Merge remote-tracking branch 'stable/linux-4.14.y' into rpi-4.14.y

This reverts commit 4a098c782d.

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: Bug report
+about: Create a report to help us fix your issue
+
+---
+
+**Is this the right place for my bug report?**
+This repository contains the Linux kernel used on the Raspberry Pi. If you believe that the issue you are seeing is kernel-related, this is the right place. If not, we have other repositories for the GPU firmware at [github.com/raspberrypi/firmware](https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware) and Raspberry Pi userland applications at [github.com/raspberrypi/userland](https://github.com/raspberrypi/userland). If you have problems with the Raspbian distribution packages, report them in the [github.com/RPi-Distro/repo](https://github.com/RPi-Distro/repo). If you simply have a question, then [the Raspberry Pi forums](https://www.raspberrypi.org/forums) are the best place to ask it.
+
+**Describe the bug**
+Add a clear and concise description of what you think the bug is.
+
+**To reproduce**
+List the steps required to reproduce the issue.
+
+**Expected behaviour**
+Add a clear and concise description of what you expected to happen.
+
+**Actual behaviour**
+Add a clear and concise description of what actually happened.
+
+**System**
+ Copy and paste the results of the raspinfo command in to this section. Alternatively, copy and paste a pastebin link, or add answers to the following questions:
+
+* Which model of Raspberry Pi? e.g. Pi3B+, PiZeroW
+* Which OS and version (`cat /etc/rpi-issue`)?
+* Which firmware version (`vcgencmd version`)?
+* Which kernel version (`uname -a`)?
+
+**Logs**
+If applicable, add the relevant output from `dmesg` or similar.
+
+**Additional context**
+Add any other relevant context for the problem.

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -390,3 +391,26 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
+
+		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
+		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+Date:		June 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Control Symetric Multi Threading (SMT)
+
+		active:  Tells whether SMT is active (enabled and siblings online)
+
+		control: Read/write interface to control SMT. Possible
+			 values:
+
+			 "on"		SMT is enabled
+			 "off"		SMT is disabled
+			 "forceoff"	SMT is force disabled. Cannot be changed.
+			 "notsupported" SMT is not supported by the CPU
+
+			 If control status is "forceoff" or "notsupported" writes
+			 are rejected.

Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst

@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   l1tf
+
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.
 

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1888,10 +1888,84 @@
 			(virtualized real and unpaged mode) on capable
 			Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=[KVM,Intel] Mitigation for L1 Terminal Fault
+			CVE-2018-3620.
+
+			Valid arguments: never, cond, always
+
+			always: L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+			cond:	Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between
+				VMEXIT and VMENTER can leak host memory.
+			never:	Disables the mitigation
+
+			Default is cond (do L1 cache flush in specific instances)
+
 	kvm-intel.vpid=	[KVM,Intel] Disable Virtual Processor Identification
 			feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	l1tf=           [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
+			      affected CPUs
+
+			The kernel PTE inversion protection is unconditionally
+			enabled and cannot be disabled.
+
+			full
+				Provides all available mitigations for the
+				L1TF vulnerability. Disables SMT and
+				enables all mitigations in the
+				hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			full,force
+				Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D
+				flush runtime control. Implies the
+				'nosmt=force' command line option.
+				(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+			flush
+				Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation, i.e. conditional
+				L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nosmt
+
+				Disables SMT and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nowarn
+				Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not
+				warn when a VM is started in a potentially
+				insecure configuration.
+
+			off
+				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
+				emit any warnings.
+
+			Default is 'flush'.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
 	l3cr=		[PPC]
@@ -2595,6 +2669,10 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+			[KNL,x86] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
+			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
+				     via the sysfs control file.
+
 	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent

Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
+========================
+
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
+when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
+for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
+     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
+
+   - The Intel XEON PHI family
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
+     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
+     available by end of 2018.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
+
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
+table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
+then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
+data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
+by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
+
+While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
+a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
+data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
+opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
+similar to the Meltdown attack.
+
+While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
+allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
+works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
+works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
+extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+1. Malicious user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
+   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
+   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
+   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
+   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
+   deterministic and more practical.
+
+   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
+   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
+   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
+   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
+
+   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
+   malicious user space applications.
+
+2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
+   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
+   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
+   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
+
+   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
+   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
+   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
+   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
+   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
+   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
+   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
+   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
+
+   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
+   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
+   effective (shadow) page tables.
+
+   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
+   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
+   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
+   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
+   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
+   are described in the next sections.
+
+   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
+   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
+
+.. _l1tf_sys_info:
+
+L1TF system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  ===========================   ===============================
+  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
+  ===========================   ===============================
+
+If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
+information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
+
+  - SMT status:
+
+    =====================  ================
+    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
+    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
+    =====================  ================
+
+  - L1D Flush mode:
+
+    ================================  ====================================
+    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
+
+    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
+
+    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
+    ================================  ====================================
+
+The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
+
+
+Host mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
+user space running on the host.
+
+
+Guest mitigation mechanisms
+---------------------------
+
+.. _l1d_flush:
+
+1. L1D flush on VMENTER
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
+   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
+
+   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
+   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
+   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
+   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
+   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
+   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
+   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
+   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
+   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
+   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
+
+   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
+    - conditional ('cond')
+    - unconditional ('always')
+
+   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
+   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
+   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
+   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
+   address space layout of the hypervisor.
+
+   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
+   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
+   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
+   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
+
+   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
+   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
+
+   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
+   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
+   attackable again.
+
+   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
+   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
+   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+.. _guest_confinement:
+
+2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
+   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
+   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
+   host tasks can run on these cores.
+
+   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
+   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
+   restricted parts of the host memory.
+
+   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
+   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
+   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
+   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
+   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
+   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
+   the code.
+
+   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
+   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
+   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
+   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
+   scenarios.
+
+   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
+   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
+
+.. _interrupt_isolation:
+
+3. Interrupt affinity
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
+   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
+   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
+   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
+   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
+
+   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
+   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
+
+   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
+   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
+   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
+   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
+   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
+   is no way to make general assumptions.
+
+   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
+   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
+   available at:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
+
+.. _smt_control:
+
+4. SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
+   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
+   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
+   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
+   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
+
+   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
+   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
+   control SMT.
+
+   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
+
+     =========== ==========================================================
+     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
+		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
+		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
+		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
+		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
+		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
+		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
+		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
+
+     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
+		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
+     =========== ==========================================================
+
+   The sysfs interface provides two files:
+
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
+
+     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
+     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
+
+	==============  ===================================================
+	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
+			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
+			restrictions.
+
+	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
+			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
+			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
+			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
+
+	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+
+	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
+			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+	==============  ===================================================
+
+     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
+     state are:
+
+     - on
+     - off
+     - forceoff
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
+
+     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
+     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
+
+   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
+   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+5. Disabling EPT
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
+  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
+  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
+  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
+  KPTI is enabled.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
+address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
+
+.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
+		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
+		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
+		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
+		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
+		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
+		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
+		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
+
+  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
+		warnings.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
+
+
+.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
+entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
+
+The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
+following arguments:
+
+  ============  ==============================================================
+  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+
+  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
+		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
+		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
+		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
+
+  never		Disables the mitigation
+  ============  ==============================================================
+
+The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
+parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
+file:
+
+/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
+
+The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
+line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
+module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
+   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
+   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
+
+   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
+   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
+   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
+  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
+
+  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
+  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
+  VMENTER is not required.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
+  mitigations can be employed:
+
+  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
+
+    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
+    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
+
+    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Guest confinement:
+
+    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
+    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
+    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
+    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
+    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
+
+  - Interrupt isolation:
+
+    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
+    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
+    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
+    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
+    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
+    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
+    which might expose valuable information. See
+    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
+
+The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
+certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
+carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
+available:
+
+  - Disabling SMT:
+
+    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
+    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
+    above mitigation methods.
+
+    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
+    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
+    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Disabling EPT:
+
+    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
+    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
+    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
+    significant.
+
+    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
+    parameter.
+
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it wiil:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+   nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
+
+.. _default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+
+  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
+    a guest.
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
+
+  The rationale for this choice is:
+
+  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
+    unattended updates.
+
+  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
+    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
+    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
+
+    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
+    on their machines blindly.
+
+  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
+    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
+    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
+    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
+    be possible, then the default might be different.
+
+  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
+    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
+    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
+    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
+    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
+    kind of scenarios.

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/rpi-poe-fan.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Bindings for the Raspberry Pi PoE HAT fan
+
+Required properties:
+- compatible	: "raspberrypi,rpi-poe-fan"
+- firmware	: Reference to the RPi firmware device node
+- pwms		: the PWM that is used to control the PWM fan
+- cooling-levels      : PWM duty cycle values in a range from 0 to 255
+			which correspond to thermal cooling states
+
+Example:
+	fan0: rpi-poe-fan@0 {
+		compatible = "raspberrypi,rpi-poe-fan";
+		firmware = <&firmware>;
+		cooling-min-state = <0>;
+		cooling-max-state = <3>;
+		#cooling-cells = <2>;
+		cooling-levels = <0 50 150 255>;
+		status = "okay";
+	};
+
+	thermal-zones {
+		cpu_thermal: cpu-thermal {
+			trips {
+				threshold: trip-point@0 {
+					temperature = <45000>;
+					hysteresis = <5000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+				target: trip-point@1 {
+					temperature = <50000>;
+					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+				cpu_hot: cpu_hot@0 {
+					temperature = <55000>;
+					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					type = "active";
+				};
+			};
+			cooling-maps {
+				map0 {
+					trip = <&threshold>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 0 1>;
+				};
+				map1 {
+					trip = <&target>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 1 2>;
+				};
+				map2 {
+					trip = <&cpu_hot>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 2 3>;
+				};
+			};
+		};
+	};

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/macb.txt

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Required properties:
   Use "cdns,pc302-gem" for Picochip picoXcell pc302 and later devices based on
   the Cadence GEM, or the generic form: "cdns,gem".
   Use "atmel,sama5d2-gem" for the GEM IP (10/100) available on Atmel sama5d2 SoCs.
+  Use "atmel,sama5d3-macb" for the 10/100Mbit IP available on Atmel sama5d3 SoCs.
   Use "atmel,sama5d3-gem" for the Gigabit IP available on Atmel sama5d3 SoCs.
   Use "atmel,sama5d4-gem" for the GEM IP (10/100) available on Atmel sama5d4 SoCs.
   Use "cdns,zynq-gem" Xilinx Zynq-7xxx SoC.

Documentation/hwmon/ina2xx

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Supported chips:
     Datasheet: Publicly available at the Texas Instruments website
                http://www.ti.com/
 
-Author: Lothar Felten <l-felten@ti.com>
+Author: Lothar Felten <lothar.felten@gmail.com>
 
 Description
 -----------

Documentation/hwmon/rpi-poe-fan

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Kernel driver rpi-poe-fan
+=====================
+
+This driver enables the use of the Raspberry Pi PoE HAT fan.
+
+Author: Serge Schneider <serge@raspberrypi.org>
+
+Description
+-----------
+
+The driver implements a simple interface for driving the Raspberry Pi PoE
+(Power over Ethernet) HAT fan. The driver passes commands to the Raspberry Pi
+firmware through the mailbox property interface. The firmware then forwards
+the commands to the board over I2C on the ID_EEPROM pins. The driver exposes
+the fan to the user space through the hwmon sysfs interface.

Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt

@@ -133,14 +133,11 @@ min_adv_mss - INTEGER
 
 IP Fragmentation:
 
-ipfrag_high_thresh - INTEGER
-	Maximum memory used to reassemble IP fragments. When
-	ipfrag_high_thresh bytes of memory is allocated for this purpose,
-	the fragment handler will toss packets until ipfrag_low_thresh
-	is reached. This also serves as a maximum limit to namespaces
-	different from the initial one.
+ipfrag_high_thresh - LONG INTEGER
+	Maximum memory used to reassemble IP fragments.
 
-ipfrag_low_thresh - INTEGER
+ipfrag_low_thresh - LONG INTEGER
+	(Obsolete since linux-4.17)
 	Maximum memory used to reassemble IP fragments before the kernel
 	begins to remove incomplete fragment queues to free up resources.
 	The kernel still accepts new fragments for defragmentation.

Documentation/process/changes.rst

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ GNU C                  3.2              gcc --version
 GNU make               3.81             make --version
 binutils               2.20             ld -v
 util-linux             2.10o            fdformat --version
-module-init-tools      0.9.10           depmod -V
+kmod                   13               depmod -V
 e2fsprogs              1.41.4           e2fsck -V
 jfsutils               1.1.3            fsck.jfs -V
 reiserfsprogs          3.6.3            reiserfsck -V
@@ -141,12 +141,6 @@ is not build with ``CONFIG_KALLSYMS`` and you have no way to rebuild and
 reproduce the Oops with that option, then you can still decode that Oops
 with ksymoops.
 
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-A new module loader is now in the kernel that requires ``module-init-tools``
-to use.  It is backward compatible with the 2.4.x series kernels.
-
 Mkinitrd
 --------
 
@@ -346,16 +340,17 @@ Util-linux
 
 - <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/>
 
+Kmod
+----
+
+- <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kmod/>
+- <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git>
+
 Ksymoops
 --------
 
 - <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/ksymoops/v2.4/>
 
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-- <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/module-init-tools/>
-
 Mkinitrd
 --------
 

Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt

@@ -123,14 +123,15 @@ memory layout to fit in user mode), check KVM_CAP_MIPS_VZ and use the
 flag KVM_VM_MIPS_VZ.
 
 
-4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST
+4.3 KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
 
-Capability: basic
+Capability: basic, KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES for KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
 Architectures: x86
-Type: system
+Type: system ioctl
 Parameters: struct kvm_msr_list (in/out)
 Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
 Errors:
+  EFAULT:    the msr index list cannot be read from or written to
   E2BIG:     the msr index list is to be to fit in the array specified by
              the user.
 
@@ -139,16 +140,23 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
 	__u32 indices[0];
 };
 
-This ioctl returns the guest msrs that are supported.  The list varies
-by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.  The
-user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
-kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in
-the indices array with their numbers.
+The user fills in the size of the indices array in nmsrs, and in return
+kvm adjusts nmsrs to reflect the actual number of msrs and fills in the
+indices array with their numbers.
+
+KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST returns the guest msrs that are supported.  The list
+varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change otherwise.
 
 Note: if kvm indicates supports MCE (KVM_CAP_MCE), then the MCE bank MSRs are
 not returned in the MSR list, as different vcpus can have a different number
 of banks, as set via the KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE ioctl.
 
+KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST returns the list of MSRs that can be passed
+to the KVM_GET_MSRS system ioctl.  This lets userspace probe host capabilities
+and processor features that are exposed via MSRs (e.g., VMX capabilities).
+This list also varies by kvm version and host processor, but does not change
+otherwise.
+
 
 4.4 KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION
 
@@ -475,14 +483,22 @@ Support for this has been removed.  Use KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG instead.
 
 4.18 KVM_GET_MSRS
 
-Capability: basic
+Capability: basic (vcpu), KVM_CAP_GET_MSR_FEATURES (system)
 Architectures: x86
-Type: vcpu ioctl
+Type: system ioctl, vcpu ioctl
 Parameters: struct kvm_msrs (in/out)
-Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+Returns: number of msrs successfully returned;
+        -1 on error
 
+When used as a system ioctl:
+Reads the values of MSR-based features that are available for the VM.  This
+is similar to KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, but it returns MSR indices and values.
+The list of msr-based features can be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_FEATURE_INDEX_LIST
+in a system ioctl.
+
+When used as a vcpu ioctl:
 Reads model-specific registers from the vcpu.  Supported msr indices can
-be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.
+be obtained using KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST in a system ioctl.
 
 struct kvm_msrs {
 	__u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in entries */

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 62
+SUBLEVEL = 79
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Petit Gorille
 
@@ -357,9 +357,9 @@ CONFIG_SHELL := $(shell if [ -x "$$BASH" ]; then echo $$BASH; \
 	  else if [ -x /bin/bash ]; then echo /bin/bash; \
 	  else echo sh; fi ; fi)
 
-HOST_LFS_CFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_CFLAGS)
-HOST_LFS_LDFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_LDFLAGS)
-HOST_LFS_LIBS := $(shell getconf LFS_LIBS)
+HOST_LFS_CFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_CFLAGS 2>/dev/null)
+HOST_LFS_LDFLAGS := $(shell getconf LFS_LDFLAGS 2>/dev/null)
+HOST_LFS_LIBS := $(shell getconf LFS_LIBS 2>/dev/null)
 
 HOSTCC       = gcc
 HOSTCXX      = g++
@@ -487,12 +487,18 @@ CLANG_GCC_TC	:= --gcc-toolchain=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN)
 endif
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CLANG_TARGET) $(CLANG_GCC_TC)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(CLANG_TARGET) $(CLANG_GCC_TC)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -no-integrated-as)
+KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -no-integrated-as)
 endif
 
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register
+RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-inline -mindirect-branch-register
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG := -mretpoline-external-thunk
+RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_CLANG := -mretpoline
 RETPOLINE_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC),$(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_CLANG)))
+RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_GCC),$(call cc-option,$(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS_CLANG)))
 export RETPOLINE_CFLAGS
+export RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS
 
 ifeq ($(config-targets),1)
 # ===========================================================================
@@ -717,8 +723,6 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, tautological-compare)
 # See modpost pattern 2
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -mno-global-merge,)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fcatch-undefined-behavior)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -no-integrated-as)
-KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -no-integrated-as)
 else
 
 # These warnings generated too much noise in a regular build.

arch/Kconfig

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ config KEXEC_CORE
 config HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
 	bool
 
+config HOTPLUG_SMT
+	bool
+
 config OPROFILE
 	tristate "OProfile system profiling"
 	depends on PROFILING
@@ -333,6 +336,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
 config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
 	bool
 
+config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_INVALIDATE
+	bool
+
 config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
 	bool
 
@@ -959,4 +965,12 @@ config REFCOUNT_FULL
 	  against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in
 	  security flaw exploits.
 
+config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture can select this if it provides an
+	  asm/compiler.h header that should be included after
+	  linux/compiler-*.h in order to override macro definitions that those
+	  headers generally provide.
+
 source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"

arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c

@@ -530,24 +530,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_mount, unsigned long, typenr, const char __user *, path,
 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(osf_utsname, char __user *, name)
 {
 	int error;
+	char tmp[5 * 32];
 
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
-	error = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 0, utsname()->sysname, 32))
-		goto out;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 32, utsname()->nodename, 32))
-		goto out;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 64, utsname()->release, 32))
-		goto out;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 96, utsname()->version, 32))
-		goto out;
-	if (copy_to_user(name + 128, utsname()->machine, 32))
-		goto out;
+	memcpy(tmp + 0 * 32, utsname()->sysname, 32);
+	memcpy(tmp + 1 * 32, utsname()->nodename, 32);
+	memcpy(tmp + 2 * 32, utsname()->release, 32);
+	memcpy(tmp + 3 * 32, utsname()->version, 32);
+	memcpy(tmp + 4 * 32, utsname()->machine, 32);
+	up_read(&uts_sem);
 
-	error = 0;
- out:
-	up_read(&uts_sem);	
-	return error;
+	if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpagesize)
@@ -567,18 +562,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
 {
 	int len, err = 0;
 	char *kname;
+	char tmp[32];
 
-	if (namelen > 32)
+	if (namelen < 0 || namelen > 32)
 		namelen = 32;
 
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
 	kname = utsname()->domainname;
 	len = strnlen(kname, namelen);
-	if (copy_to_user(name, kname, min(len + 1, namelen)))
-		err = -EFAULT;
+	len = min(len + 1, namelen);
+	memcpy(tmp, kname, len);
 	up_read(&uts_sem);
 
-	return err;
+	if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -739,13 +737,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
 	};
 	unsigned long offset;
 	const char *res;
-	long len, err = -EINVAL;
+	long len;
+	char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1];
 
 	offset = command-1;
 	if (offset >= ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_table)) {
 		/* Digital UNIX has a few unpublished interfaces here */
 		printk("sysinfo(%d)", command);
-		goto out;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	down_read(&uts_sem);
@@ -753,13 +752,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
 	len = strlen(res)+1;
 	if ((unsigned long)len > (unsigned long)count)
 		len = count;
-	if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
-		err = -EFAULT;
-	else
-		err = 0;
+	memcpy(tmp, res, len);
 	up_read(&uts_sem);
- out:
-	return err;
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,

arch/arc/Kconfig

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ config ARC
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_LZMA
 
+config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
+	def_bool y
+
 config MIGHT_HAVE_PCI
 	bool
 

arch/arc/Makefile

@@ -6,34 +6,12 @@
 # published by the Free Software Foundation.
 #
 
-ifeq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)
-ifndef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
-CROSS_COMPILE := arc-linux-
-else
-CROSS_COMPILE := arceb-linux-
-endif
-endif
-
 KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_700_defconfig
 
-cflags-y	+= -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -D__linux__
+cflags-y	+= -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -mmedium-calls -D__linux__
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT)	+= -mA7
 cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2)	+= -mcpu=archs
 
-is_700 = $(shell $(CC) -dM -E - < /dev/null | grep -q "ARC700" && echo 1 || echo 0)
-
-ifdef CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT
-ifeq ($(is_700), 0)
-    $(error Toolchain not configured for ARCompact builds)
-endif
-endif
-
-ifdef CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2
-ifeq ($(is_700), 1)
-    $(error Toolchain not configured for ARCv2 builds)
-endif
-endif
-
 ifdef CONFIG_ARC_CURR_IN_REG
 # For a global register defintion, make sure it gets passed to every file
 # We had a customer reported bug where some code built in kernel was NOT using
@@ -87,7 +65,7 @@ ldflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)	+= -EB
 # --build-id w/o "-marclinux". Default arc-elf32-ld is OK
 ldflags-$(upto_gcc44)			+= -marclinux
 
-LIBGCC	:= $(shell $(CC) $(cflags-y) --print-libgcc-file-name)
+LIBGCC	= $(shell $(CC) $(cflags-y) --print-libgcc-file-name)
 
 # Modules with short calls might break for calls into builtin-kernel
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE	+= -mlong-calls -mno-millicode
@@ -140,16 +118,3 @@ dtbs: scripts
 
 archclean:
 	$(Q)$(MAKE) $(clean)=$(boot)
-
-# Hacks to enable final link due to absence of link-time branch relexation
-# and gcc choosing optimal(shorter) branches at -O3
-#
-# vineetg Feb 2010: -mlong-calls switched off for overall kernel build
-# However lib/decompress_inflate.o (.init.text) calls
-# zlib_inflate_workspacesize (.text) causing relocation errors.
-# Thus forcing all exten calls in this file to be long calls
-export CFLAGS_decompress_inflate.o = -mmedium-calls
-export CFLAGS_initramfs.o = -mmedium-calls
-ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-export CFLAGS_core.o = -mmedium-calls
-endif

arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="ARCLinux"
-# CONFIG_SWAP is not set
 CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
 CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
 # CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH is not set

arch/arc/configs/axs103_defconfig

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="ARCLinux"
-# CONFIG_SWAP is not set
 CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
 CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
 # CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH is not set

arch/arc/configs/axs103_smp_defconfig

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="ARCLinux"
-# CONFIG_SWAP is not set
 CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
 CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
 # CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH is not set

arch/arc/include/asm/atomic.h

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_##op(int i, atomic_t *v)			\
 	"1:	llock   %[orig], [%[ctr]]		\n"		\
 	"	" #asm_op " %[val], %[orig], %[i]	\n"		\
 	"	scond   %[val], [%[ctr]]		\n"		\
-	"						\n"		\
+	"	bnz     1b				\n"		\
 	: [val]	"=&r"	(val),						\
 	  [orig] "=&r" (orig)						\
 	: [ctr]	"r"	(&v->counter),					\

arch/arc/include/asm/cache.h

@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@
 })
 
 /* Largest line length for either L1 or L2 is 128 bytes */
-#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN      128
+#define SMP_CACHE_BYTES		128
+#define cache_line_size()	SMP_CACHE_BYTES
+#define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN	SMP_CACHE_BYTES
 
 extern void arc_cache_init(void);
 extern char *arc_cache_mumbojumbo(int cpu_id, char *buf, int len);

arch/arc/include/asm/delay.h

@@ -17,8 +17,11 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_ARC_UDELAY_H
 #define __ASM_ARC_UDELAY_H
 
+#include <asm-generic/types.h>
 #include <asm/param.h>		/* HZ */
 
+extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
+
 static inline void __delay(unsigned long loops)
 {
 	__asm__ __volatile__(

arch/arc/include/asm/mach_desc.h

@@ -34,9 +34,7 @@ struct machine_desc {
 	const char		*name;
 	const char		**dt_compat;
 	void			(*init_early)(void);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	void			(*init_per_cpu)(unsigned int);
-#endif
 	void			(*init_machine)(void);
 	void			(*init_late)(void);
 

arch/arc/kernel/irq.c

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ void __init init_IRQ(void)
 	/* a SMP H/w block could do IPI IRQ request here */
 	if (plat_smp_ops.init_per_cpu)
 		plat_smp_ops.init_per_cpu(smp_processor_id());
+#endif
 
 	if (machine_desc->init_per_cpu)
 		machine_desc->init_per_cpu(smp_processor_id());
-#endif
 }
 
 /*

arch/arc/kernel/process.c

@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(arc_gettls)
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(arc_usr_cmpxchg, int *, uaddr, int, expected, int, new)
 {
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
-	int uval = -EFAULT;
+	u32 uval;
+	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * This is only for old cores lacking LLOCK/SCOND, which by defintion
@@ -60,23 +61,47 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(arc_usr_cmpxchg, int *, uaddr, int, expected, int, new)
 	/* Z indicates to userspace if operation succeded */
 	regs->status32 &= ~STATUS_Z_MASK;
 
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(int)))
-		return -EFAULT;
+	ret = access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(*uaddr));
+	if (!ret)
+		 goto fail;
 
+again:
 	preempt_disable();
 
-	if (__get_user(uval, uaddr))
-		goto done;
+	ret = __get_user(uval, uaddr);
+	if (ret)
+		 goto fault;
 
-	if (uval == expected) {
-		if (!__put_user(new, uaddr))
-			regs->status32 |= STATUS_Z_MASK;
-	}
+	if (uval != expected)
+		 goto out;
 
-done:
+	ret = __put_user(new, uaddr);
+	if (ret)
+		 goto fault;
+
+	regs->status32 |= STATUS_Z_MASK;
+
+out:
+	preempt_enable();
+	return uval;
+
+fault:
 	preempt_enable();
 
-	return uval;
+	if (unlikely(ret != -EFAULT))
+		 goto fail;
+
+	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = fixup_user_fault(current, current->mm, (unsigned long) uaddr,
+			       FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, NULL);
+	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	if (likely(!ret))
+		 goto again;
+
+fail:
+	force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2
@@ -216,6 +241,26 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags,
 		task_thread_info(current)->thr_ptr;
 	}
 
+
+	/*
+	 * setup usermode thread pointer #1:
+	 * when child is picked by scheduler, __switch_to() uses @c_callee to
+	 * populate usermode callee regs: this works (despite being in a kernel
+	 * function) since special return path for child @ret_from_fork()
+	 * ensures those regs are not clobbered all the way to RTIE to usermode
+	 */
+	c_callee->r25 = task_thread_info(p)->thr_ptr;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_CURR_IN_REG
+	/*
+	 * setup usermode thread pointer #2:
+	 * however for this special use of r25 in kernel, __switch_to() sets
+	 * r25 for kernel needs and only in the final return path is usermode
+	 * r25 setup, from pt_regs->user_r25. So set that up as well
+	 */
+	c_regs->user_r25 = c_callee->r25;
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

arch/arc/mm/cache.c

@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ void flush_cache_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
 void flush_cache_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long u_vaddr,
 		      unsigned long pfn)
 {
-	unsigned int paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	phys_addr_t paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	u_vaddr &= PAGE_MASK;
 
@@ -1055,8 +1055,9 @@ void flush_anon_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
 		     unsigned long u_vaddr)
 {
 	/* TBD: do we really need to clear the kernel mapping */
-	__flush_dcache_page(page_address(page), u_vaddr);
-	__flush_dcache_page(page_address(page), page_address(page));
+	__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page), u_vaddr);
+	__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page),
+			    (phys_addr_t)page_address(page));
 
 }
 

arch/arc/plat-eznps/include/plat/ctop.h

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #error "Incorrect ctop.h include"
 #endif
 
+#include <linux/types.h>
 #include <soc/nps/common.h>
 
 /* core auxiliary registers */
@@ -143,6 +144,15 @@ struct nps_host_reg_gim_p_int_dst {
 };
 
 /* AUX registers definition */
+struct nps_host_reg_aux_dpc {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u32 ien:1, men:1, hen:1, reserved:29;
+		};
+		u32 value;
+	};
+};
+
 struct nps_host_reg_aux_udmc {
 	union {
 		struct {

arch/arc/plat-eznps/mtm.c

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/log2.h>
 #include <asm/arcregs.h>
@@ -157,10 +159,10 @@ void mtm_enable_core(unsigned int cpu)
 /* Verify and set the value of the mtm hs counter */
 static int __init set_mtm_hs_ctr(char *ctr_str)
 {
-	long hs_ctr;
+	int hs_ctr;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = kstrtol(ctr_str, 0, &hs_ctr);
+	ret = kstrtoint(ctr_str, 0, &hs_ctr);
 
 	if (ret || hs_ctr > MT_HS_CNT_MAX || hs_ctr < MT_HS_CNT_MIN) {
 		pr_err("** Invalid @nps_mtm_hs_ctr [%d] needs to be [%d:%d] (incl)\n",

arch/arm/boot/dts/am3517.dtsi

@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@
 	};
 };
 
+/* Table Table 5-79 of the TRM shows 480ab000 is reserved */
+&usb_otg_hs {
+	status = "disabled";
+};
+
 &iva {
 	status = "disabled";
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/am437x-sk-evm.dts

@@ -535,6 +535,8 @@
 
 		touchscreen-size-x = <480>;
 		touchscreen-size-y = <272>;
+
+		wakeup-source;
 	};
 
 	tlv320aic3106: tlv320aic3106@1b {

arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-synology-ds116.dts

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
 					      3700 5
 					      3900 6
 					      4000 7>;
-			cooling-cells = <2>;
+			#cooling-cells = <2>;
 		};
 
 		gpio-leds {

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm-cygnus.dtsi

@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@
 			reg = <0x18008000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
 			reg = <0x1800b000 0x100>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@
 
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 			interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 100 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 100 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 			linux,pci-domain = <0>;
 
@@ -278,10 +278,10 @@
 				compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 				msi-controller;
 				interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 96 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 98 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 99 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 96 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 97 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 98 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 99 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			};
 		};
 
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
 
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 			interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 106 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 106 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 			linux,pci-domain = <1>;
 
@@ -313,10 +313,10 @@
 				compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 				msi-controller;
 				interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 102 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 104 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-					     <GIC_SPI 105 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 102 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 104 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+					     <GIC_SPI 105 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			};
 		};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm-nsp.dtsi

@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@
 			reg = <0x38000 0x50>;
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 89 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 89 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clock-frequency = <100000>;
 			dma-coherent;
 			status = "disabled";
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 131 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 131 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <0>;
 
@@ -519,10 +519,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 			msi-controller;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 127 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 128 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 129 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 130 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 127 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 128 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 129 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 130 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			brcm,pcie-msi-inten;
 		};
 	};
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 137 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 137 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <1>;
 
@@ -556,10 +556,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 			msi-controller;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 133 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 134 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 135 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 136 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 133 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 134 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 135 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 136 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			brcm,pcie-msi-inten;
 		};
 	};
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@
 
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 143 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 0 &gic GIC_SPI 143 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		linux,pci-domain = <2>;
 
@@ -593,10 +593,10 @@
 			compatible = "brcm,iproc-msi";
 			msi-controller;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gic>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 139 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 140 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 141 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>,
-				     <GIC_SPI 142 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 139 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 140 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 141 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				     <GIC_SPI 142 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			brcm,pcie-msi-inten;
 		};
 	};

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm270x.dtsi

@@ -152,6 +152,13 @@
 		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
 		regulator-always-on;
 	};
+
+	__overrides__ {
+		cam0-pwdn-ctrl;
+		cam0-pwdn;
+		cam0-led-ctrl;
+		cam0-led;
+	};
 };
 
 /* Configure and use the auxilliary interrupt controller */

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm5301x.dtsi

@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@
 	i2c0: i2c@18009000 {
 		compatible = "brcm,iproc-i2c";
 		reg = <0x18009000 0x50>;
-		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
+		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 121 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <0>;
 		clock-frequency = <100000>;

arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm63138.dtsi

@@ -106,21 +106,23 @@
 		global_timer: timer@1e200 {
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-global-timer";
 			reg = <0x1e200 0x20>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
 			clocks = <&axi_clk>;
 		};
 
 		local_timer: local-timer@1e600 {
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-twd-timer";
 			reg = <0x1e600 0x20>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) |
+						  IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING)>;
 			clocks = <&axi_clk>;
 		};
 
 		twd_watchdog: watchdog@1e620 {
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-twd-wdt";
 			reg = <0x1e620 0x20>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 14 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_PPI 14 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) |
+						  IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
 		};
 
 		armpll: armpll {
@@ -158,7 +160,7 @@
 		serial0: serial@600 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm6345-uart";
 			reg = <0x600 0x1b>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 32 0>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 32 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clocks = <&periph_clk>;
 			clock-names = "periph";
 			status = "disabled";
@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@
 		serial1: serial@620 {
 			compatible = "brcm,bcm6345-uart";
 			reg = <0x620 0x1b>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 33 0>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 33 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clocks = <&periph_clk>;
 			clock-names = "periph";
 			status = "disabled";
@@ -180,7 +182,7 @@
 			reg = <0x2000 0x600>, <0xf0 0x10>;
 			reg-names = "nand", "nand-int-base";
 			status = "disabled";
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 38 0>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 38 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			interrupt-names = "nand";
 		};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/da850.dtsi

@@ -518,11 +518,7 @@
 			gpio-controller;
 			#gpio-cells = <2>;
 			reg = <0x226000 0x1000>;
-			interrupts = <42 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				43 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 44 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				45 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 46 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				47 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 48 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
-				49 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 50 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH>;
+			interrupts = <42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50>;
 			ti,ngpio = <144>;
 			ti,davinci-gpio-unbanked = <0>;
 			status = "disabled";

arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi

@@ -1818,7 +1818,7 @@
 			};
 		};
 
-		dcan1: can@481cc000 {
+		dcan1: can@4ae3c000 {
 			compatible = "ti,dra7-d_can";
 			ti,hwmods = "dcan1";
 			reg = <0x4ae3c000 0x2000>;
@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
-		dcan2: can@481d0000 {
+		dcan2: can@48480000 {
 			compatible = "ti,dra7-d_can";
 			ti,hwmods = "dcan2";
 			reg = <0x48480000 0x2000>;

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-qsb-common.dtsi

@@ -130,6 +130,17 @@
 	};
 };
 
+&cpu0 {
+	/* CPU rated to 1GHz, not 1.2GHz as per the default settings */
+	operating-points = <
+		/* kHz   uV */
+		166666  850000
+		400000  900000
+		800000  1050000
+		1000000 1200000
+	>;
+};
+
 &esdhc1 {
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_esdhc1>;

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-zii-rdu2.dtsi

@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
 			dsa,member = <0 0>;
 			eeprom-length = <512>;
 			interrupt-parent = <&gpio6>;
-			interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_FALLING>;
+			interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <2>;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi

@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@
 				  0x82000000 0 0x08000000 0x08000000 0 0x00f00000>;
 			bus-range = <0x00 0xff>;
 			num-lanes = <1>;
-			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+			interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_REF_125M>,
 				 <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_AXI>,
 				 <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_LVDS1_OUT>,

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7d.dtsi

@@ -144,10 +144,14 @@
 		interrupt-names = "msi";
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		interrupt-map-mask = <0 0 0 0x7>;
-		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 1 &intc GIC_SPI 122 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				<0 0 0 2 &intc GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				<0 0 0 3 &intc GIC_SPI 124 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
-				<0 0 0 4 &intc GIC_SPI 125 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+		/*
+		 * Reference manual lists pci irqs incorrectly
+		 * Real hardware ordering is same as imx6: D+MSI, C, B, A
+		 */
+		interrupt-map = <0 0 0 1 &intc GIC_SPI 125 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				<0 0 0 2 &intc GIC_SPI 124 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				<0 0 0 3 &intc GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+				<0 0 0 4 &intc GIC_SPI 122 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		clocks = <&clks IMX7D_PCIE_CTRL_ROOT_CLK>,
 			 <&clks IMX7D_PLL_ENET_MAIN_100M_CLK>,
 			 <&clks IMX7D_PCIE_PHY_ROOT_CLK>;

arch/arm/boot/dts/ls1021a.dtsi

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 			device_type = "cpu";
 			reg = <0xf01>;
 			clocks = <&clockgen 1 0>;
+			#cooling-cells = <2>;
 		};
 	};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/mt7623.dtsi

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a7";
 			reg = <0x1>;
 			operating-points-v2 = <&cpu_opp_table>;
+			#cooling-cells = <2>;
 			clock-frequency = <1300000000>;
 		};
 
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a7";
 			reg = <0x2>;
 			operating-points-v2 = <&cpu_opp_table>;
+			#cooling-cells = <2>;
 			clock-frequency = <1300000000>;
 		};
 
@@ -114,6 +116,7 @@
 			compatible = "arm,cortex-a7";
 			reg = <0x3>;
 			operating-points-v2 = <&cpu_opp_table>;
+			#cooling-cells = <2>;
 			clock-frequency = <1300000000>;
 		};
 	};

arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-droid4-xt894.dts

@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@
 &mmc2 {
 	vmmc-supply = <&vsdio>;
 	bus-width = <8>;
-	non-removable;
+	ti,non-removable;
 };
 
 &mmc3 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/Makefile

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	ads1115.dtbo \
 	ads7846.dtbo \
 	adv7282m.dtbo \
+	adv728x-m.dtbo \
 	akkordion-iqdacplus.dtbo \
 	allo-boss-dac-pcm512x-audio.dtbo \
 	allo-digione.dtbo \
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	applepi-dac.dtbo \
 	at86rf233.dtbo \
 	audioinjector-addons.dtbo \
+	audioinjector-ultra.dtbo \
 	audioinjector-wm8731-audio.dtbo \
 	audremap.dtbo \
 	balena-fin.dtbo \
@@ -33,9 +35,11 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	fe-pi-audio.dtbo \
 	goodix.dtbo \
 	googlevoicehat-soundcard.dtbo \
+	gpio-fan.dtbo \
 	gpio-ir.dtbo \
 	gpio-ir-tx.dtbo \
 	gpio-key.dtbo \
+	gpio-no-bank0-irq.dtbo \
 	gpio-no-irq.dtbo \
 	gpio-poweroff.dtbo \
 	gpio-shutdown.dtbo \
@@ -47,6 +51,7 @@ dtbo-$(CONFIG_ARCH_BCM2835) += \
 	hifiberry-digi-pro.dtbo \
 	hy28a.dtbo \
 	hy28b.dtbo \
+	hy28b-2017.dtbo \
 	i2c-bcm2708.dtbo \
 	i2c-gpio.dtbo \
 	i2c-mux.dtbo \

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/README

@@ -274,6 +274,19 @@ Info:   Analog Devices ADV7282M analogue video to CSI2 bridge.
 Load:   dtoverlay=adv7282m,<param>=<val>
 Params: i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
                                 This is required for Pi B+, 2, 0, and 0W.
+        addr                    Overrides the I2C address (default 0x21)
+
+
+Name:   adv728x-m
+Info:   Analog Devices ADV728[0|1|2]-M analogue video to CSI2 bridges.
+        This is a wrapper for adv7282m, and defaults to ADV7282M.
+Load:   dtoverlay=adv728x-m,<param>=<val>
+Params: i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
+                                This is required for Pi B+, 2, 0, and 0W.
+        addr                    Overrides the I2C address (default 0x21)
+        adv7280m                Select ADV7280-M.
+        adv7281m                Select ADV7281-M.
+        adv7281ma               Select ADV7281-MA.
 
 
 Name:   akkordion-iqdacplus
@@ -398,6 +411,12 @@ Params: non-stop-clocks         Keeps the clocks running even when the stream
                                 is paused or stopped (default off)
 
 
+Name:   audioinjector-ultra
+Info:   Configures the audioinjector.net ultra soundcard
+Load:   dtoverlay=audioinjector-ultra
+Params: <None>
+
+
 Name:   audioinjector-wm8731-audio
 Info:   Configures the audioinjector.net audio add on soundcard
 Load:   dtoverlay=audioinjector-wm8731-audio
@@ -544,6 +563,14 @@ Load:   dtoverlay=googlevoicehat-soundcard
 Params: <None>
 
 
+Name:   gpio-fan
+Info:   Configure a GPIO pin to control a cooling fan.
+Load:   dtoverlay=gpio-fan,<param>=<val>
+Params: gpiopin                 GPIO used to control the fan (default 12)
+        temp                    Temperature at which the fan switches on, in
+                                millicelcius (default 55000)
+
+
 Name:   gpio-ir
 Info:   Use GPIO pin as rc-core style infrared receiver input. The rc-core-
         based gpio_ir_recv driver maps received keys directly to a
@@ -592,6 +619,15 @@ Params: gpio                    GPIO pin to trigger on (default 3)
         keycode                 Set the key code for the button
 
 
+Name:   gpio-no-bank0-irq
+Info:   Use this overlay to disable GPIO interrupts for GPIOs in bank 0 (0-27),
+        which can be useful for UIO drivers.
+        N.B. Using this overlay will trigger a kernel WARN during booting, but
+        this can safely be ignored - the system should work as expected.
+Load:   dtoverlay=gpio-no-bank0-irq
+Params: <None>
+
+
 Name:   gpio-no-irq
 Info:   Use this overlay to disable all GPIO interrupts, which can be useful
         for user-space GPIO edge detection systems.
@@ -756,6 +792,25 @@ Params: speed                   Display SPI bus speed
         ledgpio                 GPIO used to control backlight
 
 
+Name:   hy28b-2017
+Info:   HY28B 2017 version - 2.8" TFT LCD Display Module by HAOYU Electronics
+        Default values match Texy's display shield
+Load:   dtoverlay=hy28b-2017,<param>=<val>
+Params: speed                   Display SPI bus speed
+
+        rotate                  Display rotation {0,90,180,270}
+
+        fps                     Delay between frame updates
+
+        debug                   Debug output level {0-7}
+
+        xohms                   Touchpanel sensitivity (X-plate resistance)
+
+        resetgpio               GPIO used to reset controller
+
+        ledgpio                 GPIO used to control backlight
+
+
 Name:   i2c-bcm2708
 Info:   Fall back to the i2c_bcm2708 driver for the i2c_arm bus.
 Load:   dtoverlay=i2c-bcm2708
@@ -1256,15 +1311,7 @@ Info:   Omnivision OV5647 camera module.
         Uses Unicam 1, which is the standard camera connector on most Pi
         variants.
 Load:   dtoverlay=ov5647,<param>=<val>
-Params: cam0-pwdn               GPIO used to control the sensor powerdown line.
-
-        cam0-led                GPIO used to control the sensor led
-                                Both these fields should be automatically filled
-                                in by the firmware to reflect the default GPIO
-                                configuration of the particular Pi variant in
-                                use.
-
-        i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
+Params: i2c_pins_28_29          Use pins 28&29 for the I2C instead of 44&45.
                                 This is required for Pi B+, 2, 0, and 0W.
 
 
@@ -1577,9 +1624,16 @@ Params: touchscreen-size-x      Touchscreen X resolution (default 800)
 
 
 Name:   rpi-poe
-Info:   Raspberry Pi POE HAT
-Load:   dtoverlay=rpi-poe
-Params: <None>
+Info:   Raspberry Pi PoE HAT fan
+Load:   dtoverlay=rpi-poe,<param>[=<val>]
+Params: poe_fan_temp0           Temperature (in millicelcius) at which the fan
+                                turns on (default 50000)
+        poe_fan_temp0_hyst      Temperature delta (in millicelcius) at which
+                                the fan turns off (default 5000)
+        poe_fan_temp1           Temperature (in millicelcius) at which the fan
+                                speeds up (default 55000)
+        poe_fan_temp1_hyst      Temperature delta (in millicelcius) at which
+                                the fan slows down (default 5000)
 
 
 Name:   rpi-proto

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/adv7282m-overlay.dts

@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@
 			#size-cells = <0>;
 			status = "okay";
 
-			adv7282: adv7282@21 {
+			adv728x: adv728x@21 {
 				compatible = "adi,adv7282-m";
 				reg = <0x21>;
 				status = "okay";
 				clock-frequency = <24000000>;
 				port {
-					adv7282_0: endpoint {
+					adv728x_0: endpoint {
 						remote-endpoint = <&csi1_ep>;
 						clock-lanes = <0>;
 						data-lanes = <1>;
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 				#address-cells = <1>;
 				#size-cells = <0>;
 				csi1_ep: endpoint {
-					remote-endpoint = <&adv7282_0>;
+					remote-endpoint = <&adv728x_0>;
 				};
 			};
 		};
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 	};
 
 	__overrides__ {
-		i2c_pins_28_29 = <0>,"+2-3";
+		i2c_pins_28_29 =	<0>,"+2-3";
+		addr =			<&adv728x>,"reg:0";
 	};
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/adv728x-m-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// Definitions for Analog Devices ADV728[0|1|2]-M video to CSI2 bridges on VC
+// I2C bus
+
+#include "adv7282m-overlay.dts"
+
+/{
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	// Fragment numbers deliberately high to avoid conflicts with the
+	// included adv7282m overlay file.
+
+	fragment@101 {
+		target = <&adv728x>;
+		__dormant__ {
+			compatible = "adi,adv7280-m";
+		};
+	};
+	fragment@102 {
+		target = <&adv728x>;
+		__dormant__ {
+			compatible = "adi,adv7281-m";
+		};
+	};
+	fragment@103 {
+		target = <&adv728x>;
+		__dormant__ {
+			compatible = "adi,adv7281-ma";
+		};
+	};
+
+	__overrides__ {
+		adv7280m = <0>, "+101";
+		adv7281m = <0>, "+102";
+		adv7281ma = <0>, "+103";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/audioinjector-ultra-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// Definitions for audioinjector.net audio add on soundcard
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		target = <&i2s>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@1 {
+		target = <&i2c1>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+			status = "okay";
+
+			cs4265: cs4265@4e {
+				#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
+				compatible = "cirrus,cs4265";
+				reg = <0x4e>;
+				reset-gpios = <&gpio 5 0>;
+				status = "okay";
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@2 {
+		target = <&sound>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			compatible = "simple-audio-card";
+			i2s-controller = <&i2s>;
+			status = "okay";
+
+			simple-audio-card,name = "audioinjector-ultra";
+
+			simple-audio-card,widgets =
+				"Line", "OUTPUTS",
+				"Line", "INPUTS";
+
+			simple-audio-card,routing =
+				"OUTPUTS","LINEOUTL",
+				"OUTPUTS","LINEOUTR",
+				"OUTPUTS","SPDIFOUT",
+				"LINEINL","INPUTS",
+				"LINEINR","INPUTS",
+				"MICL","INPUTS",
+				"MICR","INPUTS";
+
+			simple-audio-card,format = "i2s";
+
+			simple-audio-card,bitclock-master = <&sound_master>;
+			simple-audio-card,frame-master = <&sound_master>;
+
+			simple-audio-card,cpu {
+				sound-dai = <&i2s>;
+				dai-tdm-slot-num = <2>;
+				dai-tdm-slot-width = <32>;
+			};
+
+			sound_master: simple-audio-card,codec {
+				sound-dai = <&cs4265>;
+				system-clock-frequency = <12288000>;
+			};
+		};
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/gpio-fan-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Overlay for the Raspberry Pi GPIO Fan @ BCM GPIO12.
+ * References: 
+ *	- https://www.raspberrypi.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=107&p=1367135#p1365084
+ *
+ * Optional parameters:
+ *	- "gpiopin"	- BCM number of the pin driving the fan, default 12 (GPIO12);
+ * 	- "temp"	- CPU temperature at which fan is started in millicelsius, default 55000;
+ *
+ * Requires:
+ *	- kernel configurations: CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN=m;
+ *	- kernel rebuild;
+ *	- N-MOSFET connected to gpiopin, 2N7002-[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2N7000];
+ *	- DC Fan connected to N-MOSFET Drain terminal, a 12V fan is working fine and quite silently;
+ *	  [https://www.tme.eu/en/details/ee40101s1-999-a/dc12v-fans/sunon/ee40101s1-1000u-999/]
+ *
+ *                   ┌─────────────────────┐
+ *                   │Fan negative terminal│
+ *                   └┬────────────────────┘
+ *                    │D
+ *             G   │──┘
+ * [GPIO12]──────┤ │<─┐  2N7002
+ *                 │──┤
+ *                    │S
+ *                   ─┴─
+ *                   GND
+ *
+ * Build:
+ * 	- `sudo dtc -W no-unit_address_vs_reg -@ -I dts -O dtb -o /boot/overlays/gpio-fan.dtbo gpio-fan-overlay.dts`
+ * Activate:
+ *	- sudo nano /boot/config.txt add "dtoverlay=gpio-fan" or "dtoverlay=gpio-fan,gpiopin=12,temp=45000"
+ *	 or
+ *	- sudo sh -c 'printf "\n# Enable PI GPIO-Fan Default\ndtoverlay=gpio-fan\n" >> /boot/config.txt'
+ *	- sudo sh -c 'printf "\n# Enable PI GPIO-Fan Custom\ntoverlay=gpio-fan,gpiopin=12,temp=45000\n" >> /boot/config.txt'
+ *
+ */
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2708";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		target-path = "/";
+		__overlay__ {
+			fan0: gpio-fan@0 {
+				compatible = "gpio-fan";
+				gpios = <&gpio 12 1>;
+				gpio-fan,speed-map = <0    0>,
+									 <5000 1>;
+				#cooling-cells = <2>;
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@1 {
+		target = <&cpu_thermal>;
+		polling-delay = <2000>;	/* milliseconds */
+		__overlay__ {
+			trips {
+				cpu_hot: trip-point@0 {
+					temperature = <55000>;	/* (millicelsius) Fan started at 55°C */
+					hysteresis = <10000>;	/* (millicelsius) Fan stopped at 45°C */
+					type = "active";
+				};
+			};
+			cooling-maps {
+				map0 {
+					trip = <&cpu_hot>;
+					cooling-device = <&fan0 1 1>;
+				};
+			};
+		};
+	};
+	__overrides__ {
+		gpiopin = <&fan0>,"gpios:4", <&fan0>,"brcm,pins:0";
+		temp = <&cpu_hot>,"temperature:0";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/gpio-no-bank0-irq-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2835";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		// Configure the gpio pin controller
+		target = <&gpio>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			    interrupts = <255 255>, <2 18>;
+		};
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/hy28b-2017-overlay.dts

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Device Tree overlay for HY28b display shield by Texy.
+ * Modified for 2017 version with ILI9325 D chip
+ */
+
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+/ {
+	compatible = "brcm,bcm2835", "brcm,bcm2708", "brcm,bcm2709";
+
+	fragment@0 {
+		target = <&spi0>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			status = "okay";
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@1 {
+		target = <&spidev0>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@2 {
+		target = <&spidev1>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			status = "disabled";
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@3 {
+		target = <&gpio>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			hy28b_pins: hy28b_pins {
+				brcm,pins = <17 25 18>;
+				brcm,function = <0 1 1>; /* in out out */
+			};
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@4 {
+		target = <&spi0>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			/* needed to avoid dtc warning */
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <0>;
+
+			hy28b: hy28b@0{
+				compatible = "ilitek,ili9325";
+				reg = <0>;
+				pinctrl-names = "default";
+				pinctrl-0 = <&hy28b_pins>;
+
+				spi-max-frequency = <48000000>;
+				spi-cpol;
+				spi-cpha;
+				rotate = <270>;
+				bgr;
+				fps = <50>;
+				buswidth = <8>;
+				startbyte = <0x70>;
+				reset-gpios = <&gpio 25 0>;
+				led-gpios = <&gpio 18 1>;
+
+				init = <0x10000e5 0x78F0
+					0x1000001 0x0100
+					0x1000002 0x0700
+				        0x1000003 0x1030
+					0x1000004 0x0000
+					0x1000008 0x0207
+					0x1000009 0x0000
+				        0x100000a 0x0000
+					0x100000c 0x0000
+					0x100000d 0x0000
+					0x100000f 0x0000
+				        0x1000010 0x0000
+					0x1000011 0x0007
+					0x1000012 0x0000
+					0x1000013 0x0000
+					0x1000007 0x0001
+				        0x2000032
+				        0x2000032
+				        0x2000032
+				        0x2000032
+					0x1000010 0x1090
+					0x1000011 0x0227
+				        0x2000032
+					0x1000012 0x001f
+				        0x2000032
+				        0x1000013 0x1500
+					0x1000029 0x0027
+					0x100002b 0x000d
+				        0x2000032
+				        0x1000020 0x0000
+					0x1000021 0x0000
+				        0x2000032
+					0x1000030 0x0000
+					0x1000031 0x0707
+					0x1000032 0x0307
+					0x1000035 0x0200
+					0x1000036 0x0008
+					0x1000037 0x0004
+					0x1000038 0x0000
+					0x1000039 0x0707
+					0x100003c 0x0002
+					0x100003d 0x1d04
+					0x1000050 0x0000
+				        0x1000051 0x00ef
+					0x1000052 0x0000
+					0x1000053 0x013f
+					0x1000060 0xa700
+				        0x1000061 0x0001
+					0x100006a 0x0000
+					0x1000080 0x0000
+					0x1000081 0x0000
+				        0x1000082 0x0000
+					0x1000083 0x0000
+					0x1000084 0x0000
+					0x1000085 0x0000
+				        0x1000090 0x0010
+					0x1000092 0x0600
+					0x1000007 0x0133>;
+				debug = <0>;
+			};
+
+			hy28b_ts: hy28b-ts@1 {
+				compatible = "ti,ads7846";
+				reg = <1>;
+
+				spi-max-frequency = <2000000>;
+				interrupts = <17 2>; /* high-to-low edge triggered */
+				interrupt-parent = <&gpio>;
+				pendown-gpio = <&gpio 17 0>;
+				ti,x-plate-ohms = /bits/ 16 <100>;
+				ti,pressure-max = /bits/ 16 <255>;
+			};
+		};
+	};
+	__overrides__ {
+		speed = 	<&hy28b>,"spi-max-frequency:0";
+		rotate = 	<&hy28b>,"rotate:0";
+		fps = 		<&hy28b>,"fps:0";
+		debug = 	<&hy28b>,"debug:0";
+		xohms =		<&hy28b_ts>,"ti,x-plate-ohms;0";
+		resetgpio =	<&hy28b>,"reset-gpios:4",
+				<&hy28b_pins>, "brcm,pins:4";
+		ledgpio =	<&hy28b>,"led-gpios:4",
+				<&hy28b_pins>, "brcm,pins:8";
+	};
+};

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/ov5647-overlay.dts

@@ -78,9 +78,17 @@
 		};
 	};
 
+	fragment@5 {
+		target-path="/__overrides__";
+		__overlay__ {
+			cam0-pwdn-ctrl = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:0";
+			cam0-pwdn      = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:4";
+			cam0-led-ctrl  = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:12";
+			cam0-led       = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:16";
+		};
+	};
+
 	__overrides__ {
 		i2c_pins_28_29 = <0>,"+4-5";
-		cam0-pwdn = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:4";
-		cam0-led = <&ov5647>,"pwdn-gpios:16";
 	};
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/pi3-disable-bt-overlay.dts

@@ -37,6 +37,15 @@
 	};
 
 	fragment@3 {
+		target = <&bt_pins>;
+		__overlay__ {
+			brcm,pins;
+			brcm,function;
+			brcm,pull;
+		};
+	};
+
+	fragment@4 {
 		target-path = "/aliases";
 		__overlay__ {
 			serial0 = "/soc/serial@7e201000";

arch/arm/boot/dts/overlays/rpi-poe-overlay.dts

@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@
 		target-path = "/";
 		__overlay__ {
 			fan0: rpi-poe-fan@0 {
-				compatible = "rpi-poe-fan";
+				compatible = "raspberrypi,rpi-poe-fan";
 				firmware = <&firmware>;
 				cooling-min-state = <0>;
-				cooling-max-state = <3>;
+				cooling-max-state = <2>;
 				#cooling-cells = <2>;
-				cooling-levels = <0 50 150 255>;
+				cooling-levels = <0 150 255>;
 				status = "okay";
 			};
 		};
@@ -26,36 +26,38 @@
 		target = <&cpu_thermal>;
 		__overlay__ {
 			trips {
-				threshold: trip-point@0 {
-					temperature = <45000>;
+				trip0: trip0 {
+					temperature = <50000>;
 					hysteresis = <5000>;
 					type = "active";
 				};
-				target: trip-point@1 {
-					temperature = <50000>;
-					hysteresis = <2000>;
-					type = "active";
-				};
-				cpu_hot: cpu_hot@0 {
+				trip1: trip1 {
+
 					temperature = <55000>;
-					hysteresis = <2000>;
+					hysteresis = <5000>;
 					type = "active";
 				};
 			};
 			cooling-maps {
 				map0 {
-					trip = <&threshold>;
+					trip = <&trip0>;
 					cooling-device = <&fan0 0 1>;
 				};
 				map1 {
-					trip = <&target>;
+					trip = <&trip1>;
 					cooling-device = <&fan0 1 2>;
 				};
-				map2 {
-					trip = <&cpu_hot>;
-					cooling-device = <&fan0 2 3>;
-				};
 			};
 		};
 	};
+
+	fragment@2 {
+		target-path = "/__overrides__";
+		__overlay__ {
+			poe_fan_temp0 =		<&trip0>,"temperature:0";
+			poe_fan_temp0_hyst =	<&trip0>,"hysteresis:0";
+			poe_fan_temp1 =		<&trip1>,"temperature:0";
+			poe_fan_temp1_hyst =	<&trip1>,"hysteresis:0";
+		};
+	};
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom-msm8974-lge-nexus5-hammerhead.dts

@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@
 						regulator-max-microvolt = <2950000>;
 
 						regulator-boot-on;
+						regulator-system-load = <200000>;
+						regulator-allow-set-load;
 					};
 
 					l21 {

arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7790.dtsi

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
 
 			trips {
 				cpu-crit {
-					temperature	= <115000>;
+					temperature	= <95000>;
 					hysteresis	= <0>;
 					type		= "critical";
 				};

arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_emac.dtsi

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 			};
 
 			macb1: ethernet@f802c000 {
-				compatible = "cdns,at91sam9260-macb", "cdns,macb";
+				compatible = "atmel,sama5d3-macb", "cdns,at91sam9260-macb", "cdns,macb";
 				reg = <0xf802c000 0x100>;
 				interrupts = <35 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 3>;
 				pinctrl-names = "default";

arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra20.dtsi

@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@
 		phy_type = "ulpi";
 		clocks = <&tegra_car TEGRA20_CLK_USB2>,
 			 <&tegra_car TEGRA20_CLK_PLL_U>,
-			 <&tegra_car TEGRA20_CLK_CDEV2>;
+			 <&tegra_car TEGRA20_CLK_PLL_P_OUT4>;
 		clock-names = "reg", "pll_u", "ulpi-link";
 		resets = <&tegra_car 58>, <&tegra_car 22>;
 		reset-names = "usb", "utmi-pads";

arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra30-cardhu.dtsi

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@
 			#address-cells = <1>;
 			#size-cells = <0>;
 			reg = <0x70>;
+			reset-gpio = <&gpio TEGRA_GPIO(BB, 0) GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 		};
 	};
 

arch/arm/configs/bcm2709_defconfig

@@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2760=m
 CONFIG_BATTERY_GAUGE_LTC2941=m
 CONFIG_HWMON=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_DS1621=m
+CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_JC42=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_LM75=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_RPI_POE_FAN=m
@@ -914,6 +915,7 @@ CONFIG_SND_PISOUND=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU1701=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU7002=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_AK4554=m
+CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4265=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4271_I2C=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_SPDIF=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_WM8804_I2C=m
@@ -927,6 +929,7 @@ CONFIG_HID_APPLE=m
 CONFIG_HID_ASUS=m
 CONFIG_HID_BELKIN=m
 CONFIG_HID_BETOP_FF=m
+CONFIG_HID_BIGBEN_FF=m
 CONFIG_HID_CHERRY=m
 CONFIG_HID_CHICONY=m
 CONFIG_HID_CYPRESS=m
@@ -1001,6 +1004,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_MICROTEK=m
 CONFIG_USBIP_CORE=m
 CONFIG_USBIP_VHCI_HCD=m
 CONFIG_USBIP_HOST=m
+CONFIG_USBIP_VUDC=m
 CONFIG_USB_DWC2=m
 CONFIG_USB_SERIAL=m
 CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_GENERIC=y

arch/arm/configs/bcmrpi_defconfig

@@ -649,6 +649,7 @@ CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2760=m
 CONFIG_BATTERY_GAUGE_LTC2941=m
 CONFIG_HWMON=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_DS1621=m
+CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_JC42=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_LM75=m
 CONFIG_SENSORS_RPI_POE_FAN=m
@@ -907,6 +908,7 @@ CONFIG_SND_PISOUND=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU1701=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_ADAU7002=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_AK4554=m
+CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4265=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_CS4271_I2C=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_SPDIF=m
 CONFIG_SND_SOC_WM8804_I2C=m
@@ -920,6 +922,7 @@ CONFIG_HID_APPLE=m
 CONFIG_HID_ASUS=m
 CONFIG_HID_BELKIN=m
 CONFIG_HID_BETOP_FF=m
+CONFIG_HID_BIGBEN_FF=m
 CONFIG_HID_CHERRY=m
 CONFIG_HID_CHICONY=m
 CONFIG_HID_CYPRESS=m
@@ -994,6 +997,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_MICROTEK=m
 CONFIG_USBIP_CORE=m
 CONFIG_USBIP_VHCI_HCD=m
 CONFIG_USBIP_HOST=m
+CONFIG_USBIP_VUDC=m
 CONFIG_USB_DWC2=m
 CONFIG_USB_SERIAL=m
 CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_GENERIC=y

arch/arm/configs/imx_v4_v5_defconfig

@@ -144,9 +144,11 @@ CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
 CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA=y
 CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_UDC=y
 CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_HOST=y
+CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_ULPI=y
 CONFIG_NOP_USB_XCEIV=y
 CONFIG_USB_GADGET=y
 CONFIG_USB_ETH=m
+CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS=y
 CONFIG_MMC=y
 CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=y
 CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=y

arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h

@@ -447,11 +447,23 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 	.size \name , . - \name
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	csdb
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+	.inst.w	0xf3af8014
+#else
+	.inst	0xe320f014
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 	.macro check_uaccess, addr:req, size:req, limit:req, tmp:req, bad:req
 #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS
 	adds	\tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
 	sbcccs	\tmp, \tmp, \limit
 	bcs	\bad
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	movcs	\addr, #0
+	csdb
+#endif
 #endif
 	.endm
 

arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h

@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@
 #define isb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("isb " #option : : : "memory")
 #define dsb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("dsb " #option : : : "memory")
 #define dmb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("dmb " #option : : : "memory")
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+#define CSDB	".inst.w 0xf3af8014"
+#else
+#define CSDB	".inst	0xe320f014"
+#endif
+#define csdb() __asm__ __volatile__(CSDB : : : "memory")
 #elif defined(CONFIG_CPU_XSC3) || __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ == 6
 #define isb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("mcr p15, 0, %0, c7, c5, 4" \
 				    : : "r" (0) : "memory")
@@ -37,6 +43,13 @@
 #define dmb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : : "memory")
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CSDB
+#define CSDB
+#endif
+#ifndef csdb
+#define csdb()
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_HEAVY_MB
 extern void (*soc_mb)(void);
 extern void arm_heavy_mb(void);
@@ -63,6 +76,25 @@ extern void arm_heavy_mb(void);
 #define __smp_rmb()	__smp_mb()
 #define __smp_wmb()	dmb(ishst)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx,
+						    unsigned long sz)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	asm volatile(
+		"cmp	%1, %2\n"
+	"	sbc	%0, %1, %1\n"
+	CSDB
+	: "=r" (mask)
+	: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
+	: "cc");
+
+	return mask;
+}
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+#endif
+
 #include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
 
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */

arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H
 #define __ASM_BUGS_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
-#define check_bugs() check_writebuffer_bugs()
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+extern void check_bugs(void);
+extern void check_other_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
+#define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #endif

arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h

@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
 #define __write_sysreg(v, r, w, c, t)	asm volatile(w " " c : : "r" ((t)(v)))
 #define write_sysreg(v, ...)		__write_sysreg(v, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+#define BPIALL				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 6)
+#define ICIALLU				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 0)
+
 extern unsigned long cr_alignment;	/* defined in entry-armv.S */
 
 static inline unsigned long get_cr(void)

arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h

@@ -77,8 +77,16 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12		0x4100c0d0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17		0x4100c0e0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15		0x4100c0f0
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A53		0x4100d030
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57		0x4100d070
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72		0x4100d080
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73		0x4100d090
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75		0x4100d0a0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_MASK		0xff00fff0
 
+/* Broadcom cores */
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15		0x420000f0
+
 /* DEC implemented cores */
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_SA1100		0x4400a110
 

arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h

@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu;
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init[];
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init_end[];
 
-extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
-
 extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm *kvm);

arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/kvm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
@@ -298,8 +299,17 @@ int kvm_arm_vcpu_arch_has_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
 {
-	/* No way to detect it yet, pretend it is not there. */
-	return false;
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+		return true;
+#endif
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 #define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1

arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h

@@ -246,7 +246,28 @@ static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
 
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
-	return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
+	}
+
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv);
+	}
+#endif
+	default:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	}
+	}
 }
 
 static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)

arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h

@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ extern struct processor {
 	 * Set up any processor specifics
 	 */
 	void (*_proc_init)(void);
+	/*
+	 * Check for processor bugs
+	 */
+	void (*check_bugs)(void);
 	/*
 	 * Disable any processor specifics
 	 */

arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/irqflags.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
 
 extern void cpu_init(void);
 
@@ -15,6 +16,20 @@ void soft_restart(unsigned long);
 extern void (*arm_pm_restart)(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *cmd);
 extern void (*arm_pm_idle)(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+typedef void (*harden_branch_predictor_fn_t)(void);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
+static inline void harden_branch_predictor(void)
+{
+	harden_branch_predictor_fn_t fn = per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn,
+						  smp_processor_id());
+	if (fn)
+		fn();
+}
+#else
+#define harden_branch_predictor() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 #define UDBG_UNDEFINED	(1 << 0)
 #define UDBG_SYSCALL	(1 << 1)
 #define UDBG_BADABORT	(1 << 2)

arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h

@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ struct user_vfp_exc;
 
 extern int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
 					   struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
-extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
-				    struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
+extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *,
+				    struct user_vfp_exc *);
 #endif
 
 /*

arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h

@@ -84,6 +84,13 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 		: "cc"); \
 	flag; })
 
+/*
+ * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
+ * that type, or otherwise unsigned long long.
+ */
+#define __inttype(x) \
+	__typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
+
 /*
  * Single-value transfer routines.  They automatically use the right
  * size if we just have the right pointer type.  Note that the functions
@@ -153,7 +160,7 @@ extern int __get_user_64t_4(void *);
 	({								\
 		unsigned long __limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit - 1; \
 		register const typeof(*(p)) __user *__p asm("r0") = (p);\
-		register typeof(x) __r2 asm("r2");			\
+		register __inttype(x) __r2 asm("r2");			\
 		register unsigned long __l asm("r1") = __limit;		\
 		register int __e asm("r0");				\
 		unsigned int __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();	\
@@ -243,6 +250,16 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 #define user_addr_max() \
 	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : get_fs())
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+/*
+ * When mitigating Spectre variant 1, it is not worth fixing the non-
+ * verifying accessors, because we need to add verification of the
+ * address space there.  Force these to use the standard get_user()
+ * version instead.
+ */
+#define __get_user(x, ptr) get_user(x, ptr)
+#else
+
 /*
  * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the
  * address space - it must have been done previously with a separate
@@ -259,12 +276,6 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 	__gu_err;							\
 })
 
-#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err)					\
-({									\
-	__get_user_err((x), (ptr), err);				\
-	(void) 0;							\
-})
-
 #define __get_user_err(x, ptr, err)					\
 do {									\
 	unsigned long __gu_addr = (unsigned long)(ptr);			\
@@ -324,6 +335,7 @@ do {									\
 
 #define __get_user_asm_word(x, addr, err)			\
 	__get_user_asm(x, addr, err, ldr)
+#endif
 
 
 #define __put_user_switch(x, ptr, __err, __fn)				\

arch/arm/kernel/Makefile

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ else
 obj-y		+= entry-armv.o
 endif
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)		+= bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_IDLE)		+= cpuidle.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API)	+= dma.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_FIQ)		+= fiq.o fiqasm.o

arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
+
+void check_other_bugs(void)
+{
+#ifdef MULTI_CPU
+	if (processor.check_bugs)
+		processor.check_bugs();
+#endif
+}
+
+void __init check_bugs(void)
+{
+	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+	check_other_bugs();
+}

arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S

@@ -241,9 +241,7 @@ local_restart:
 	tst	r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	badr	lr, ret_fast_syscall		@ return address
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, ret_fast_syscall
 
 	add	r1, sp, #S_OFF
 2:	cmp	scno, #(__ARM_NR_BASE - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
@@ -277,14 +275,8 @@ __sys_trace:
 	mov	r1, scno
 	add	r0, sp, #S_OFF
 	bl	syscall_trace_enter
-
-	badr	lr, __sys_trace_return		@ return address
-	mov	scno, r0			@ syscall number (possibly new)
-	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
-	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ and update the stack args
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	mov	scno, r0
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, __sys_trace_return, reload=1
 	cmp	scno, #-1			@ skip the syscall?
 	bne	2b
 	add	sp, sp, #S_OFF			@ restore stack
@@ -362,6 +354,10 @@ sys_syscall:
 		bic	scno, r0, #__NR_OABI_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmp	scno, #__NR_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmpne	scno, #NR_syscalls	@ check range
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+		movhs	scno, #0
+		csdb
+#endif
 		stmloia	sp, {r5, r6}		@ shuffle args
 		movlo	r0, r1
 		movlo	r1, r2

arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S

@@ -378,6 +378,31 @@
 #endif
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	invoke_syscall, table, nr, tmp, ret, reload=0
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	mov	\tmp, \nr
+	cmp	\tmp, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	movcs	\tmp, #0
+	csdb
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \tmp, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#else
+	cmp	\nr, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \nr, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 /*
  * These are the registers used in the syscall handler, and allow us to
  * have in theory up to 7 arguments to a function - r0 to r6.

arch/arm/kernel/signal.c

@@ -149,22 +149,18 @@ static int preserve_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame)
 
 static int restore_vfp_context(char __user **auxp)
 {
-	struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame =
-		(struct vfp_sigframe __user *)*auxp;
-	unsigned long magic;
-	unsigned long size;
-	int err = 0;
-
-	__get_user_error(magic, &frame->magic, err);
-	__get_user_error(size, &frame->size, err);
+	struct vfp_sigframe frame;
+	int err;
 
+	err = __copy_from_user(&frame, *auxp, sizeof(frame));
 	if (err)
-		return -EFAULT;
-	if (magic != VFP_MAGIC || size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
+		return err;
+
+	if (frame.magic != VFP_MAGIC || frame.size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*auxp += size;
-	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame->ufp, &frame->ufp_exc);
+	*auxp += sizeof(frame);
+	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame.ufp, &frame.ufp_exc);
 }
 
 #endif
@@ -184,6 +180,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe {
 
 static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigframe __user *sf)
 {
+	struct sigcontext context;
 	char __user *aux;
 	sigset_t set;
 	int err;
@@ -192,23 +189,26 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigframe __user *sf)
 	if (err == 0)
 		set_current_blocked(&set);
 
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r0, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r0, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r1, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r1, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r2, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r2, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r3, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r3, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r4, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r4, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r5, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r5, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r6, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r6, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r7, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r7, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r8, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r8, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r9, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r9, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r10, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r10, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_fp, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_fp, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_ip, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_ip, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_sp, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_sp, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_lr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_lr, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_pc, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_cpsr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_cpsr, err);
+	err |= __copy_from_user(&context, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext, sizeof(context));
+	if (err == 0) {
+		regs->ARM_r0 = context.arm_r0;
+		regs->ARM_r1 = context.arm_r1;
+		regs->ARM_r2 = context.arm_r2;
+		regs->ARM_r3 = context.arm_r3;
+		regs->ARM_r4 = context.arm_r4;
+		regs->ARM_r5 = context.arm_r5;
+		regs->ARM_r6 = context.arm_r6;
+		regs->ARM_r7 = context.arm_r7;
+		regs->ARM_r8 = context.arm_r8;
+		regs->ARM_r9 = context.arm_r9;
+		regs->ARM_r10 = context.arm_r10;
+		regs->ARM_fp = context.arm_fp;
+		regs->ARM_ip = context.arm_ip;
+		regs->ARM_sp = context.arm_sp;
+		regs->ARM_lr = context.arm_lr;
+		regs->ARM_pc = context.arm_pc;
+		regs->ARM_cpsr = context.arm_cpsr;
+	}
 
 	err |= !valid_user_regs(regs);
 

arch/arm/kernel/smp.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
@@ -402,6 +403,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 * before we continue - which happens after __cpu_up returns.
 	 */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
+
+	check_other_bugs();
+
 	complete(&cpu_running);
 
 	local_irq_enable();

arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/idmap.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ int cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg, int (*fn)(unsigned long))
 		cpu_switch_mm(mm->pgd, mm);
 		local_flush_bp_all();
 		local_flush_tlb_all();
+		check_other_bugs();
 	}
 
 	return ret;

arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c

@@ -329,9 +329,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	err = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op,  &tsops->sem_op,  err);
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
+		struct oabi_sembuf osb;
+		err |= __copy_from_user(&osb, tsops, sizeof(osb));
+		sops[i].sem_num = osb.sem_num;
+		sops[i].sem_op = osb.sem_op;
+		sops[i].sem_flg = osb.sem_flg;
 		tsops++;
 	}
 	if (timeout) {

arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  * Foundation, 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301, USA.
  */
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
@@ -71,6 +72,90 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector:
 	W(b)	hyp_irq
 	W(b)	hyp_fiq
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	.align 5
+__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv:
+	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv
+
+	/*
+	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
+	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
+	 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
+	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
+
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 0	/* ICIALLU */
+	isb
+
+	b	decode_vectors
+
+	.align 5
+__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
+	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv
+
+	/*
+	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
+	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
+	 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
+	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
+
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	/* BPIALL */
+	isb
+
+decode_vectors:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+	/*
+	 * Yet another silly hack: Use VPIDR as a temp register.
+	 * Thumb2 is really a pain, as SP cannot be used with most
+	 * of the bitwise instructions. The vect_br macro ensures
+	 * things gets cleaned-up.
+	 */
+	mcr	p15, 4, r0, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
+	mov	r0, sp
+	and	r0, r0, #7
+	sub	sp, sp, r0
+	push	{r1, r2}
+	mov	r1, r0
+	mrc	p15, 4, r0, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
+	mrc	p15, 0, r2, c0, c0, 0	/* MIDR  */
+	mcr	p15, 4, r2, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
+#endif
+
+.macro vect_br val, targ
+ARM(	eor	sp, sp, #\val	)
+ARM(	tst	sp, #7		)
+ARM(	eorne	sp, sp, #\val	)
+
+THUMB(	cmp	r1, #\val	)
+THUMB(	popeq	{r1, r2}	)
+
+	beq	\targ
+.endm
+
+	vect_br	0, hyp_fiq
+	vect_br	1, hyp_irq
+	vect_br	2, hyp_hvc
+	vect_br	3, hyp_dabt
+	vect_br	4, hyp_pabt
+	vect_br	5, hyp_svc
+	vect_br	6, hyp_undef
+	vect_br	7, hyp_reset
+#endif
+
 .macro invalid_vector label, cause
 	.align
 \label:	mov	r0, #\cause
@@ -118,7 +203,7 @@ hyp_hvc:
 	lsr     r2, r2, #16
 	and     r2, r2, #0xff
 	cmp     r2, #0
-	bne	guest_trap		@ Guest called HVC
+	bne	guest_hvc_trap		@ Guest called HVC
 
 	/*
 	 * Getting here means host called HVC, we shift parameters and branch
@@ -149,7 +234,14 @@ hyp_hvc:
 	bx	ip
 
 1:
-	push	{lr}
+	/*
+	 * Pushing r2 here is just a way of keeping the stack aligned to
+	 * 8 bytes on any path that can trigger a HYP exception. Here,
+	 * we may well be about to jump into the guest, and the guest
+	 * exit would otherwise be badly decoded by our fancy
+	 * "decode-exception-without-a-branch" code...
+	 */
+	push	{r2, lr}
 
 	mov	lr, r0
 	mov	r0, r1
@@ -159,7 +251,21 @@ hyp_hvc:
 THUMB(	orr	lr, #1)
 	blx	lr			@ Call the HYP function
 
-	pop	{lr}
+	pop	{r2, lr}
+	eret
+
+guest_hvc_trap:
+	movw	r2, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r2, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	ldr	r0, [sp]		@ Guest's r0
+	teq	r0, r2
+	bne	guest_trap
+	add	sp, sp, #12
+	@ Returns:
+	@ r0 = 0
+	@ r1 = HSR value (perfectly predictable)
+	@ r2 = ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	mov	r0, #0
 	eret
 
 guest_trap:

arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S

@@ -91,6 +91,15 @@
 
 ENTRY(__copy_from_user_std)
 WEAK(arm_copy_from_user)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	get_thread_info r3
+	ldr	r3, [r3, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
+	adds	ip, r1, r2	@ ip=addr+size
+	sub	r3, r3, #1	@ addr_limit - 1
+	cmpcc	ip, r3		@ if (addr+size > addr_limit - 1)
+	movcs	r1, #0		@ addr = NULL
+	csdb
+#endif
 
 #include "copy_template.S"
 

arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c

@@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ static struct gpiod_lookup_table mmc_gpios_table = {
 		GPIO_LOOKUP("davinci_gpio.0", DA850_MMCSD_CD_PIN, "cd",
 			    GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),
 		GPIO_LOOKUP("davinci_gpio.0", DA850_MMCSD_WP_PIN, "wp",
-			    GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW),
+			    GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH),
 	},
 };
 

arch/arm/mach-exynos/suspend.c

@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ static int __init exynos_pmu_irq_init(struct device_node *node,
 					  NULL);
 	if (!domain) {
 		iounmap(pmu_base_addr);
+		pmu_base_addr = NULL;
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 

arch/arm/mach-hisi/hotplug.c

@@ -148,13 +148,20 @@ static int hi3xxx_hotplug_init(void)
 	struct device_node *node;
 
 	node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "hisilicon,sysctrl");
-	if (node) {
-		ctrl_base = of_iomap(node, 0);
-		id = HI3620_CTRL;
-		return 0;
+	if (!node) {
+		id = ERROR_CTRL;
+		return -ENOENT;
 	}
-	id = ERROR_CTRL;
-	return -ENOENT;
+
+	ctrl_base = of_iomap(node, 0);
+	of_node_put(node);
+	if (!ctrl_base) {
+		id = ERROR_CTRL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	id = HI3620_CTRL;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void hi3xxx_set_cpu(int cpu, bool enable)
@@ -173,11 +180,15 @@ static bool hix5hd2_hotplug_init(void)
 	struct device_node *np;
 
 	np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "hisilicon,cpuctrl");
-	if (np) {
-		ctrl_base = of_iomap(np, 0);
-		return true;
-	}
-	return false;
+	if (!np)
+		return false;
+
+	ctrl_base = of_iomap(np, 0);
+	of_node_put(np);
+	if (!ctrl_base)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 void hix5hd2_set_cpu(int cpu, bool enable)
@@ -219,10 +230,10 @@ void hip01_set_cpu(int cpu, bool enable)
 
 	if (!ctrl_base) {
 		np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "hisilicon,hip01-sysctrl");
-		if (np)
-			ctrl_base = of_iomap(np, 0);
-		else
-			BUG();
+		BUG_ON(!np);
+		ctrl_base = of_iomap(np, 0);
+		of_node_put(np);
+		BUG_ON(!ctrl_base);
 	}
 
 	if (enable) {

arch/arm/mach-mvebu/pmsu.c

@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ void mvebu_pmsu_set_cpu_boot_addr(int hw_cpu, void *boot_addr)
 		PMSU_BOOT_ADDR_REDIRECT_OFFSET(hw_cpu));
 }
 
-extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_start;
-extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_end;
+extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_start[];
+extern unsigned char mvebu_boot_wa_end[];
 
 /*
  * This function sets up the boot address workaround needed for SMP
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int mvebu_setup_boot_addr_wa(unsigned int crypto_eng_target,
 			     phys_addr_t resume_addr_reg)
 {
 	void __iomem *sram_virt_base;
-	u32 code_len = &mvebu_boot_wa_end - &mvebu_boot_wa_start;
+	u32 code_len = mvebu_boot_wa_end - mvebu_boot_wa_start;
 
 	mvebu_mbus_del_window(BOOTROM_BASE, BOOTROM_SIZE);
 	mvebu_mbus_add_window_by_id(crypto_eng_target, crypto_eng_attribute,

arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-smp.c

@@ -109,6 +109,45 @@ void omap5_erratum_workaround_801819(void)
 static inline void omap5_erratum_workaround_801819(void) { }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+/*
+ * Configure ACR and enable ACTLR[0] (Enable invalidates of BTB with
+ * ICIALLU) to activate the workaround for secondary Core.
+ * NOTE: it is assumed that the primary core's configuration is done
+ * by the boot loader (kernel will detect a misconfiguration and complain
+ * if this is not done).
+ *
+ * In General Purpose(GP) devices, ACR bit settings can only be done
+ * by ROM code in "secure world" using the smc call and there is no
+ * option to update the "firmware" on such devices. This also works for
+ * High security(HS) devices, as a backup option in case the
+ * "update" is not done in the "security firmware".
+ */
+static void omap5_secondary_harden_predictor(void)
+{
+	u32 acr, acr_mask;
+
+	asm volatile ("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (acr));
+
+	/*
+	 * ACTLR[0] (Enable invalidates of BTB with ICIALLU)
+	 */
+	acr_mask = BIT(0);
+
+	/* Do we already have it done.. if yes, skip expensive smc */
+	if ((acr & acr_mask) == acr_mask)
+		return;
+
+	acr |= acr_mask;
+	omap_smc1(OMAP5_DRA7_MON_SET_ACR_INDEX, acr);
+
+	pr_debug("%s: ARM ACR setup for CVE_2017_5715 applied on CPU%d\n",
+		 __func__, smp_processor_id());
+}
+#else
+static inline void omap5_secondary_harden_predictor(void) { }
+#endif
+
 static void omap4_secondary_init(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	/*
@@ -131,6 +170,8 @@ static void omap4_secondary_init(unsigned int cpu)
 		set_cntfreq();
 		/* Configure ACR to disable streaming WA for 801819 */
 		omap5_erratum_workaround_801819();
+		/* Enable ACR to allow for ICUALLU workaround */
+		omap5_secondary_harden_predictor();
 	}
 
 	/*

arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap_hwmod_reset.c

@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ static void omap_rtc_wait_not_busy(struct omap_hwmod *oh)
  */
 void omap_hwmod_rtc_unlock(struct omap_hwmod *oh)
 {
-	local_irq_disable();
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
 	omap_rtc_wait_not_busy(oh);
 	omap_hwmod_write(OMAP_RTC_KICK0_VALUE, oh, OMAP_RTC_KICK0_REG);
 	omap_hwmod_write(OMAP_RTC_KICK1_VALUE, oh, OMAP_RTC_KICK1_REG);
-	local_irq_enable();
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -110,9 +112,11 @@ void omap_hwmod_rtc_unlock(struct omap_hwmod *oh)
  */
 void omap_hwmod_rtc_lock(struct omap_hwmod *oh)
 {
-	local_irq_disable();
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
 	omap_rtc_wait_not_busy(oh);
 	omap_hwmod_write(0x0, oh, OMAP_RTC_KICK0_REG);
 	omap_hwmod_write(0x0, oh, OMAP_RTC_KICK1_REG);
-	local_irq_enable();
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }

arch/arm/mach-pxa/irq.c

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int pxa_irq_suspend(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < pxa_internal_irq_nr / 32; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(pxa_internal_irq_nr, 32); i++) {
 		void __iomem *base = irq_base(i);
 
 		saved_icmr[i] = __raw_readl(base + ICMR);
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void pxa_irq_resume(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < pxa_internal_irq_nr / 32; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(pxa_internal_irq_nr, 32); i++) {
 		void __iomem *base = irq_base(i);
 
 		__raw_writel(saved_icmr[i], base + ICMR);

arch/arm/mach-rockchip/Kconfig

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ config ARCH_ROCKCHIP
 	select ARM_GLOBAL_TIMER
 	select CLKSRC_ARM_GLOBAL_TIMER_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select ZONE_DMA if ARM_LPAE
+	select PM
 	help
 	  Support for Rockchip's Cortex-A9 Single-to-Quad-Core-SoCs
 	  containing the RK2928, RK30xx and RK31xx series.

arch/arm/mm/Kconfig

@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ config CPU_V7
 	select CPU_CP15_MPU if !MMU
 	select CPU_HAS_ASID if MMU
 	select CPU_PABRT_V7
+	select CPU_SPECTRE if MMU
 	select CPU_THUMB_CAPABLE
 	select CPU_TLB_V7 if MMU
 
@@ -826,6 +827,28 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 	help
 	  Say Y here to disable branch prediction.  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CPU_SPECTRE
+	bool
+
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
+	depends on CPU_SPECTRE
+	default y
+	help
+	   Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely
+	   on being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim
+	   context by executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.
+	   Such attacks can be partially mitigated against by clearing
+	   internal branch predictor state and limiting the prediction
+	   logic in some situations.
+
+	   This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden
+	   the branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on
+	   specific instruction sequences or control bits being set by
+	   the system firmware.
+
+	   If unsure, say Y.
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS

arch/arm/mm/Makefile

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_MOHAWK)	+= proc-mohawk.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FEROCEON)	+= proc-feroceon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6)		+= proc-v6.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6K)		+= proc-v6.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o proc-v7-bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7M)		+= proc-v7m.o
 
 AFLAGS_proc-v6.o	:=-Wa,-march=armv6

arch/arm/mm/fault.c

@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
 {
 	struct siginfo si;
 
+	if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
+		harden_branch_predictor();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
 	if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
 	    ((user_debug & UDBG_BUS)  && (sig == SIGBUS))) {

arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c

@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ void pci_ioremap_set_mem_type(int mem_type)
 
 int pci_ioremap_io(unsigned int offset, phys_addr_t phys_addr)
 {
-	BUG_ON(offset + SZ_64K > IO_SPACE_LIMIT);
+	BUG_ON(offset + SZ_64K - 1 > IO_SPACE_LIMIT);
 
 	return ioremap_page_range(PCI_IO_VIRT_BASE + offset,
 				  PCI_IO_VIRT_BASE + offset + SZ_64K,

arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S

@@ -273,13 +273,14 @@
 	mcr	p15, 0, ip, c7, c10, 4		@ data write barrier
 	.endm
 
-.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0
+.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0, bugs=0
 	.type	\name\()_processor_functions, #object
 	.align 2
 ENTRY(\name\()_processor_functions)
 	.word	\dabort
 	.word	\pabort
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_init
+	.word	\bugs
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_fin
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_reset
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_do_idle