800 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		i2c5: i2c@7e205a00 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2c";
+			reg = <0x7e205a00 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		i2c6: i2c@7e205c00 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2c";
+			reg = <0x7e205c00 0x200>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		pixelvalve@7e206000 {
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 109 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		pixelvalve@7e207000 {
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 110 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		pwm1: pwm@7e20c800 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pwm";
+			reg = <0x7e20c800 0x28>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_PWM>;
+			assigned-clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_PWM>;
+			assigned-clock-rates = <10000000>;
+			#pwm-cells = <2>;
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+
+		emmc2: emmc2@7e340000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-emmc2";
+			status = "okay";
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 126 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2838_CLOCK_EMMC2>;
+			reg = <0x7e340000 0x100>;
+		};
+
+		hvs@7e400000 {
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		pixelvalve@7e807000 {
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 106 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+	};
+
+	arm-pmu {
+		compatible = "arm,cortex-a72-pmu";
+		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 16 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			<GIC_SPI 17 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			<GIC_SPI 18 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			<GIC_SPI 19 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		interrupt-affinity = <&cpu0>, <&cpu1>, <&cpu2>, <&cpu3>;
+	};
+
+	timer {
+		compatible = "arm,armv7-timer";
+		interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) |
+					  IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW)>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 14 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) |
+					  IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW)>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 11 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) |
+					  IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW)>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 10 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) |
+					  IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW)>;
+		arm,cpu-registers-not-fw-configured;
+		always-on;
+	};
+
+	cpus: cpus {
+		#address-cells = <1>;
+		#size-cells = <0>;
+		enable-method = "brcm,bcm2836-smp"; // for ARM 32-bit
+
+		cpu0: cpu@0 {
+			device_type = "cpu";
+			compatible = "arm,cortex-a72";
+			reg = <0>;
+			enable-method = "spin-table";
+			cpu-release-addr = <0x0 0x000000d8>;
+		};
+
+		cpu1: cpu@1 {
+			device_type = "cpu";
+			compatible = "arm,cortex-a72";
+			reg = <1>;
+			enable-method = "spin-table";
+			cpu-release-addr = <0x0 0x000000e0>;
+		};
+
+		cpu2: cpu@2 {
+			device_type = "cpu";
+			compatible = "arm,cortex-a72";
+			reg = <2>;
+			enable-method = "spin-table";
+			cpu-release-addr = <0x0 0x000000e8>;
+		};
+
+		cpu3: cpu@3 {
+			device_type = "cpu";
+			compatible = "arm,cortex-a72";
+			reg = <3>;
+			enable-method = "spin-table";
+			cpu-release-addr = <0x0 0x000000f0>;
+		};
+	};
+
+	v3dbus {
+		compatible = "simple-bus";
+		#address-cells = <1>;
+		#size-cells = <1>;
+		ranges = <0x7c500000  0x0 0xfc500000  0x03300000>,
+			 <0x40000000  0x0 0xff800000  0x00800000>;
+		dma-ranges = <0x00000000  0x0 0x00000000  0x3c000000>;
+
+		v3d: v3d@7ec04000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,2711-v3d";
+			reg =
+			    <0x7ec00000 0x4000>,
+			    <0x7ec04000 0x4000>;
+			reg-names = "hub", "core0";
+
+			power-domains = <&pm BCM2835_POWER_DOMAIN_GRAFX_V3D>;
+			resets = <&pm BCM2835_RESET_V3D>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_V3D>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 74 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+	};
+
+	scb: scb {
+		compatible = "simple-bus";
+		#address-cells = <2>;
+		#size-cells = <1>;
+
+		ranges = <0x0 0x7c000000  0x0 0xfc000000  0x03800000>,
+			 <0x0 0x40000000  0x0 0xff800000  0x00800000>,
+			 <0x6 0x00000000  0x6 0x00000000  0x40000000>,
+			 <0x0 0x00000000  0x0 0x00000000  0xfc000000>;
+		dma-ranges = <0x0 0x00000000  0x0 0x00000000  0xfc000000>;
+
+		pcie_0: pcie@7d500000 {
+			reg = <0x0 0x7d500000 0x9310>,
+			      <0x0 0x7e00f300 0x20>;
+			msi-controller;
+			msi-parent = <&pcie_0>;
+			#address-cells = <3>;
+			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <2>;
+			bus-range = <0x0 0x01>;
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm7211-pcie", "brcm,bcm7445-pcie",
+				     "brcm,pci-plat-dev";
+			max-link-speed = <2>;
+			tot-num-pcie = <1>;
+			linux,pci-domain = <0>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 148 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 148 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupt-names = "pcie", "msi";
+			interrupt-map-mask = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x7>;
+			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 1 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 143
+						IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH
+					 0 0 0 2 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 144
+						IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH
+					 0 0 0 3 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 145
+						IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH
+					 0 0 0 4 &gicv2 GIC_SPI 146
+						IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+
+			/* Map outbound accesses from scb:0x6_00000000-03ffffff
+			 * to pci:0x0_f8000000-fbffffff
+			 */
+			ranges = <0x02000000 0x0 0xf8000000  0x6 0x00000000
+				  0x0 0x04000000>;
+			/* Map inbound accesses from pci:0x0_00000000..ffffffff
+			 * to scb:0x0_00000000-ffffffff
+			 */
+			dma-ranges = <0x02000000 0x0 0x00000000  0x0 0x00000000
+				      0x1 0x00000000>;
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+
+		genet: genet@7d580000 {
+			compatible = "brcm,genet-v5";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7d580000 0x10000>;
+			status = "okay";
+			#address-cells = <0x1>;
+			#size-cells = <0x1>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 157 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 158 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			phy-handle = <&phy1>;
+			phy-mode = "rgmii";
+			mdio@e14 {
+				#address-cells = <0x0>;
+				#size-cells = <0x1>;
+				compatible = "brcm,genet-mdio-v5";
+				reg = <0xe14 0x8>;
+				reg-names = "mdio";
+				phy1: genet-phy@0 {
+					compatible =
+						"ethernet-phy-ieee802.3-c22";
+					/* No interrupts - use PHY_POLL */
+					max-speed = <1000>;
+					reg = <0x1>;
+				};
+			};
+		};
+
+		dma40: dma@7e007b00 {
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2838-dma";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7e007b00 0x400>;
+			interrupts =
+				<GIC_SPI 89 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, /* dma4 11 */
+				<GIC_SPI 90 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, /* dma4 12 */
+				<GIC_SPI 91 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, /* dma4 13 */
+				<GIC_SPI 92 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* dma4 14 */
+			interrupt-names = "dma11",
+				"dma12",
+				"dma13",
+				"dma14";
+			#dma-cells = <1>;
+			brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x7800>;
+		};
+		/* DMA4 - 40 bit DMA engines */
+
+		xhci: xhci@7e9c0000 {
+			compatible = "generic-xhci";
+			status = "disabled";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7e9c0000 0x100000>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 176 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		hevc-decoder@7eb00000 {
+			compatible = "raspberrypi,rpivid-hevc-decoder";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7eb00000 0x10000>;
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+
+		rpivid-local-intc@7eb10000 {
+			compatible = "raspberrypi,rpivid-local-intc";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7eb10000 0x1000>;
+			status = "okay";
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 98 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		};
+
+		h264-decoder@7eb20000 {
+			compatible = "raspberrypi,rpivid-h264-decoder";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7eb20000 0x10000>;
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+
+		vp9-decoder@7eb30000 {
+			compatible = "raspberrypi,rpivid-vp9-decoder";
+			reg = <0x0 0x7eb30000 0x10000>;
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+	};
+};
+
+&clk_osc {
+	clock-frequency = <54000000>;
+};
+
+&clocks {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2838-cprman";
+};
+
+&cpu_thermal {
+	coefficients = <(-487)  410040>;
+};
+
+&dsi0 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 100 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&dsi1 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 108 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&gpio {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2838-gpio", "brcm,bcm2835-gpio";
+
+	gpclk0_gpio49: gpclk0_gpio49 {
+		brcm,pins = <49>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT1>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+	gpclk1_gpio50: gpclk1_gpio50 {
+		brcm,pins = <50>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT1>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+	gpclk2_gpio51: gpclk2_gpio51 {
+		brcm,pins = <51>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT1>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+
+	i2c0_gpio46: i2c0_gpio46 {
+		brcm,pins = <46 47>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT0>;
+	};
+	i2c1_gpio46: i2c1_gpio46 {
+		brcm,pins = <46 47>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT1>;
+	};
+	i2c3_gpio2: i2c3_gpio2 {
+		brcm,pins = <2 3>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c3_gpio4: i2c3_gpio4 {
+		brcm,pins = <4 5>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c4_gpio6: i2c4_gpio6 {
+		brcm,pins = <6 7>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c4_gpio8: i2c4_gpio8 {
+		brcm,pins = <8 9>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c5_gpio10: i2c5_gpio10 {
+		brcm,pins = <10 11>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c5_gpio12: i2c5_gpio12 {
+		brcm,pins = <12 13>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c6_gpio0: i2c6_gpio0 {
+		brcm,pins = <0 1>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c6_gpio22: i2c6_gpio22 {
+		brcm,pins = <22 23>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	i2c_slave_gpio8: i2c_slave_gpio8 {
+		brcm,pins = <8 9 10 11>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	jtag_gpio48: jtag_gpio48 {
+		brcm,pins = <48 49 50 51 52 53>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+	};
+
+	mii_gpio28: mii_gpio28 {
+		brcm,pins = <28 29 30 31>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+	};
+	mii_gpio36: mii_gpio36 {
+		brcm,pins = <36 37 38 39>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+
+	pcm_gpio50: pcm_gpio50 {
+		brcm,pins = <50 51 52 53>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT2>;
+	};
+
+	pwm0_gpio52: pwm0_gpio52 {
+		brcm,pins = <52>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT1>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+	pwm1_gpio53: pwm1_gpio53 {
+		brcm,pins = <53>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT1>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+
+	/* The following group consists of:
+         *  RGMII_START_STOP
+         *  RGMII_RX_OK
+         */
+	rgmii_gpio35: rgmii_gpio35 {
+		brcm,pins = <35 36>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+	};
+	rgmii_irq_gpio34: rgmii_irq_gpio34 {
+		brcm,pins = <34>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	rgmii_irq_gpio39: rgmii_irq_gpio39 {
+		brcm,pins = <39>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+	};
+	rgmii_mdio_gpio28: rgmii_mdio_gpio28 {
+		brcm,pins = <28 29>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	rgmii_mdio_gpio37: rgmii_mdio_gpio37 {
+		brcm,pins = <37 38>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+	};
+
+	spi0_gpio46: spi0_gpio46 {
+		brcm,pins = <46 47 48 49>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT2>;
+	};
+	spi2_gpio46: spi2_gpio46 {
+		brcm,pins = <46 47 48 49 50>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
+	};
+	spi3_gpio0: spi3_gpio0 {
+		brcm,pins = <0 1 2 3>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+	spi4_gpio4: spi4_gpio4 {
+		brcm,pins = <4 5 6 7>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+	spi5_gpio12: spi5_gpio12 {
+		brcm,pins = <12 13 14 15>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+	spi6_gpio18: spi6_gpio18 {
+		brcm,pins = <18 19 20 21>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
+	};
+
+	uart2_gpio0: uart2_gpio0 {
+		brcm,pins = <0 1>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+	uart2_ctsrts_gpio2: uart2_ctsrts_gpio2 {
+		brcm,pins = <2 3>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+	uart3_gpio4: uart3_gpio4 {
+		brcm,pins = <4 5>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+	uart3_ctsrts_gpio6: uart3_ctsrts_gpio6 {
+		brcm,pins = <6 7>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+	uart4_gpio8: uart4_gpio8 {
+		brcm,pins = <8 9>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+	uart4_ctsrts_gpio10: uart4_ctsrts_gpio10 {
+		brcm,pins = <10 11>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+	uart5_gpio12: uart5_gpio12 {
+		brcm,pins = <12 13>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_OFF BCM2835_PUD_UP>;
+	};
+	uart5_ctsrts_gpio14: uart5_ctsrts_gpio14 {
+		brcm,pins = <14 15>;
+		brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
+		brcm,pull = <BCM2835_PUD_UP BCM2835_PUD_OFF>;
+	};
+};
+
+&vec {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&usb {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 73 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&hdmi {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 104 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		     <GIC_SPI 105 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&uart1 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 93 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&spi1 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 93 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&spi2 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 93 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&csi0 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 102 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&csi1 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&sdhci {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 126 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&i2c0 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&i2c1 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&i2c2 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 117 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&gpio {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 113 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		     <GIC_SPI 114 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		     <GIC_SPI 115 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		     <GIC_SPI 116 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&mailbox {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 33 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&rng {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2838-rng200";
+};
+
+&sdhost {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&uart0 {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};
+
+&dma {
+	reg = <0x7e007000 0xb00>;
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 80 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 81 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 82 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 83 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 84 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+		<GIC_SPI 87 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, /* dmalite  7 */
+		<GIC_SPI 87 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, /* dmalite  8 */
+		<GIC_SPI 88 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, /* dmalite  9 */
+		<GIC_SPI 88 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* dmalite 10 */
+	interrupt-names = "dma0",
+			  "dma1",
+			  "dma2",
+			  "dma3",
+			  "dma4",
+			  "dma5",
+			  "dma6",
+			  "dma7",
+			  "dma8",
+			  "dma9",
+			  "dma10";
+	brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x07f5>;
+};
+
+&txp {
+	interrupts = <GIC_SPI 75 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm283x.dtsi

@@ -55,18 +55,7 @@
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <1>;
 
-		timer@7e003000 {
-			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-system-timer";
-			reg = <0x7e003000 0x1000>;
-			interrupts = <1 0>, <1 1>, <1 2>, <1 3>;
-			/* This could be a reference to BCM2835_CLOCK_TIMER,
-			 * but we don't have the driver using the common clock
-			 * support yet.
-			 */
-			clock-frequency = <1000000>;
-		};
-
-		txp@7e004000 {
+		txp: txp@7e004000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-txp";
 			reg = <0x7e004000 0x20>;
 			interrupts = <1 11>;
@@ -113,16 +102,18 @@
 			brcm,dma-channel-mask = <0x7f35>;
 		};
 
-		intc: interrupt-controller@7e00b200 {
-			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-armctrl-ic";
-			reg = <0x7e00b200 0x200>;
-			interrupt-controller;
-			#interrupt-cells = <2>;
-		};
-
 		watchdog@7e100000 {
-			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pm-wdt";
-			reg = <0x7e100000 0x28>;
+			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pm", "brcm,bcm2835-pm-wdt";
+			#power-domain-cells = <1>;
+			#reset-cells = <1>;
+			reg = <0x7e100000 0x114>,
+			      <0x7e00a000 0x24>;
+			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_V3D>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_PERI_IMAGE>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_H264>,
+				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_ISP>;
+			clock-names = "v3d", "peri_image", "h264", "isp";
+			system-power-controller;
 		};
 
 		clocks: cprman@7e101000 {
@@ -139,7 +130,7 @@
 				<&dsi1 0>, <&dsi1 1>, <&dsi1 2>;
 		};
 
-		rng@7e104000 {
+		rng: rng@7e104000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-rng";
 			reg = <0x7e104000 0x10>;
 			interrupts = <2 29>;
@@ -174,8 +165,7 @@
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <2>;
 
-			/* Defines pin muxing groups according to
-			 * BCM2835-ARM-Peripherals.pdf page 102.
+			/* Defines common pin muxing groups
 			 *
 			 * While each pin can have its mux selected
 			 * for various functions individually, some
@@ -253,15 +243,7 @@
 				brcm,pins = <44 45>;
 				brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT2>;
 			};
-			i2c_slave_gpio18: i2c_slave_gpio18 {
-				brcm,pins = <18 19 20 21>;
-				brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT3>;
-			};
 
-			jtag_gpio4: jtag_gpio4 {
-				brcm,pins = <4 5 6 12 13>;
-				brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT5>;
-			};
 			jtag_gpio22: jtag_gpio22 {
 				brcm,pins = <22 23 24 25 26 27>;
 				brcm,function = <BCM2835_FSEL_ALT4>;
@@ -387,7 +369,7 @@
 
 		uart0: serial@7e201000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-pl011", "arm,pl011", "arm,primecell";
-			reg = <0x7e201000 0x1000>;
+			reg = <0x7e201000 0x200>;
 			interrupts = <2 25>;
 			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_UART>,
 				 <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
@@ -418,7 +400,7 @@
 
 		spi: spi@7e204000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-spi";
-			reg = <0x7e204000 0x1000>;
+			reg = <0x7e204000 0x200>;
 			interrupts = <2 22>;
 			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
@@ -428,7 +410,7 @@
 
 		i2c0: i2c@7e205000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-i2c";
-			reg = <0x7e205000 0x1000>;
+			reg = <0x7e205000 0x200>;
 			interrupts = <2 21>;
 			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_VPU>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
@@ -478,14 +460,6 @@
 
 		};
 
-		thermal: thermal@7e212000 {
-			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-thermal";
-			reg = <0x7e212000 0x8>;
-			clocks = <&clocks BCM2835_CLOCK_TSENS>;
-			#thermal-sensor-cells = <0>;
-			status = "disabled";
-		};
-
 		aux: aux@7e215000 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-aux";
 			#clock-cells = <1>;
@@ -651,12 +625,6 @@
 			phy-names = "usb2-phy";
 		};
 
-		v3d: v3d@7ec00000 {
-			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-v3d";
-			reg = <0x7ec00000 0x1000>;
-			interrupts = <1 10>;
-		};
-
 		vc4: gpu {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2835-vc4";
 		};

arch/arm/boot/dts/dra76x-mmc-iodelay.dtsi

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  *
  * Datamanual Revisions:
  *
- * DRA76x Silicon Revision 1.0: SPRS993A, Revised July 2017
+ * DRA76x Silicon Revision 1.0: SPRS993E, Revised December 2018
  *
  */
 
@@ -169,25 +169,25 @@
 	/* Corresponds to MMC2_HS200_MANUAL1 in datamanual */
 	mmc2_iodelay_hs200_conf: mmc2_iodelay_hs200_conf {
 		pinctrl-pin-array = <
-			0x190 A_DELAY_PS(384) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A19_OEN */
-			0x194 A_DELAY_PS(0) G_DELAY_PS(174)       /* CFG_GPMC_A19_OUT */
-			0x1a8 A_DELAY_PS(410) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A20_OEN */
-			0x1ac A_DELAY_PS(85) G_DELAY_PS(0)        /* CFG_GPMC_A20_OUT */
-			0x1b4 A_DELAY_PS(468) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A21_OEN */
-			0x1b8 A_DELAY_PS(139) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A21_OUT */
-			0x1c0 A_DELAY_PS(676) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A22_OEN */
-			0x1c4 A_DELAY_PS(69) G_DELAY_PS(0)        /* CFG_GPMC_A22_OUT */
-			0x1d0 A_DELAY_PS(1062) G_DELAY_PS(154)	  /* CFG_GPMC_A23_OUT */
-			0x1d8 A_DELAY_PS(640) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A24_OEN */
-			0x1dc A_DELAY_PS(0) G_DELAY_PS(0)         /* CFG_GPMC_A24_OUT */
-			0x1e4 A_DELAY_PS(356) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A25_OEN */
-			0x1e8 A_DELAY_PS(0) G_DELAY_PS(0)         /* CFG_GPMC_A25_OUT */
-			0x1f0 A_DELAY_PS(579) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A26_OEN */
-			0x1f4 A_DELAY_PS(0) G_DELAY_PS(0)         /* CFG_GPMC_A26_OUT */
-			0x1fc A_DELAY_PS(435) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_A27_OEN */
-			0x200 A_DELAY_PS(36) G_DELAY_PS(0)        /* CFG_GPMC_A27_OUT */
-			0x364 A_DELAY_PS(759) G_DELAY_PS(0)       /* CFG_GPMC_CS1_OEN */
-			0x368 A_DELAY_PS(72) G_DELAY_PS(0)        /* CFG_GPMC_CS1_OUT */
+			0x190 A_DELAY_PS(384) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A19_OEN */
+			0x194 A_DELAY_PS(350) G_DELAY_PS(174)	/* CFG_GPMC_A19_OUT */
+			0x1a8 A_DELAY_PS(410) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A20_OEN */
+			0x1ac A_DELAY_PS(335) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A20_OUT */
+			0x1b4 A_DELAY_PS(468) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A21_OEN */
+			0x1b8 A_DELAY_PS(339) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A21_OUT */
+			0x1c0 A_DELAY_PS(676) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A22_OEN */
+			0x1c4 A_DELAY_PS(219) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A22_OUT */
+			0x1d0 A_DELAY_PS(1062) G_DELAY_PS(154)	/* CFG_GPMC_A23_OUT */
+			0x1d8 A_DELAY_PS(640) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A24_OEN */
+			0x1dc A_DELAY_PS(150) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A24_OUT */
+			0x1e4 A_DELAY_PS(356) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A25_OEN */
+			0x1e8 A_DELAY_PS(150) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A25_OUT */
+			0x1f0 A_DELAY_PS(579) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A26_OEN */
+			0x1f4 A_DELAY_PS(200) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A26_OUT */
+			0x1fc A_DELAY_PS(435) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A27_OEN */
+			0x200 A_DELAY_PS(236) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_A27_OUT */
+			0x364 A_DELAY_PS(759) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_CS1_OEN */
+			0x368 A_DELAY_PS(372) G_DELAY_PS(0)	/* CFG_GPMC_CS1_OUT */
 	      >;
 	};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5260.dtsi

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
 			wakeup-interrupt-controller {
 				compatible = "samsung,exynos4210-wakeup-eint";
 				interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 32 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 48 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			};
 		};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-arndale-octa.dts

@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
 				regulator-name = "PVDD_APIO_1V8";
 				regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
 				regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
+				regulator-always-on;
 			};
 
 			ldo3_reg: LDO3 {
@@ -144,6 +145,7 @@
 				regulator-name = "PVDD_ABB_1V8";
 				regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
 				regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
+				regulator-always-on;
 			};
 
 			ldo9_reg: LDO9 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5422-odroidxu3-audio.dtsi

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 			"Headphone Jack", "HPL",
 			"Headphone Jack", "HPR",
 			"Headphone Jack", "MICBIAS",
-			"IN1", "Headphone Jack",
+			"IN12", "Headphone Jack",
 			"Speakers", "SPKL",
 			"Speakers", "SPKR";
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/gemini-dlink-dns-313.dts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 / {
 	model = "D-Link DNS-313 1-Bay Network Storage Enclosure";
-	compatible = "dlink,dir-313", "cortina,gemini";
+	compatible = "dlink,dns-313", "cortina,gemini";
 	#address-cells = <1>;
 	#size-cells = <1>;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx50.dtsi

@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@
 				reg = <0x63fb0000 0x4000>;
 				interrupts = <6>;
 				clocks = <&clks IMX5_CLK_SDMA_GATE>,
-					 <&clks IMX5_CLK_SDMA_GATE>;
+					 <&clks IMX5_CLK_AHB>;
 				clock-names = "ipg", "ahb";
 				#dma-cells = <3>;
 				fsl,sdma-ram-script-name = "imx/sdma/sdma-imx50.bin";

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx51.dtsi

@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
 				reg = <0x83fb0000 0x4000>;
 				interrupts = <6>;
 				clocks = <&clks IMX5_CLK_SDMA_GATE>,
-					 <&clks IMX5_CLK_SDMA_GATE>;
+					 <&clks IMX5_CLK_AHB>;
 				clock-names = "ipg", "ahb";
 				#dma-cells = <3>;
 				fsl,sdma-ram-script-name = "imx/sdma/sdma-imx51.bin";